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ABSTRACT
This study is an empirical comparison between statistically recorded and 
unrecorded garment establishments in Shubra El Kheima. The comparison covers three 
main areas: labour, marketing channels and forms of cooperation between establishments.
Within the area of labour, our findings suggest, firstly, that there are no significant 
differences in wages, working conditions and secondary terms of employment between 
workers in recorded and unrecorded establishments. Secondly, that both types of 
establishments recruit most of their labour from the same pool. And thirdly that 
differences in the technology used in the production process are limited. These findings 
challenge some of the assumptions of dual labour market theories.
In the area of marketing channels our findings suggest that there are significant 
differences between the unrecorded and the recorded establishments. The two kinds of 
establishments rely on different kinds of cloth and use different markets for 
dissemination. In both cases there was no evidence of links to export markets. These 
findings suggest that the two types of establishments are part of two different and distinct 
commodity chains. The unrecorded establishments are linked to a global commodity 
chain through imported cloth and import competition. The recorded establishments are 
part of a local commodity chain linking the large textile mills and local retail.
In the area of cooperation, our findings suggest that there is a significant level of 
horizontal cooperation between the unrecorded establishments. This type of cooperation 
was found to be lacking in the case of the recorded establishments. The findings also 
suggest that although Shubra El-Kheima has a concentration of firms at each stage of the 
textile and garment industry, there are no backward linkages between the private garment 
producers and the local textile industry.
Finally, our findings suggest that a combination of intense import competition 
coupled with policy restrictions on legally imported cloth, have prevented the emergence 
of an industrial cluster in Shubra El-Kheima, with the varieties of vertical and horizontal 
cooperation associated with successful clusters in other developing cities.
2
Acknowledgements
This dissertation would not have been completed if it were not for the 
insurmountable support of my family, my supervisor and numerous friends.
First and for most, I am indebted to the people of Shubra El Kheima who gave me 
from their valuable time and knowledge, what made this thesis what it is. They were 
ready to sit and talk and to explain a lot of things that made the bulk of my research 
findings.
My supervisor Nigel Harris, was very patient and giving on both a personal and 
academic level. His continuous support and encouragement, our long talks and his sharp 
comments left their imprints on both the text and myself.
Equal appreciation goes to my family for their care and love that manifested itself 
way before I began this project and throughout doing it. My gratitude to my grandmother 
Isis is beyond words.
Many friends around the globe carried me through the tough moments of writing, 
and helped make this research complete. Lamia Bulbul was always there to help, 
sometimes even before I asked. Heba Helmy’s support and encouragement made writing 
possible. Finally, Anne Alexander who helped me to overcome the obstacle of being in 
Egypt and submitting in London.
The one person without whom this dissertation would never have been completed 
is Rabab El Mahdi. Her love, companionship, encouragement, constant support and 
practical help made it possible for me to get through the final and most difficult stage of 
this project. My love, gratitude and respect for her are boundless.
3
Acronyms
Lower Middle Income (LMI)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)
Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE)
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Gross Domestic Production (GDP)
Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA)
Long Term Arrangement (LTA)
General Agreement for Trade & Tariffs (GATT) 
European Community (EC)
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) 
Global Commodity Chains (GCC)
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Acknowledgements 
List of Tables and 
Diagrams
2
3
8-10
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
1. Research Project 11
2. Significance of the Industry 11
3. Peculiarities of the Egyptian Case 13
4. The Return of the Informal Sector Debate 14
5. From Economies of Scale to External 
Economies 18
6. Overview of the Remaining Chapters 20
CHAPTER TWO THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EGY]
1. Introduction 22
2. Origins of the State Capitalist Project 22
3. Agriculture 23
4. Industry 24
5. The Open Door Policy 26
6. A Continued Crisis 29
7. Economic Reforms 31
8. The Development of the Private Sector Industry 33
9. Failure of Economic Reform Program 35
10. Persistent Features of the Economy 42
5
11. Developments in the Urban Labour Market 46
12. Summary 49
CHAPTER THREE THE WORLD TEXTILE INDUSTRY
1. Introduction 50
2. The Development of Protection 50
3. Trends in World Production and Trade 55
4. Effects of the Phasing Out of the MFA 63
5. Technology 66
6. Informalisation and Changes in 
Concentration of Production
the 70
7. Summary 72
CHAPTER FOUR THE EGYPTIAN TEXTILE AND 
INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
GARME
1. Introduction 74
2. The Traditional Industry 74
3. Birth of the Modem Sector 75
4. The Second World War and The Rise of State Intervention 79
5. Cotton Production and the Textile Industry 80
6. Export Failure 83
7. Summary 87
CHAPTER FIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction 88
2. Dualist Models and the Informal Sector Debate 88
3. Petty Commodity Production 94
6
4. Deconcentration of Production 95
5. A Return to the Putting-Out System 101
6. Clusters 102
7. Subcontracting 106
8. Child Labour 110
9. Summary 113
CHAPTER SIX METHODOLOGY
1. Introduction 115
2. Research Objectives 115
3. Research Strategy 116
4. Characteristics of the Studied Establishments 120
5. Research Design and Methods o f Data „
Collection
6. The Site 123
7. Summary 128
CHAPTER SEVEN LABOUR
1. Introduction 129
2. Features of the Establishments 130
3. Wages and Debt 132
4. Work Contracts, Secondary Terms of ^ g
Employment, and Working Hours
5. Child Labour 142
6. Features of Recruited Labour 144
7. Technology and the Labour Process 148
8. Summary 153
7
List of Interviews 155
CHAPTER EIGHT PRODUCTION AND TRADE
1. Introduction 156
2. Comparing Sources for Raw Materials 156
3. Comparing Marketing Channels 163
4. Forms of Cooperation between Units 169
5. Import Competition 172
6. Summary 175
List of Interviews 177
CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSIONS
Back to the Beginning 178
1. Labour 180
2. Markets 183
3. Global and Local Commodity Chains 185
4. Economic Clusters 188
Further Research 190
BIBLIOGRAPHY 191
8
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Comparative performance of lower middle income (LMI) economies 36
and Egypt, various indices, 1997, 2000, 2001
2.2 Manufactured exports, selected low middle income countries, 1985- 37
1988
2.3 Integration with global economy, selected lower middle income 39
economies
2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), selected years (millions $) 40
2.5 Foreign Direct Investment (selected lower middle income economies) 41
2.6 Employment Growth in the Egyptian Economy, 1988-1998 43
2.7 Growth of Private Sector Non-agricultural Wage Work by Protection 46
Status, 1988-1998
2.8 Distribution of Private Non-agricultural Wage Employment By 47
Industry Group, 1988-1998
3.1 Leading exporters of textiles 57
3.2 Leading exporters of garments 58
3.3 Open-end rotors and shuttleless looms as percentages of total 67
spinning and weaving capacity in selected countries
3.4 World output of cotton, wool, and synthetics 68
3.5 World export market shares of textile and leather machinery 69
4.1 Cotton: cultivated area, production and yield by type and year, 1952- 82
9
1992, selected years
4.2 Textile exports, 1980-1992, selected years (million $) 84
4.3 Geographical distribution of Egyptian textile and garment exports 84
4.4 Market shares of textile exports in EU market: Egypt and a selection 85
of developing countries (2001)
4.5 Market shares of garment exports in EU market: Egypt and a 85
selection of developing countries (2001)
4.6 Market shares of textile exports in US market: Egypt and a selection 86
of developing countries (2001)
4.7 Market shares of garment exports in US market: Egypt and a selection 86
of developing countries (2001)
7.1 Age of establishment 130
7.2 Number of workers 130
7.3 Characteristics of sub group of unrecorded workshops 131
7.4 Characteristics of the recorded factories 132
7.5 Comparing total daily wage rates 133
7.6 Comparing daily wage rates by job (approximate percentage of 134
workers)
7.7 Comparing workers indebtedness to employers 135
7.8 Comparing means of wage payment 136
7.9 Workers with and without contracts in factory sample 138
7.10 Comparing age distribution of workers 143
7.11 Comparison of labour origins 145
10
7.12 Comparing previous employment 145
7.13 Comparing educational attainment 146
7.14 Comparing gender distribution 147
7.15 Comparing gender distribution according to job 148
7.16 Comparing cutting technology 150
7.17 Comparing use of mechanical and electrical sewing machines 151
7.18 Comparing types of irons used 152
8.1 Comparing main sources o f cloth 157
8.2 Comparing main provisions from contractors 164
8.3 Main reasons given for focusing on one contractor 165
Diagram 1 168
8.4 Subjects discussed between owners of unrecorded workshops 171
8.5 Main challenge from illegally imported garments 172
11
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. Research Project
This research project investigates the world of garment production in the Egyptian 
city of Shubra El Kheima. It involves an empirical comparison between formal sector 
factories and informal sector workshops. The main hypothesis of the project is that in 
developing economies such as in the Egyptian case, and with pressures of international 
market competition, the differences between informal and formal sectors are often 
exaggerated. To test this hypothesis, the research will focus on three main areas of 
comparison between formal and informal workshops: 1) labour market, labour costs and 
working conditions; 2) market channels for inputs and outputs; and 3) degrees and forms 
of cooperation and networking between units of production. The aim of this comparative 
study is to establish whether or not there are significant differences between the two types 
of establishments, and to describe and explain such differences if they exist. Through 
doing this, I will shed some light on the dynamics of garment production in Egypt.
In this introduction, I argue the case for three basic points that this research is 
built on. The first is the significance of the subject matter; the textile and garment 
industry in a developing country. The second is the type of comparison, between 
unrecorded “informal” production versus “formal” sector production. And the third is the 
choice of the areas of comparison (labour markets, marketing channels, and cooperation). 
Finally in the last section of the chapter I give an overview of the following chapters of 
this research.
2. Significance of the Industry
The textile and garment industry has played, and continues to play, an important 
role in the process of industrialization worldwide. The central role of the cotton textile 
and garment industry during the industrial revolution in Britain is well documented- 
Hobsbawm has shown how its rate of expansion closely parallels that of the Britisl1 
economy as a whole during the second half of the 18th century (Hobsbawm 1962)- 
Braudel further describes how the British cotton industry began by imitating the Indiat1
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industry, finally catching up and outstripping it. He demonstrates how the cotton 
industry was always aimed at export markets during the industrial revolution, 
representing, by 1800, a quarter of all British exports rising to fifty percent by 1850.
The England of railways and steamships, of heavy equipment which 
required massive capital investment but yielded relatively low profits, 
surely owed its existence to the huge amounts of capital which had already 
accumulated in the country. So even if cotton did not directly influence the 
machine revolution and the coming of heavy metal industry, profits from 
cotton certainly paid the first bills. One cycle propelled the other on its 
way. (Braudel 2002, p.574)
The cotton textile industry has played a similar role in the process of 
industrialization in a number of developing economies too, acting as a leading sector 
especially in the early stages of industrialization. The creation of a mechanized textile 
industry requires relatively modest investments in capital. Its rapid expansion also 
generates demand for the output and development of other industries, such as 
engineering, coal, transport and construction. In this way, as the process of industrial 
development unfolds, capital intensive industries replace cotton as the leading sectors. 
Although the ‘stages’ of industrial development theory greatly simplifies the process and 
is not applicable to every developing economy, there is no doubt that, in a large number 
of cases, the textile and garment industry has played a central role in the early stages of 
industrialization.
This process has been particularly evident over the last three decades, as the rapid 
growth of world trade has further served to stimulate the growth of the cotton textile 
industry and, by extension, the garment industry, in a number of developing countries. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, a number of developing countries were able to begin the export of 
garments with considerable success. In some cases, this initiative then permitted 
countries to develop more general industrialization. In the 1970s, for example, Greece, 
Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Colombia greatly increased 
their export of garments, while in the 1980s several newcomers entered the field. In the 
last half of the 1980s, the growth rates of garment exports in the Philippines, Indonesia
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and Malaysia were respectively 139, 110 and 78 percent. Others, such as Mauritius, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Vietnam, Morocco, and Madagascar, 
followed.
The most extraordinary performance, however, was that of China, which 
increased its garment exports in value six times over in the 1980s, finally reaching 
US$9.7 billion by 1990. In particular markets, other new entrants also had remarkable 
successes. Turkey, by 1995, was set to overtake China in the European market, while 
Mexico moved to displace China in the North American market) having expanded its 
exports from under half a million US dollars in 1970 to $82 million a decade later, $2.9 
billion in 1990 and $6.2 billion in 1995.1 In all these cases there was a correlation 
between extraordinary performance in the garment industry and increased 
industrialization in general. If the textile and garment industry plays such an important 
role, both in the industrialization process and in the integration of developing economies 
into the world market, then an empirical examination of this industry in Egypt can help us 
better understand the record of, and prospects for, economic development in that country.
9. 3. Peculiarities of the Egyptian Case
Two factors would suggest that Egypt should have been one of the developing 
countries to benefit from the boom in textile and garment exports. First, since the 1980s, 
a stated aim of economic policy in Egypt has been the promotion of exports and the 
attraction of foreign investment through a program of economic liberalization. 
Additionally, Egypt has a long history of textile and garment production, encompassing 
all stages of the production process and employing over half a million workers2 with a 
large pool of skills and at internationally competitive wage costs. However, the actual 
record for textile and garment exports from Egypt suggests otherwise.
During the period from 1990 to 2001, the value of Egyptian textile exports as a 
percentage of world textile exports fell from 0.5 percent to 0.2 percent, while the value of 
garment exports as a percentage of world garment exports remained at the low level of 
0.13 percent (Fawzy 2003, p. 11). These results are in line with estimates of revealed
1 Trends in the world textile and garment industry and trade are examined in more detail in chapter 2.
2 This number only includes those that are statistically visible
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comparative advantage (RCA) in the Egyptian textile and garments industry, which fell 
from 7 to 2.9 in the case of textiles and remained stagnant at 1.8 for garments (Fawzy 
2003). The share of Egyptian textile exports in the European market fell from 2.2 percent 
in 1995 to 0.5 percent in 2000. The share of garment exports also fell from 0.4 percent to
0.3 percent in the same period (Fawzy 2003, p.l 1).
Thus, Egypt represents a special case that casts doubt on some of the 
generalizations concerning the role of this industry in the process of global integration. 
The realities of actual economic policies and their outcomes contradict their stated aims 
for a variety of reasons which include the previous structure and history of the industry, 
the national economic context and political and social obstacles. However, the failure of 
exports does not mean that the industry can remain isolated and protected from the world 
market. As will be shown in this study, import competition is an important catalyst in the 
Egyptian case. It is this factor rather than export markets that has forced change in the 
industry. The relevance of the Egyptian case, then, stems from these contradictions and 
peculiarities and helps to shed light on the limits and complexities of processes of global 
economic integration and development.
4. The Return of the Informal Sector Debate
Historically, a large part of the textile and garment industry has been undertaken 
in households or in statistically unrecorded workshops. For obvious reasons, the data 
covering this activity has always been defective. Some authorities have seen macro 
economic reform -  or at least, increased global economic integration -  as promoting, or 
coinciding with, a significant increase in statistically unrecorded or 'informal’ activity. 
For example, the ILO (1996) notes in a report on the textile, clothing and footwear 
industry that 'the number of clandestine workshops has grown exponentially in recent 
years’, and suggests that for the 24 million workers recorded as employed in these three 
industries in developing countries, there are five to ten times as many who are unrecorded 
(ILO 1996, p. 45).
In some activities, the phenomenon is more apparent than others: for example, 
sewing garments, attaching buttons, and hemming are activities often done by home­
workers subcontracted by factories or brokers dealing with factories. In India, it is
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officially estimated that there are seven to eight million rural household workers 
producing hand-woven cotton goods, an increasing volume of which are said to go to 
exports, sometimes leaking into official flows through subcontracting relationships. This 
is particularly true for specialized tasks which resist machine production, like embroidery 
in Delhi’s kurta export industry which is said to engage 200,000 home workers (ILO 
1996; Levy 1989; Laze 1992; Baneijee 1991).
Over the last decade, there has been a renewed interest in the role and nature of 
small-scale and ‘informal’ economic activities. This has rekindled the debates that took 
place in the 1970s and 1980s on the dynamics and nature of the ‘informal sector’ versus 
the ‘formal sector’ or what came to be known as “dual labour marker. The concept of 
dual labour market demarks the differences between the two sectors. In more recent 
literature on development, micro and small enterprise (MSE) are commonly seen as a key 
to, among other things, output growth, employment generation, poverty alleviation, and 
female empowerment (Rondinelli and Kasarda 1992). They have thus been, over the last 
three decades, the target of major development funding from public institutions, donor 
agencies, and non-government organizations. A vast, mostly empirical literature has 
developed covering several aspects of their behavior and anatomy. Their access to 
formal credit (as well as the efficiency and sustainability of purpose-built financial 
institutions that facilitate access) has attracted a good deal of research attention (see, for 
instance, Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Webster, 1991, and Yunnus, 1989). Substantial 
research has also been done on their access to physical inputs (Levy, 1993); activity- 
specific performance (Little, Mazumdar and Page, 1987); informality (De Soto 1989 & 
2000); region-specific characteristics (Ghate, 1992; Page and Steel, 1984; Tokman, 
1992); regulation (Stone, Levy and Paredes 1991); training (Harper 1989); and 
transaction costs and linkages (Levy 1991).
The World Development Report (1995), produced by the World Bank and entitled 
“Workers in an Integrating World,” provides the Bank’s analysis of the global state of 
labour towards the end of the twentieth century. The formal/informal divide is one of the 
main features discussed in this report, and due to the World Bank influence in the 
development arena the report signifies the rise of this divide within development thinking 
and practice on the issue of labour. The formal sector of the non-agrarian economy is
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defined as including all enterprises, whether private or public, which hire workers under 
contract as wage- earning employees. In low income countries, those with a GNP per 
capita of $695 or less in 1993, the report estimates that not more than 15 percent of the 
total workforce outside agriculture has formal sector jobs (World Bank Report 1995, p.3). 
With rising incomes and industrialization, informal work arrangements and small-scale 
production tend to diminish. Consequently, formal sector employment increased in 1993 
to 45 percent in middle income countries, i.e. those with GNP per capita of between $695 
and $8,626 (World Bank 1995). The report maintains that as employment in agriculture 
declines, job opportunities simultaneously expand in services and industry. Economic 
diversification causes rural workers to move to urban areas and from the informal to the 
formal sector.
The authors of the report acknowledge that workers prefer to switch to a formal 
contract because of the security of a regular wage and the various forms of legal 
protection that go with it but they also point out that, in many Latin American, South 
Asian and Middle Eastern countries, labour laws establish onerous job security 
regulations, rendering hiring decisions practically irreversible. Additionally, they add, 
the system of dispute resolution is subject to often unpredictable government decision 
making, adding uncertainty to firms’ estimates of future labour costs (World Bank 1995). 
For this reason, the report favours a shift in the opposite direction -  i.e. towards 
informalization -  since, the authors argue, formal labour markets are inherently distorted 
and biased against the working poor. The basic argument is that by dismantling the 
position of the small but privileged segment of the workforce employed in the formal 
sector, more jobs can be created. Labour market dualism, resulting from an erroneous 
policy towards the formalization of work arrangements, should be scrapped.
There are a number of questionable assumptions, however, in this argument. 
First, the authors state that, on leaving the countryside, self employed peasants first tend 
to become wage labourers in the urban informal sector, earning money and learning skills 
at the bottom of the urban economy with which they ultimately either set up their own 
business or join formal sector employment. This image is coupled in the report with 
praise for the maximum flexibility that is required to successfully make one’s way up the 
labour hierarchy. Informal sector workers, whom the report categorizes mainly as the
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self employed, have no real need for the security and protection which supposedly 
comfort the life of workers in the formal sector of the economy.
The authors go on to describe minimum wages and, other labour regulations, 
which aim to stifle market freedom, as both dysfunctional and inoperative. The 
implication is that labour should be willing to go where it is needed and to work as long 
as there is a demand for it. According to the authors, under these conditions, it would be 
counterproductive for workers to insist on secondary labour rights and work security.
The report also strongly suggests that informal sector workers are not really as 
vulnerable as is claimed. The authors maintain that the employer-worker relations in the 
informal economy continue to be governed by a wide range of social customs and 
traditions that mitigate the insecurity of the working poor. They posit that employers will 
extend loans to workers who face sudden expenses, support older workers or those unable 
to work on health grounds, and continue to wage payments despite seasonal fluctuations. 
They also claim that informal commitments by employers are an important element of 
socially sanctioned codes of conduct and that horizontal ties of solidarity along family 
lines further lighten the burden of the working poor.
The World Development Report 1995 also contends that financial help from 
relatives remains the principal form of income support and distribution in developing 
countries. The extended family system is an important way of providing extra income 
and security to individual workers and their immediate households. Private transfers play 
an important insurance function in addition to reducing income inequality, offering old 
age support and ameliorating the effect of disability, illness and unemployment (World 
Bank 1995).
Thus, in summary, the authors of the World Development Report 1995 argue that 
the formal-informal divide in the labour market is a result of false government policies 
that create artificial barriers through legal protection of jobs and minimum wages and 
thereby adversely affecting job creation and flexibility of the labour market in developing 
cities. The authors also argue that conditions in informal employment provide flexibility 
and forms of informal protection and security that balance the absence of legal protection. 
They therefore conclude that the liberalization of labour laws and removal of protective 
regulations will be a positive step in terms of job creation and long term growth.
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It is clear that a significant portion of the textile and garment industry takes place 
in statistically unrecorded and small-scale establishments. Traditionally such activities 
have been analysed in terms of dividing the economy into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
sectors. The World Development Report 1995, along with De Soto’s (2000) The Mystery 
o f Capital, have both helped to revive these theories of economic dualism, but with 
differing policy implications. In both cases the assumption is that there is a harmful 
dualism in the market leading to distortions that hamper economic development. In the 
case of the World Bank, however, the policy recommendation is to informalize the 
formal sector through scrapping protective labour legislation. In the case of De Soto, the 
argument is to formalize the informal sector by legally recognizing and statistically 
recording it. In this thesis, I will attempt to challenge some of these assumptions by 
comparing the statistically unrecorded garment workshops with the statistically recorded 
garment factories in Shubra El Kheima.
One of the merits of an empirical investigation of unrecorded economic activities 
is that it is able to shed light on the dynamics of activities that are statistically invisible. 
Generalizations based solely on available statistics are necessarily distorted since they 
ignore a significant section of the economy. By integrating empirical data gathered 
through research with data from the available statistics, it may be possible to overcome 
some of these distortions and provide a sharper and more accurate account of the 
economy as a whole.
5. From Economies of Scale to External Economies
One of the consequences of the increasing global integration of the textile and 
garment industry has been a separation of the different stages of the industrial process. 
Different parts of the finished product, as well as different processes in manufacturing, 
can now be undertaken in different specialized localities, thus lowering the final total 
cost. This process eliminates the advantage of having economies of scale through 
vertically integrated industrial complexes that combine the different manufacturing stages 
into one plant (from spinning and weaving to garment manufacture). The vertically- 
integrated mill became a casualty of this development, as processing and making-up 
became increasingly dissociated both by company and by country. Many of the new
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producers of ready-made garments in developing countries did not need to have a local 
textile industry and, indeed, could bypass it altogether by using imported fabrics and 
yam.
Another aspect of this separation process is the concentration of small- and 
medium-sized manufacturing establishments producing the same or complementary 
products in particular locations and, within these ‘industrial clusters,’ the development of 
external economies through both vertical and horizontal cooperation and networking. 
Research on industrial clusters has grown rapidly throughout the 1990s, showing that 
clusters exist in a wide range of countries and sectors. The wave of interest in this topic 
was triggered by the export success of Italian industrial districts and books such as 
Industrial Districts and Inter-firm Co-operation in Italy (Pyke et al. 1990). The emphasis 
in the literature on co-operation did not imply a lack of competition amongst clustering 
enterprises. On the contrary, the early accounts of the Italian experience stress that 
competition in product markets and co-operation for tackling common obstacles are not 
mutually exclusive.
Meyer-Stamer (1999), for example, examines how a ceramic tile cluster in Santa 
Catarina (Brazil) overcame a major crisis in the early-1990s. He concludes that an 
increase in inter-firm co-operation was a key factor. This took various forms, ranging 
from substantial but informal exchange of information, to benchmarking between local 
firms, to rejuvenating business associations. A similar conclusion emerges from Scott’s 
comparison (1994) of the gem and jewelry clusters of Los Angeles and Bangkok. He 
attributes the greater dynamism of the Thai cluster to “remarkable collective 
activism...significant resources have been clustered to create an infrastructure of 
supporting services, ranging from training and educational programs to international 
marketing and information providing agencies” (Scott 1994, p.260). Swaminathan et al. 
(1996) reports more limited, but also important, joint action in their study of the cotton 
knitwear cluster in Tiruppur, South India. They stress that the Tiruppur Exporters 
Association (set up in 1990) played a major role in helping local producers to compete in 
increasingly demanding international markets and to press for the upgrading of poor local 
infrastructure.
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A different kind of co-operation was found by Tewari (1999) in the knitwear 
cluster of Ludhiana, North India. She suggests that, in the course of overcoming a major 
crisis in the early-1990s, Ludhiana’s manufacturers forged closer backward ties with 
local suppliers of inputs, as well as forward ties with distributors. A more pronounced 
increase in this kind of co-operation was found by Dei Ottati (1996) in industrial clusters 
in Tuscany, Italy:
The successful implementation of product diversification and quality 
upgrading strategies calls for greater integration and closer co-ordination 
amongst the various activities of different firms than was necessary in the 
past, when product ranges were limited to the traditional articles, quality 
requisites were less cogent and delivery terms less strict (Dei Ottati 1996, 
p.55).
What forms of cooperation and interaction take place in garment production in Shubra el 
Kheima? Can we classify the concentration of garment producers in this location as an 
industrial cluster? If exports play an insignificant role, how do such clusters, if they 
exist, fit into the global commodity chain and how are they influenced by import 
competition? These are some of the questions that I attempt to answer and explain in this 
study.
6. Overview of Remaining Chapters
In the first half of this thesis, I discuss and analyze the historical, economic and 
policy factors influencing both the Egyptian and the international textile industries. 
Chapter Two, for example, describes the historical background underpinning three 
decades of Egyptian economic reform policies, examines their implementation and 
outcomes, and presents the economic context within which the textile and garment 
industry has developed. In Chapter Three, I present some of the major trends in the 
world textile industry, with a focus on the transformation of world trade, the growth of 
exports from developing countries and changes within the trade policy environment. In 
Chapter Four, I give a brief history of the Egyptian textile and garment industry, focusing 
on the distinguishing features of its development. In Chapter Five, I deal with the
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theoretical issues involved in the study of small-scale establishments, focusing on the 
inadequacy of dualistic models explained above. I also address more recent approaches 
involving the study of economic clusters and global commodity chains. The second half 
of the dissertation focuses on the field data itself. Chapter Six introduces the 
methodology and research design used in the field research. It presents the argument that 
the case study approach is the most useful research tool to tackle the difficulties in 
gathering data on small and statistically unrecorded economic units. Chapter Seven 
presents the findings in the area of labour and, Chapter Eight, those in marketing 
channels and forms of cooperation. In Chapter Nine, I conclude by discussing the 
meanings and implications of the findings and sum up the main arguments presented.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EGYPT
1. Introduction
In spite of its large size, long history and the implementation of an economic reform 
program explicitly aimed at export promotion, the Egyptian textile and garment industry 
has failed to penetrate export markets. In order to explain this anomaly, it is important to 
understand the nature, limits and historical context of the economic reforms carried out. 
This chapter will attempt to place these reforms in the context of the historical 
development of the Egyptian economy as a whole. The chapter begins with a discussion 
of the evolution of the state-led development project initiated by the Nasserist regime in 
the 1950s. I describe how that project ended in failure and crisis in the mid-1960s. I then 
go on to analyze the limited reforms initiated by the Sadat regime in the 1970s and to 
explore the subsequent deepening structural crisis of the Egyptian economy.
This is followed by sections looking at the performance of the neo-liberal reform 
program initiated in the early-1990s. I investigate the context of the program’s stated aim 
of encouraging Egyptian integration into the world economy through export promotion 
and an increase in foreign investment. Finally, the chapter ends with a description of 
some of the main features of the urban labour market in Egypt.
2. Origins of the State Capitalist Project
It is often wrongly assumed that it was the Nasserist regime that first started state 
regulation and planning of the economy in the 1950s. In fact this process had started 
decades before. In a report by the Bank of Egypt in 1929, the state proposed a ten-year 
industrial development plan based on an import substitution strategy. Under this plan, 
the state would play a major role and a public industrial development bank would provide 
the finance. By the late-1940s, import substitution industrialization had become a major 
element of economic policy, and in the period between 1946 and 1951, the industrial 
sector grew by an average of ten percent annually. In 1949, the state established the 
Industrial Bank providing credit exclusively to the industrial sector (Waterbury 1983, p. 
59).
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In its early years, the Nasserist regime was not opposed to either private capital or 
foreign capital. For example, in 1953 a new law was issued allowing the entry of foreign 
capital in the petroleum sector. Similarly, in 1954 the conditions for foreign investment 
were made easier, with a law issued allowing for the transfer of profits overseas and for 
foreigners to own up to 51 percent o f a company’s capital (in contrast to the 49 percent 
allowed in the previous law of 1947) (Issawi 1963, p. 57). The regime also attempted to 
encourage private investors by issuing a law in 1954 giving a seven-year tax holiday for 
new private industrial projects (Mabro 1974). It was only the weakness of the private 
sector and the unwillingness -  especially among foreign investors -  to invest after the 
1952 coup that led the new regime to a policy of state capitalist development and import 
substitution industrialization (ISI). Thus, the state had to introduce agricultural reforms 
in order to be able to embark on its ISI project.
3. Agriculture
One of the first reforms to be carried out by the new regime was land reform. 
Breaking the influence of the old landowning class was a political and social priority. 
The land reforms were carried out in three stages. In 1952, the maximum land area to be 
owned by an individual was set at 200 feddans. In 1961, this was reduced to 100 feddans 
and, in 1969, 50 feddans. By 1971, 822,000 feddans had been distributed to 342,000 
peasant families, with an average of 2.4 feddans per family. 184,000 feddans of public 
land were also distributed between 1960 and 1967 (Waterbury 1983, p. 266). The main 
beneficiaries were not the poorest peasants but rather those with holdings between 10 and 
15 feddans per family. Finally, by 1965, more than a third of total agricultural land was 
held by 148,000 families with an average of 13 feddans each (Richards 1982).
Most commentators concentrate on land distribution as the main aspect of the land 
reforms, trying to establish which sections of the peasantry benefited and in what ways 
they were linked to the Nasserist regime; however, a much more significant aspect of the 
transformations that took place in agriculture during that period was the changing role of 
the state. In fact, it could be argued that the state was the main beneficiary of the land 
reforms since, through reform, it was able monopolize the production of agricultural
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inputs such as seeds and fertilizers, the sale and lease of agricultural machinery, the 
provision of credit and the whole marketing process.
Agriculture was nationalized in all but name. The peasants owned the land but 
had no control over what to produce or how to produce it. The state created cooperative 
councils, headed by a group of appointed officials at the village level. These councils 
controlled the production process and the marketing of agricultural products; decided on 
the crops to be produced and on the pattern of crop rotation. They policed the peasantry 
to make sure they complied with state directives. They were the only seller of 
agricultural inputs to the peasants, the only source of credit, and the only buyer of 
agricultural products from them. These councils were controlled and monitored by the 
General Agricultural Council which was, in turn, directed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
in Cairo.
Through this system of control the state was able to extract large surpluses from 
the peasantry. As the only seller of agricultural inputs, the state set prices far higher than 
cost. As the only buyer of crops, it set prices far lower than the world price at which it 
would export. For example, in the early-1960s, imported chemical fertilizers with an 
import price of 16 pounds per ton would be sold to the peasant at 25 pounds per ton. 
Likewise, in 1970, cotton was bought at 14.5 pounds per cantar from the peasant and 
exported at 20.5 pounds per cantar. In 1975, the total surplus extracted from the 
peasantry by the state amounted to 5.5 billion Egyptian pounds and represented 30 
percent of that year’s budget (Waterbury 1983).
4. Industry
The purpose of extracting a surplus from agriculture by manipulating the terms of 
urban-rural trade was to finance the rapid industrialization project that the regime wished 
to pursue. By the late-1950s, it had become clear that neither foreign capital nor private 
Egyptian capital would play a significant role in this process. The nationalization of the 
Suez Canal in 1956 had frightened off what remained of foreign capital and the state was 
forced to intervene. Hence, to complement the agricultural reforms and further support 
its industrialization project, in 1961, the state carried out a set of wide-ranging
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nationalizations that included the whole of the financial sector, 70 percent of large- and 
medium-scale industries and all major retail outlets (Issawi 1963, p. 59).
A Soviet-style five-year plan was also put in place in 1961, which focused all 
investment capabilities on industrialization and the building of the Aswan high dam. The 
dam, in turn, was aimed at increasing agricultural production and acting as a major 
energy source for industry. The plan involved the investment of US $5 billion with $1.6 
billion coming from loans from the Soviet Union, $300 million from loans from the US 
under the ‘Food for Peace’ program, and $840 million from loans from other countries 
(Mabro 19974). The remaining $2.2 billion was to come mainly from agricultural 
transfers. Industry represented 28 percent of the total investments in the plan, and the 
share of industry in GDP increased from 16 percent in 1956 to 24 percent in 1964 (Mabro 
1974). The philosophy of the plan was to rapidly industrialize the country through an 
import substitution policy, thereby emulating the Soviet Union.
The plan, however, did not achieve its anticipated results. Indeed, instead of 
becoming the first in a series of five year plans that would industrialize and modernize 
the Egyptian economy, it soon ran into severe crises. As a plan for import substitution, in 
particular, it proved to be a total failure. Imports had been expected to fall from Egyptian 
LE 229 million to LE 215 million during the five years of the plan (1964 prices) (Mabro 
1974). In practice, they rose to LE 413 million. By 1965, the trade deficit had reached 
LE 166 million, and the share of imports to GDP rose from 15 percent at the start of the 
plan, to 20 percent at its end (Mabro and Radwan 1976).
By 1962, there was a deficit of LE 417 million in the plan’s various investment 
funds and the only way to solve this problem was to increase foreign borrowing. A major 
balance of payments crisis took place in 1962, followed by a more severe crisis which 
paralyzed the government in 1965 (Mabro and Radwan 1976). One factor deepening the 
crisis was the cotton harvest failure of 1962 which led to the reduction of foreign 
currency earnings from LE 121 million in 1960/61 to LE 75 million in 1961/62 (Toth 
1999). Another factor was military spending which rose as a percentage of GDP from 8 
percent to 12 percent during the period from 1963 to 1965. In 1965, it amounted to LE 
575 million pounds (Hansen and Nashashibi 1976).
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The foreign currency reserves fell from US $109 million at the beginning of the plan to 
$7 million in 1962, forcing the government into an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund according to which it received loans of $20 million, in exchange for 
devaluing the Egyptian pound from 35.2 piasters/US dollar to 43.5 piasters/US dollar 
(Hansen and Nashashibi 1976). Moreover, in 1965, the value of wheat imports was LE 
55 million, while the value of total Egyptian exports to the West was LE 52 million. 
When the US halted wheat transfers to Egypt that same year, the move created a severe 
food shortage and inflation. Hence, in 1966, the government entered new negotiations 
with the IMF, subsequently agreeing to a severe austerity program. And consequently, 
the investment budget was trimmed from LE 383 million in 1966 to LE 365 million in 
1967, while imports were reduced from LE 465 million to LE 344 million. The plan had 
failed and no second five-year plan followed (Mabro 1974).
This dismal failure though did not mean that there was no growth in the economy 
during the years in which the plan was implemented. In fact, GDP increased by 6 percent 
annually during that period. This growth however, was financed by heavy borrowing and 
the government simply did not have the money to invest in its larger projects. Similar 
plans in other developing countries were financed either by export growth or by the 
expansion of a local market. In the Egyptian case, neither of these resources were 
created.
5. The Open Door Policy
This crisis created by the Nasserite regime endured, and was carried forward into 
the Sadat’s era which started with his accession of power in 1970. Many accounts of the 
Egyptian economy during the 1970s see the policies of the Sadat regime -  known as 
‘infitah’ or ‘open door’ -  as the real beginning of the restructuring of the Egyptian 
economy. This policy which ended an earlier era of Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) aimed at economic liberalization, unleashing of market forces, and the reduction of 
the role of the state, starting from 1974 onwards. In fact, while the Sadat regime did shift 
politically from reliance on the Soviet Union to closer links with the West -  and while 
there was much rhetoric about liberalization and the need for a market economy -  infitah 
actually led to very few substantial structural changes in the Egyptian economy. The
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public sector remained intact and the state continued to be in full control of the 
agricultural sector. Even the banking sector, which experienced one the biggest changes 
with the establishment of private banks in 1974, continued to be dominated by the state; 
in 1979, five years after the infitah policy was started, the public sector banks continued 
to control 81 percent of total savings and 83 percent of total credit (Harek 1998).
The infitah policy was an attempt by the state to save itself economically by 
trying to attract foreign investment (especially from the Gulf after the 1973 boom in oil 
prices) in order to help solve the investment crisis that had plagued the regime since the 
mid-1960s. However, this attempt was unsuccessful and foreign investment remained 
limited. What saved the regime temporarily was not the infitah policy but two external 
factors: the inflow of Western loans and aid following the peace treaty with Israel, and 
the dramatic increase in oil prices after 1973 and its subsequent increase of state revenue 
through various kinds of rents.
American and other Western aid played a major role in the Egyptian economy 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1970, Egypt’s foreign debt was $1.3 billion which 
represented 18 percent of GDP. The debt jumped to $13 billion in 1977 (95 percent of 
GDP), to $20.4 billion in 1980 (128 percent), to $42.2 billion in 1985 (159 percent) 
(Harek 1998). Foreign loans were obviously a temporary solution to the immediate 
problems facing the regime and, as the debts accumulated, the price of servicing them 
became extremely high. Similarly, an increase in oil prices saved the day, creating the 
three most important resources for the regime: 1) direct export of oil; 2) migrant workers 
remittances from the Gulf; and 3) Suez Canal revenues. In 1979, petroleum exports 
represented 66 percent of total export value, while Suez Canal revenues and workers 
remittances accounted for 50 percent of total visible exports (including oil) (Handoussa
1991).
These different sources of rents solved the immediate crisis facing the regime, but 
it also allowed the state to delay any serious structural reforms in the crisis-ridden 
industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. The agricultural crisis, in particular, 
continued to deepen and in 1974, wheat production had reached 1.884 million tons, with 
wheat imports at 2.251 million tons. By 1979, production had only increased to 1.933 
million tons while imports had soared to 3.56 million tons. In the period between 1950
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and 1980, wheat production increased by only 71 percent, while wheat imports increased 
by 612 percent (Waterbury 1983).
Although the share of agriculture in the GDP fell from 33 percent in 1970 to 24 
percent in 1980, there was no complementary increase in the share of industry. Indeed, 
by 1979, the share of industry in the GDP, excluding petroleum, had fallen to 14 percent 
from a high of 24 percent in 1965 (Hussein 1982, p. 479).3 Although the rate of growth 
within the industrial sector rose in the 1970s, it did not match the level achieved during 
the previous high growth period (1960-1965) of around 6.6 percent (Hansen 1991, p. 10). 
The percentage of agricultural exports in total also decreased from 88 percent in the year 
1953 to 33 percent in 1978. As with the case of GDP, however, agricultural exports were 
not replaced by industrial exports, rather by oil. At the same time, the value of imports 
increased from LE 213 million in 1952, to LE 6.9 billion in 1980. The share of deficit in 
the trade balance, as a percentage of GDP, increased from one percent in the beginning of 
the 1950s, to six percent by the end of the Five Year Plan (1966), to 37 percent in 1975. 
In addition, the share of industrial investment in gross national investment declined from 
29.3 percent in the year 1970-71, to 21.4 percent in 1979-80. The percentage of 
industrial exports declined sharply from 47 percent of the total exports in 1970, to 14.6 
percent in 1979 (Suleiman 1999, p.38). This shows clearly the extent of the failure of 
import-substitution policies, and the fact that it was not replaced by an export-oriented 
model of growth, as in the case of other developing countries during the same era.
As the statistics demonstrate, the boom witnessed by the Egyptian economy in the 
second half of the 1970s on into the 1980s hid a deepening structural crisis in the 
Egyptian economy. The boom -  a result of the increase in oil prices, Suez Canal 
revenues, and remittances from workers in the Gulf -  was highly sensitive to the 
volatility of oil prices and political instability in the Gulf region. Nevertheless, the state 
capitalist system struggled along into the late-1980s, as infitah policies aimed at 
dismantling the system and shift to free-market policies were postponed, first, because of 
the 1977 demonstrations against the elimination of food subsidies and, second, because of 
oil revenues which allowed the regime to stall reform.
3 Adel Hussein, in his study o f the Egyptian economy during the 1970s, records the decline o f the 
industrial sector in the 1970s relative to the 1960s. The share o f industry in the GDP, according to Hussein, 
fell from 19 percent in 1973 to 14.9 percent in 1978 (Hussein 1982: 479).
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6. A Continued Crisis
The economic crisis continued to deepen in the mid-1980s as external debt 
increased in an unprecedented way, and its service became a heavy burden on the budget. 
The oil price declined sharply, together with a decrease in Suez Canal revenues, oil 
exports, and the remittances of Egyptian workers in the Gulf. In addition, the crisis of the 
industrial public sector deepened, agricultural production declined, and the deficit in the 
balance of trade in agricultural commodities soared. By the late-1980s, the deficit in the 
balance of payments reached 24 percent of the GDP, inflation rates rose to 25 percent 
annually, the percentage of external debt to the GDP increased to 200 percent. In 1987, 
the percentage of external debt to total exports was 343 percent, and the percentage of 
debt service to the GDP increased from four percent in 1970 to 85 percent in 1987 
(Kassem 1998).
The crisis also deepened in the industrial public sector, which needed more than a 
billion dollars annually to import its means of production at a time when its gross exports 
were only $500 million a year. The public sector banks financed $300 million of this 
deficit, while the rest was financed by the revenues received by the industries selling their 
products locally in dollars. The industrial institutions withdrew LE 2 billion without 
credit in the year 1986-87, an increase of LE 50 million from the previous year. The 
gross imports of the public sector for this year reached $1.3 billion, while exports were 
valued only at $671 million (Harek 1998). In 1986, the government presented LE 293 
million as direct aid to the industrial public sector, compared with only LE 1 million in 
1971. The number of loss-making public sector companies increased from four 
companies in 1974, to 60 companies in 1987, reaching 78 in the year 1988 out o f a total 
of 116. The gross profit of the successful companies was valued at only LE355 million, 
while loss-making companies achieved a gross loss of LE581 million in the same year 
(Harek 1998, p. 43).
Similarly, the agricultural sector of the economy was not faring well. The system 
prevailing in the countryside prior to the start of the 1987 economic reform program was 
controlled by the state through peasants’ obligatory handing over of crops and a state 
monopoly on agricultural inputs. The surplus extracted from the peasantry by the state
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increased massively during the period from 1980 to 1985, from (in current prices) LE 
1401.27 million to LE 2209.36 million (Mandour 1998). Until 1992, the government 
used to receive a surplus of around 58 percent of the value of the cotton crops from the 
difference between the price of handing over and the price of exporting. Before 
liberalizing the cotton trade, the state also used to receive 44 percent of the value of the 
international cotton price. Until 1973, in fact, the value of agricultural exports had 
exceeded that of imports, with net profits from the agricultural external trade more than 
half the inflow of foreign currency in the period 1970 to 1973, and constituting around 
one third of the total external trade in the period from 1973 to 1979.
During the 1980s, however, a rapid decline in agricultural exports occurred. As 
the contraction rate of agriculture exports reached 15 percent in the late-1980s, the deficit 
in the agricultural trade balance reached $ 3.16 billion, constituting around 13.7 percent 
of the total trade deficit (Fletcher 1998, p.55). The percentage of agricultural exports to 
total internal trade declined from 21.7 percent (1980 to 1985) to 14 percent (1986 to
1992). The share of agricultural exports coverage of agricultural imports declined from 
24.8 percent on average (1980 to 1985) to 15.6 percent (1986 to 1992). The percentage 
of agricultural exports to gross exports decreased from 41.4 percent on average (1973 to 
1979), to 15.5 percent (1980to 1985), then finally to 8.4 percent (1986-1992) (Fletcher 
1998). The agricultural sector was suffering from a severe crisis and had begun to be a 
heavy burden on the state.
The crisis in Egyptian agriculture was caused by several factors, most notably, the limited 
investment in agriculture. The share of investment in agriculture to gross investment was 
less than 8 percent in the beginning of the 1980s, declining to 7 percent by the end of the 
decade. In spite of this lack of investment, however, the agricultural sector still 
constitutes a primary sector of the economy, as the sector -  including production, 
marketing, and manufacturing -  constitutes 40 percent of the GDP. Nevertheless, this 
continual shortage of investment in developing and expanding agricultural production led 
to increases in the cost of crops and, thus, to a comparative increase in the price of the 
Egyptian crops relative to that of other countries. One of the most important examples of 
this process is that of long staple cotton, which used to be, in the last century, Egypt’s 
most important export crop, and the highest in return of foreign currency. Cotton exports
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used to constitute 61.3 percent of gross agricultural exports in the period from 1980 to 
1985. This percentage decreased to 43.9 percent by 1990. Egypt lost most of its cotton 
export markets to other brands of cotton, most notably, the American Pima cotton, which 
has become a substitute for Egyptian cotton in the northern European market. The price 
of Egyptian long staple cotton exceeded that of American Pima during the second half of 
the 1980s by percentages varying between 30 percent and 127 percent (Fletcher 1998).
Another more direct cause of the agricultural crisis of the 1980s was the collapse 
of Eastern European markets. These markets had absorbed a large part of Egyptian 
agricultural produce, mainly through bilateral trade agreements. These agreements were 
of a political nature and, thus, were never particularly affected by changes in world prices 
(nor did they do much to help improve the competitiveness of agricultural production in 
Egypt). When the guaranteed market in Eastern Europe collapsed, Egyptian agriculture 
was exposed to world market prices and standards against which it found difficult to 
compete.
7. Economic Reforms
Hence, by the late 1980s and early 1990s it had become increasingly clear to the 
Egyptian regime that it was no longer able to postpone reforming the system. A 
combination of pressure from international financial institutions, the strategic interests of 
local capitalists, and the fact that the system could not continue to finance its deficit, 
finally pushed the regime to accelerate reforms. The logic behind the reforms was an 
attempt to save the rates of profits, and to enable the state to pay its debts. The first step 
was a set of severe austerity measure. In some countries, the result of such measures has 
been economic stability matched by a period of rapid growth. In other countries, the 
reforms have led to rapid economic decline. The Egyptian experience has been 
somewhat mixed. It did not experience the sort of temporary success experienced by 
countries like Mexico, nor did it witness the swift implosion experienced by countries 
like Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The economic reform program started with the agricultural sector. In 1987, the state 
embarked on a reform program in agriculture with the aim of liberalizing crop prices, 
land tenure laws and input prices. The first stage of structural adjustment, between 1987
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and 1989, involved the liberalization of prices and the ending of state control over the 
marketing of ten major crops. These changes were expected to increase cotton 
production by encouraging producers to move away from less profitable crops to cotton. 
The results, however, were quite the opposite. This was mainly due to several severe 
drops in world prices. In fact, dependency on unstable world commodity prices was a 
general feature and shortfall of the reforms in agriculture during the 1990s. 
Liberalization was taking place at a time when world agricultural commodity prices were 
falling. The reforms did not, therefore, lead to a boom in agricultural exports as had been 
hoped by the government.
A good example of the troubles facing the liberalization of agriculture is the case 
of cotton -which is directly related to the textile industry. In 1991, for example, the 
export price of cotton decreased by 30 percent and, in 1993, the price was again halved. 
In 1992, the price agreed upon between the government and the farmers was 14 percent 
above the world price. In 1993, the government paid 30 percent above the world price 
for the cotton harvest (Mandour 1998). Between 1990 and 1994, a major economic aim 
was the complete liberalization of cotton prices. In 1994, three laws were passed aimed 
at freeing the pricing and marketing of the crop (www.sis.gov.eg). Because of 
restrictions imposed on imported cotton, however, and the need for a domestic supply to 
Egypt’s state-dominated textiles mills, this liberalization was not maintained. In 2000, 
the government set a minimum equivalent price of about 80 cents per pound for the 
standard cotton variety of Giza 75 at which farmers could choose to sell to state 
collection points or to private traders (www.sis.gov.eg). There was a rapid increase in 
price by approximately 75 percent. The price increase, in turn, led to a severe crisis in 
the textile industry which continued to be forced to use domestically-produced Egyptian 
cotton since the restrictions on the importing of cotton remained in place (Financial 
Times Survey 2001). At the beginning of October 2000, the government stepped back 
into the market. First, it froze all exports of cotton until domestic consumption needs had 
been met. Second, it changed the recommended price to a maximum price in order to 
stop further speculation. Although private traders could now buy cotton from the market 
and export it, most of the crop still went to six state trading companies all controlled by 
the same chairman (Financial Times Survey 2001). This inconsistency in handling cotton
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production was a characterizing feature of the state policy towards agricultural sector 
reform as well as economic reforms in general.
The pace of the economic reform process began to accelerate in the early-1990s 
under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
which had become increasingly alarmed by the country’s widening macroeconomic 
imbalances. An Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program was signed with 
the IMF in May 1991, followed by the granting of a structural adjustment loan worth 
$300 million by the World Bank in November of that year. A second agreement with the 
IMF, arranged under its Extended Fund Facility, was approved in September 1993. 
Additionally, the pro-American role played by the Egyptian military in the Gulf war led 
to the writing off of over $20 billion from the county’s external debts (UNIDO 1994). 
The disbursement of IMF funds was made conditional upon the undertaking o f economic 
reforms aimed primarily at stimulating a transition to a market economy in which private 
capital would play a greater role. Interest rates were gradually freed to encourage the 
repatriation of funds, while credit ceilings were imposed on bank lending to help ease 
inflationary pressures. By 1992, the country’s exchange system had been completely 
reformed, resulting in both the devaluation of the Egyptian pound and the pegging of it to 
the US dollar, thus making it internationally convertible (UNIDO 1994). This was the 
first concrete sign of the state loosening its control over the economy, a process that was 
slow and pendulum-like.
8. The Development of Private Sector Industry
One of the developments that resulted from the loosening of state controls over 
the economy was the growth of private sector industry. The share of industry in GDP 
(excluding petroleum) rose from 13.5 percent in 1982 to 18 percent in 1996. In the 
period from 1982 to 1995, the average rate of growth for the industrial sector as a whole, 
excluding petroleum, was 7.5 percent annually. This compares to 3.2 percent for 
agriculture and 5.2 percent for trade (Suleiman 1999, p. 17). The share of industry in total 
private sector investments increased from 15.9 percent in 1981, to 34.7 percent in 1990, 
to 45.9 percent in 1995, which was also due to the selling-off of public enterprise. With 
the acceleration of the privatization policy, the share of the private sector in total
34
industrial production increased from 36.9 percent in the early- 1980s, to 55.6 percent in 
1990, to 75 percent in 1997 (Suleiman 1999, p. 19).
In addition to this increase in private sector investments in the industry, other 
important changes took place in the structure of this sector’s industry. Textiles and 
garments continued to be in the lead with an increased share from 27.1 percent in 1980- 
81 to 34.3 percent in 1996-97. In the meantime the share of the food industry decreased 
from 49.3 percent to 17.8 percent, while the shares of the engineering industry rose from 
9 percent to 15 percent and the chemical industry from 8.1 percent to 23.9 percent 
(Suleiman 1999, p.25). An industry which has experienced unprecedented growth has 
been the car industry. Until the early-1990s, there was one major public sector car 
producer. By 1995, there were 15 major automobile producers with a combined capital 
value of LE 6.1 billion. Additionally, there were 123 car component producers with a 
capital value of LE 2 billion. The industry as a whole employed over 100,000 workers in
1999. Annual sales of locally manufactured cars increased from 20,000 cars in 1994 to
75,000 cars in 1996 (Suleiman 1999, p. 27).
All this might seem impressive if it were still the 1960s when the aim was to 
create an independent industrial base separated from the world economy and for the 
purpose of import substitution. However at a time when the stated aim of the government 
was and still is to integrate the Egyptian economy into the world economy and make 
Egyptian industry competitive internationally, it is clear that the Egyptian economy is not 
faring well. Rather, the private sector investments in industry are focused on more 
capital intensive industries in which there is no obvious comparative advantage. They 
rely on a heavily protected local market and state policy continues to be geared toward 
import substitution. For example, a four cylinder passenger car imported from Korea has 
a 100 percent tariff on it, yet the same brand of car produced locally would be sold for 
only 5 to 10 percent less than the imported one. Although targeting export-oriented 
growth, the state and the private sector still rely on protectionist practices suited for ISI, 
which appears to be more of a failure now than it was in the 1960s. The state and private 
capital can no longer prevent the entry of imports, either directly or indirectly. The trade 
imbalances suffered by the regime in the 1960s and 1970s have become even worse 
during the age of the supposed export-oriented growth and the structural problems of
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Egyptian industry have not been solved and Egypt’s track-record of exports remained 
insignificant, as I will show in detail in the next section.
9. Failure of the Economic Reform Program
Since the 1980s, the strategy of the Egyptian government has been to solve the 
economic crisis through integrating into the world economy. The old import substitution 
model had failed and a new model, one based on export promotion and the attraction of 
foreign investments, was to be followed. Paradoxically, by the beginning of the new 
century, the Egyptian economy is less integrated into the world economy than it was in 
1990. From a comparative perspective, the Egyptian economy is one of the worst 
performers in terms of integration from among the group of lower-middle income 
economies in which it is classified by the World Bank (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Comparative performance of lower middle income (LMI) economies and
Egypt, various indices, 1997, 2000, 2001
1997 2000 2001
LM I E gypt LM I Egypt LM I E gypt
GDP growth (annual %) 4 .7 5.5 6 .4 5.1 4.1 2 .9
Exports o f goods and services 
(% o f GDP) 2 6 .9 19.5 3 4 .0 16.3 3 3 .0 17 .6
Imports o f goods and services 
(% o f GDP) 2 6 .6 2 5 .7 2 9 .6 2 2 .9 2 9 .9 2 2 .7
Trade in goods as share o f  
GDP (%) 43 .1 22.6 51 .3 18.8 5 0 .3 17.1
Trade in goods as share o f  
goods GDP (%) 8 1 .9 4 2 .8 8 9 .2 3 5 .4 8 0 .5 32 .3
High-tech exports (% o f  
exports o f goods and services 13 .0 0.2 16.7 — 0.8
Source: World Development Indicators Database, April 2003
As the indicators in Table 2.1 illustrate, the export performance of the Egyptian 
economy is significantly worse than average for lower middle income economies and the 
gap has significantly increased in the period between 1997 and 2001. Though there was 
significant growth in manufacturing exports, as shown in Table 2.2, when compared with 
the rate of growth and the final value of these exports to that of other lower middle 
income countries, it is obvious that the share of Egyptian manufactured exports is 
shrinking.
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Table 2.2 Manufactured exports, selected low middle income countries, 1985-1998
Manufactured 
exports 
per capita 
( millions $)
Total
manufactured 
exports 
(millions $)
1985 1998 1985 1998
Egypt 9.8 36.5 458 2242
B razil 130 .3 2 3 4 .4 17617 3 8 8 8 2
C hina 5 .8 135 .4 6 0 4 9 167681
C olom b ia 3 3 .9 103 .9 1073 4241
M orocco 5 5 .4 11 1 .9 1200 31 0 8
P araguay 11.2 6 6 .4 40 347
P h ilip p ines 4 4 .4 3 7 4 .0 2 4 2 9 2 8 1 1 9
T hailand 71 .5 7 3 1 .4 3 6 5 8 4 4 7 6 0
T unisia 115.1 554 .1 83 6 51 7 3
T urkey 115.1 3 6 0 .7 5 7 9 0 2 2 8 8 5
Source: Selections from UNIDO statistical annex
Moreover, although Table 2.2 shows both the absolute and the per capita growth in 
Egyptian manufactured exports, the rate of growth for the whole period compared to the 
total value of exports in 1998 also demonstrates the limits of this performance. Similarly, 
the composition of merchandise exports has changed markedly in the past few decades. 
That is, in Egypt between 1965 and 1990, the share of agricultural commodities in total 
exports dropped from 71 percent to 20 percent, while that of fuel, minerals and metals 
rose from 8 percent to 41 percent, reflecting the increased importance of petroleum and 
petroleum products (Fawzy 2003). Manufactured goods also rose as a share of exports, 
mainly on account of greater output of textiles and clothing. A major thrust of economic 
reform has been to stimulate non-oil exports but, as is clear from Table 2.2, this has been 
a failure if Egypt is compared to many other developing countries. From 1995, Egypt 
began to register current-account deficits as imports rose rapidly. The deficit widened 
dramatically to US$2.4bn in 1998 (2.8 percent of GDP), up from US$600m in 1997, 
mainly owing to a sharp deterioration in the trade balance, a drop in tourism in the wake 
of the Luxor massacre and the negative effects of the Asian economic crisis. Similarly,
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Table 2.3 presents another perspective on the relative integration of the Egyptian 
economy into the global economy of the 1990s, compared to other lower-middle income 
economies. The same indications are suggestive of an economy that is becoming 
relatively more isolated, not integrated.
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Table 2.3 Integration with global economy, selected lower middle income economies
Trade in Goods
% o f
GDP
Change 
in Trade
% o f  
GDP
Growth
in
Real
Trade
less
Growth 
in Real 
GDP
% points
Gross Private 
Capital Flows
% o f
GDP
Gross Foreign
Direct
Investment
% o f
GDP
1990 2001 1990 2001
1990
to
2001
1990
to
2001
1990 2001 1990 2001
Egypt 36.8 17.1 72.9 32.3 -4 0 .5 -1.2 6.8 6.7 1.7 0 .5
Brazil 11.6 2 3 .2 - - 7 1 .9 5 .4 1.9 10 .9 0 .4 5.1
Bulgaria 4 8 .9 98.1 7 0 .8 18 6 .7 - 5 .4 3 9 .2 16 .6 0 .0 5 .2
China 3 2 .5 4 4 .0 4 7 .4 6 6 .3 - 6 .2 2 .5 1 0 .4 1.2 4 .9
Colombia 30 .7 3 0 .4 - - 8 0 .7 3 .7 3.1 14.1 1.3 2 .9
Ecuador 42 .8 54 .5 - - 3.1 0 .7 10.7 2 1 .9 1.2 7 .4
El Salvador 3 8 .4 5 7 .4 88 .5 14 6 .7 4 8 .5 7 .4 2 .0 14 .7 0 .8 2 .0
Guatemala 36 .8 3 9 .4 - - -1 2 .9 3 .4 2 .9 2 9 .7 0 .6 12.0
1 Honduras 57 .9 66 .3 10 6 .4 127 .1 -2 1 .6 -0 .4 7 .2 5 .9 1.4 3.1
Jordan 91.1 80 .8 2 0 5 .2 2 2 4 .2 -7 .9 -2 .8 6 .3 8 .0 1.7 1.2
M orocco 43 .3 52 .8 86 .5 1 1 3 .0 3 0 .4 3.1 5 .5 10.3 0 .6 8.5
Paraguay 4 3 .9 43 .5 82 .8 8 2 .7 142 .3 -2 .4 5 .4 5 .2 1.5 2.3
Peru 25 .5 29.1 -- -- 4 5 .9 3 .9 3 .2 5.1 0 .2 2 .2
Philippines 4 7 .7 8 8 .9 8 4 .7 - 142 .3 3 .8 4 .4 4 2 .0 1.2 2 .7
Syria 5 3 .7 45.1 102 .4 7 8 .0 -2 9 .8 0.1 18.0 16 .9 0 .0 1.5
Thailand 6 5 .7 1 1 0 .9 132 .2 2 1 3 .9 9 9 .6 2 .8 13.5 9.1 3 .0 3 .5
Tunisia 7 3 .5 8 0 .8 16 1 .6 1 9 9 .6 9 .3 0 .2 9 .5 6 .2 0 .6 2.3
Turkey 2 3 .4 4 8 .6 4 4 .5 1 0 1 .8 - 7.1 4 .3 15.1 0 .5 2.5
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003
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Another measure of integration, the performance of foreign direct investment, is 
also indicative of Egypt’s lack of economic progress (Table 2.4). One of the stated aims 
of the whole economic reform programme has been to attract foreign investment, 
particularly direct investment. The state has provided tax exemptions, new labour 
legislation, and free capital transfers supposedly towards this goal.
Table 2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), selected years (millions $)
1985-1995  
(annual average! 1998 2001
Egypt (inward) 871 1065 510
Egypt (outward) 28 38 12
M orocco (inward) 2 6 4 333 2 6 5 8
M orocco (outward) 2 8 2 0 92
Turkey (inward) 5 2 9 9 4 0 3 2 6 6
Turkey (outward) 2 4 3 6 7 4 9 7
Africa (inward) 3 6 4 6 9021 17165
Africa (outward) 1 2 9 7 2 0 5 4 2 5 4 4
Developing Countries 
(inward) 5 0 9 1 2 187611 2 0 4 8 0 1
Developing Countries 
(outward) 2 1 5 1 2 5 0 2 5 6 3 6 5 7 1
World (inward) 1 8 1 1 0 1 6 9 4 4 5 7 7 3 5 1 4 6
World (outward) 2 0 2 4 8 1 6 8 4 0 3 9 62 0 7 1
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002
However, as can be seen from Table 2.4, foreign direct investment actually decreased 
significantly during the 1990s, compared to large increases in other developing countries. 
Along the same lines, Table 2.5 shows, the level of foreign investment that Egypt attracts 
falls far short of the most successful developing economies. Owing to concerns over 
liquidity and the management of the exchange rate, as well as a dislike of the underlying 
constraint of bureaucracy, FDI declined to about US$500m in 2001, before rising slightly
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to US$650m in 2002. This is down from more than US$lbn during the period of 1998 to
2000. As a result, Egypt is still dependent on capital inflows from multilateral and 
bilateral funding. Table 2.5 compares in more detail foreign direct investment in a 
selection of lower middle income countries.
Table 2.5 Foreign Direct Investment (selected lower middle income economies)
W orld R ank  
by Per C apita
FDI inflow s
Econom y
Per capita  
(dollars)
T otal value  
(b illions o f 
dollars)
Share o f  gross
dom estic
investm ent(% )
Share o f  G D P  
(% )
1998 1985
1993
to
1997
1981
to
1985
1993
to
1997
1981
to
1985
1993
to
1997
1981
to
1985
1993
to
1997
1981
to
1985
61 32 E gypt 13.3 15.5 0.78 0.75 7.83 8.43 1.32 2.38
39 33 Brazil 4 9 .6 15 .4 7 .2 8 1.74 5 .0 6 4 .3 3 1.08 0 .8 3
4 9 65 China 30.1 0 .8 37 .81 0 .93 13 .54 0 .8 7 5 .51 0.31
37 27 Colombia 6 2 .2 18 .6 1.98 0 .4 4 11 .29 6 .1 9 2 .5 4 1.33
55 54 Morocco 19 .4 2 .4 0.51 0 .0 4 7 .7 2 1 .34 1.63 0 .3 5
44 4 4 Paraguay 4 0 .6 4 .8 0 .2 0 0.01 9 .93 1 .08 2 .2 7 0 .2 9
52 62 Philippines 20 .1 1.2 1 .54 0 .0 5 8 .4 6 0 .6 7 2.01 0 .1 8
45 4 2 Thailand 3 8 .0 5 .6 2 .4 5 0 .2 8 4 .0 7 2 .4 9 1 .48 0 .7 2
43 19 Tunisia 4 1 .2 3 0 .6 0 .3 8 0 .2 0 8 .3 9 7 .7 2 2 .2 2 2 .5 0
62 58 Turkey 12 .0 1.7 0 .7 4 0 .0 9 1.76 0 .7 5 0 .4 3 0 .13
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002
In brief, as the various statistics presented above show, the Egyptian economic 
reform program, failed to significantly increase annual growth rates, not to mention 
further economic integration, attraction of FDI, and increase of manufactured exports. 
This failure was further magnified by the relative success of other developing countries 
that have embarked on the same growth path and global economic integration at the same 
time of Egyptian attempts. Moreover, the failure of the reforms to reach its most
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important target -increased exports- points to the persistence o f Egypt’s structural 
economic problems.
10. Persistent Features of the Economy
The dismal failure o f the economic reform program sketched above was a logical 
outcome o f the inconsistency characterizing state reform policies (as shown in the 
agricultural sector) and its failure to shift away from the ISI vision. This inconsistency 
and hybridity o f the reforms in place, is clear in two important aspect of the Egyptian 
economy; 1) the role of the state as the major employer and economic actor, through the 
public sector and the military, and 2) continued reliance on rents -from remittances, oil 
exports and tourism. Contrary, to the productive liberal economic model the state 
rhetoric was pushing for, its practices and policies continued to depend on the public 
sector as opposed to the private, and rents as opposed to productive output, as its main 
modes o f economic intervention.
The public sector comprises four main categories in Egypt: central government, 
local government, public authorities and public enterprises. The sector covers a wide 
range o f economic and social functions, with some engaged in productive undertakings 
and others in the delivery of social services. A public employment drive was undertaken 
after the extensive nationalization o f the early-1960s. The share o f government 
employment out of total employment was about 10 percent in 1960. Between 1960 and 
1976, while the rate o f growth o f Egypt’s labour force was 2.2 percent, that of 
government employment was 7.5 percent. The government provided an additional 1.1 
million jobs over the 16-year period, a 46.2 percent o f the total increase in employment. 
(Asaad 2002, p. 44). The crucial mechanism for generating public employment has been 
the employment guarantee for university and secondary school graduates. The 
employment guarantee gave university graduates the right to apply for public 
appointment two years after graduation, secondary school graduates after three years. 
The waiting period was designed to allow male graduates to complete their military 
service.
Despite liberalization attempts and privatization policies, the public sector still played an 
important role in the economy, accounting directly or indirectly for around one-third of
43
total GDP and employing some 30 percent of the total workforce up until the late 1990s. 
In the 1990s, government employment accounted for 7 percent of total employment in 
Africa, 6 percent in Asia, 9 percent in Latin America, and 17 percent in OECD countries. 
In contrast in 1998, government employment in Egypt accounted for 32 percent of total 
employment, and public enterprises another 7 percent, thus contributing to almost 39 
percent to total employment and almost half of the GDP (Asaad 2002, p. 42). Although 
the economic reform program was initiated in the early-1990s, the transition rate from 
both the government and public enterprises to the private sector decreased almost by half 
in the 1990s compared with that of the 1980s. The overall public-private sector mobility 
rates were 4.8 percent in the 1990s, compared with 8.1 percent in the 1980s (Assaad 
2002, p.46). After a decade of supposed liberalization policies, the fastest growing 
segment and the largest contributor to employment growth in Egypt continued to be the 
government (Table 2.6). In the period between 1988 and 1998, government employment 
grew at 4.8 percent per year -nearly twice as fast as total employment -  and contributed 
42 percent of net job creation. The public sector as a whole increased its share o f total 
employment from 27.6 percent to 29.1 percent, despite the contraction in state owned 
enterprise employment by 2.6 percent (Assaad 2002, p. 40).
Table 2.6 Employment Growth in the Egyptian Economy, 1988-1998
Share of Growth Annual Rate of Growth
Government 4 1 .8 4 .8
State owned enterprises -7 .0 -2 .6
Subtotal Public sector 3 4 .7 3 .0
Subtotal Private Agriculture 2 6 .9 1.6
Subtotal Private Non Agriculture 3 8 .4 3 .0
Total 100 2 .5
Source: Assaad (2002, p.40)
Another aspect of continuing state domination of the economy in the age of liberalization 
is the role of the military. The military developed into a major player in the Egyptian 
economy during the 1980s and 1990s. The arms industry, subsidized by the state and 
excluded from national economic accounts, is still the largest manufacturing sector,
44
producing not only military equipment but clothing, electrical appliances, construction 
goods, and pharmaceuticals. The military has also established itself as a dominant force 
in agriculture, setting up dairy, poultry and vegetable farms, land reclamation projects, 
and food processing industries. It has also played a leading role in the construction of 
bridges, roads, power lines and other civilian infrastructure projects. Among those 
countries classified as lower middle income, Egypt ranks near the top in terms of the 
proportion of central government expenditure devoted to the military. The Ministry of 
Defense has also built, during the past two decades, its own military cities, mainly around 
Cairo. By 2000, there were more than 20 military cities, complete with hospitals, shops, 
schools and mosques (Mitchel 2002, p. 119). The National Organization for Military 
Production has 24 major plants and a contract to assemble the US’s main battle tank, the 
M l-A l, under an arrangement with the US company, General Dynamics Corporation. 
Military spending, then, represents a significant and statistically unrecorded segment of 
the economy. If included in calculations, it would greatly increase the relative weight of 
the state sector and place important doubts on claims concerning the liberalization o f the 
economy. For example, in the early-1990s, it was estimated that government spending on 
the armed forces reached 4.7 billion Egyptian pounds, or about 20 percent of government 
outlays, a figure that excluded foreign military assistance from the United States $ 1.3 
billion), income from arms exports, and the army’s civilian agriculture and 
manufacturing projects. Thus, one fifth of government spending and perhaps 10 percent 
of GDP is unmeasured and unreported (Mitchel 2002, p.l 19).
The final feature of the Egyptian economy that persisted during the economic 
reform decade and until, and the end o f the 1990s, was its continued dependence on rents, 
because of which Egyptian economy was facing severe problems. Again, since the 1970s, 
Egypt’s major sources of hard currency have been oil exports, workers’ remittances and 
tourism. These sources were negatively affected by the downturn in oil prices, the 
subsequent recession in Gulf economies and the fallout in tourism because o f the 
November 1997 terrorist attacks in Luxor, respectively. And even with the latter 
recovery of oil prices, the long term reliance on oil export revenues has a limited future, 
and thus the continued reliance on it is one of Egypt structural problems. At 3.7 billion 
barrels, reserves are modest while at the same time Egypt is facing depletion of its ageing
45
oilfields in the Gulf of Suez. Production fell to 628,153 barrels/day in 2002, down from 
an average of 639,478 barrels/day in 2001 and 700,000 barrels/day in 2000 (E.I.U. Egypt 
Country Report 2002). Export growth has been constrained by lower production as well 
as an increase in domestic consumption resulting from the high population growth rate. 
Domestic consumption stood at around 460,000 barrels/day in 2001, compared with
412.000 barrels/day in 1997. As a result, petroleum exports, the main export earner at 
US$3.1 billion in 2002/03, are set to decline, and Egypt may no longer be a net oil 
exporter within a decade (E.I.U. Egypt Country Report 2002).
As for remittances, the second source of Egypt’s rents and a major contributor to the 
current account, those rose steadily from US$3 billion in fiscal year 1987/88 to over US 
$6 billion in 1993/94 as a response to the stable Egyptian pound, new opportunities for 
investment in financial instruments such as high- yielding Treasury bills, and attractive 
returns on local currency deposits. However, remittances dropped to US $3.3 billion in 
1994/95 owing to the changed method of calculation, but rose again in 1998/99 to US 
$3.8 billion. Remittances have since fallen, dipping below US $3 billion in 2000/01, 
reflecting expatriate concern at the exchange rate regime, and a reluctance to send 
remittances through official channels when attractive informal market rates are available 
(E.I.U. Egypt Country Report 2002). These fluctuations are reflected on lack of stability 
in the Egyptian economy and its ability to make solid economic plans. Especially that the 
Egyptian emigrant workers are heavily concentrated in the Gulf region, a region where 
political instability and war have negatively affected the prospects for emigrant labour. 
For example, it is estimated that 2 million jobs held Egyptian workers in Iraq were lost 
during the 1990s.
Finally, tourism -the third biggest source of rents- continues to be the source of 
revenue with the best chance for long term growth. Overall hotel room capacity grew to
127.000 in 2002, compared with 117,000 in 2001 and a mere 19,000 in 1982. Capacity is 
expected to rise to 250,000 within the next few years as several major projects come on 
stream. The sector grew by an annual average rate of 12.5 percent between 1993 and 
2000 (E.I.U. Egypt Country Report 2002). However, the tourism industry has also 
proven to be highly sensitive to political instability and terrorist threats. A minor attack
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involving a small number of tourists has a disproportionately large effect on the number 
of tourists the following season.
The relatively slow growth and structural imbalances of the Egyptian economy, as 
well as the failed reform program, described above, have had significant effects on the 
structure and evolution of the urban labour market, which is one of the main issues of this 
research. The following section provides a summary overview of some of the main 
developments in the urban labour market in Egypt since the 1990s as a background to the 
detailed case study of labour in Shubra El-Kheima, which I provide in Chapter Seven.
11. Developments in the Urban Labour Market
A number of features characterized the labour market in 1990s and were 
indicative of the changes brought about by economic reforms. First, the majority of jobs 
created during that period were unprotected by legal contract. Irregular wage 
employment declined as a share of total employment, while unprotected regular 
employment grew rapidly. With the former referring to jobs that do not guarantee a 
regular income and the latter meaning jobs that provide regular income but are not 
protected by a legal contract. Table 2.7 clarifies this pattern that was witnessed in the 
labour market during the 1990s.
Table 2.7 Growth of Private Sector Non-agricultural Wage Work by Protection 
Status, 1988-1998
Share of Growth Annual Rate of Growth
P rotected /R egu lar 17 .8 4 .8
U n p rotected /R egu lar 6 5 .8 7 .0
Irregular 1 6 .4 3 .3
Total 100 5 .5
Source: Assaad (2002 p.52)
The number of non-agricultural wageworkers in 1998 was estimated at nearly 9.8 
million, of which 34.7 percent worked on an informal unprotected basis (Assad 2002, 
p.50). Private sector employment accounted for 41 percent of total employment, with 
informal employment representing 80.8 percent of total private non-agricultural wage
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employment (Assad 2002). This increase in unprotected and informal employment was 
matched by an almost freeze in the distribution of labour between different industrial 
sectors. This is clear from Table 2.8, which shows changes in the distribution of wage 
employment by industry during the same period (1988-1998).
Table 2.8 Distribution of Private Non-agricultural Wage Employment By Industry 
Group, 1988-1998
Sector 1988 1998
Manufacturing, mining and utilities 32 .5 3 4 .0
Construction 2 2 .4 2 1 .2
Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 19.3 19.1
Transport, Storage and Communications 9 .4 10.1
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 2 .0 3 .2
Public and Personal Services 14.9 13.1
Undefined 0 .5 0 .3
Total 100 100
Source: Assaad (2002, p. 64)
Table 2.8 shows that there was very little structural change in the distribution of wage 
employment, another indication of the static nature of the economy, despite a decade of 
economic reforms.
In an important study, Moktar and Wahba (2002) measure the degree of 
informality in the Egyptian labour market and find that the proportion of nonagricultural 
workers over 18 years old engaged in informal jobs increased by 5 -  6 percentage points 
in the 1990s (p.135).4 They also find that a substantial proportion of new entrants to the 
labour market in the 1990s have ended up in informal employment. In the early-1970s, 
20 percent of workers used to start their working life with informal jobs, but by 1998, 69 
percent of new workers have started in informal employment (Moktar and Wahba 2002, 
p. 137). Thus, evidence suggests that, in the 1990s, the Egyptian labour market has 
experienced an increase in the informalisation of “new” workers. The probability of
4 This is the case whether the proportion is measured using those workers lacking a job contract or those 
without social security coverage.
48
being informal worker was 5 percentage points more in 1998 than in 1990 (Moktar and 
Wahba 2002, p. 137).
The main characteristics of informal workers are as follow. Informal workers are 
predominately male, though the share of female informal workers has risen by 3 to 4 
percentage points between 1990 and 1998 (El-Kogali 2002, p. 165). Although the 
probability of informality increased for both male and female workers, females 
experienced a bigger increase. Also young workers and those less than 40 years old 
have witnessed an especially large increase in the probability of being informal workers 
in 1998 compared to 1990 (Amer 2002, p. 225). Formal workers are on average older 
than informal workers reflecting the fact that during the 90s, the time spent queuing for 
public sector jobs was longer than before, extending in some cases up to ten years after 
graduation. The educational composition of informal workers seems also to have altered 
between 1990 and 1998. This is partly reflective of the changes in the educational 
composition of the total working population. The proportion of workers with no 
education who could read and write among the formal working population has fallen and 
so too has that of informal employment (Amer 2002, p.230). Nonetheless, the share of 
those with only intermediate education in informal employment has increased by more 
than for any other educational group. Finally, examining the region of residence of 
informal workers, by the end of the 1990s, the shares represented by Greater Cairo and 
Lower Rural in informal employment increased, while the shares of other regions fell 
(Wahba 2002, p.261).
Another feature of the labour market in Egypt during the era of reform in the 
1990s, is that there was no substantial decrease in the public sector employment, that was 
absorbed in the private sector. Although this should have been the case if the state was 
truly initiating an economic liberalization program as they claimed. Rather, among those 
who were economically inactive in 1990, an equal proportion ended up in public formal 
jobs and in private informal ones (26 percent) (Wahba 2002). Only 8 percent managed to 
secure a formal private job by the end of the period. Younger individuals were more 
likely to move into a formal private job than older individuals. Males were more likely to 
end up with a private informal job than with public formal work, while the opposite was 
true for women. Also, only 4 percent of economically inactive women moved to formal
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private employment by the end of the period. To sum up, there is no evidence of 
substantial exodus of public sector workers into private formal or informal employment 
during the 90s.
12. Summary
In this chapter, I provided an overview of the development of the Egyptian 
economy. Statist policies of development initiated in the 1940s, accelerated in the 1950s 
and 1960s and culminating in the five year plan of 1960-1965, failed to solve the main 
structural weaknesses of the Egyptian economy. The infitah policies of the 1970s, which 
were initiated to attempt to solve the economic crisis through liberalization of trade and 
deregulation, also did not lead to any significant liberalization of the economy. Only in 
the early-1990s, with the deepening of the economic crisis, was a policy of structural 
adjustment initiated with the stated aim of dismantling the state capitalist system and 
encouraging foreign investment and export-led development. These policies, however 
failed to significantly increase foreign investment or increase exports. In fact, through 
comparing the performance of the Egyptian economy with that of other developing 
countries, the relative performance of the economy has been negative in terms of 
attracting foreign investment, increasing exports and integrating into the world economy.
In the second part of the chapter, I described the current structure and 
performance of the economy, pointing out the continued reliance of the economy on 
bilateral aid, oil, migrant worker’s remittances and tourism, and the continuing growth 
and hegemony of the state sector in the economy. I gave a brief description of recent 
developments in the urban labour market, concentrating on the effects of increasing 
informal employment, the persistence of government employment and the changing 
patterns of internal migration as the main features of the current market structure. In the 
next chapter we turn to developments in the world textile and garments industry in order 
to be able to place this sector in Egypt within its world-boundaries.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE WORLD TEXTILE INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
The Egyptian textile and garment industry, despite being heavily protected and relatively 
isolated from the world economy until the 1990s, has not escaped the effects of the rapid 
and fundamental changes taking place over the past three decades in the global 
production and trade of textiles and garments. It is impossible to understand the 
development of the Egyptian textile industry without a clear understanding of the world 
textile and garment industry as a whole. This chapter will attempt to provide a brief 
introduction to major trends and developments in the world textile and garment industry. 
The chapter will start with a brief description of the imposition, history and complicated 
effects of protectionism and trade restrictions known as the Multi Fiber Agreement 
(MFA). Here I will show the effects that trade restrictions have had in shaping the 
growth of world trade and the relocation of production. The next section of the chapter 
will deal with of the major developments in world production and trade, followed by a 
discussion of the major relocations that have been taking place over the last three 
decades. The aim will be to demonstrate that the changes taking place are not simply a 
shift of production from the industrialized countries to the developing ones but, rather, 
represent the emergence of a more complex international division of labour. I will then 
discuss three significant shifts affecting textile industry and trade worldwide. The first of 
these shifts is the possible consequences of the termination of the MFA in 2005. The 
second is the acceleration of technological advances in the textile industry as firms face 
an increasingly competitive world market and attempted to cut costs through increasing 
productivity. The final section will briefly discuss the third shift, which is change in the 
concentration of production and the growth of the statistically unrecorded and small-scale 
sector.
2. The Development of Protectionism
During much of the last century, the protection of ‘national’ industries from 
‘foreign’ competition has been the aim of policy makers. The tools used to achieve this
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aim have been the imposition of trade restrictions such as tariffs on imports or bilateral 
and/or multilateral quota restrictions. The failure of such policies in reducing imports 
and preventing shifts in global industrial production cannot be more evident than in the 
case of the textile industry, which has simultaneously seen both the most restrictive 
protectionist trade policies and the most rapid increase in world trade. The glaring 
contradiction between the centrality of the issue of protection in the literature and the 
relative ineffectiveness of the actual policy necessitates a closer examination of the actual 
evolution of protectionist policies in the world textile industry.
In the 1950s, special trade agreements reduced trade restrictions between the US 
and Europe, while simultaneously tightened restrictions on Japan, Eastern Europe and 
developing countries. In 1957, Japan was pressured by the US into accepting a 
‘voluntary export restraint.’ As a result, Japan’s share of US imports of cotton textiles 
fell from 63 percent in 1958 to 26 percent in 1960. The outcome of these policies was a 
process of pushing exports from restricted areas to non-restricted areas (Hong Kong’s 
share of US imports, for instance, increased in the same period from 14 to 28 percent).
Within the same vain, the GATT discussions of 1959 and 1960 under the 
leadership of the US developed the concept of ‘market disruption.’ This was defined as a 
situation arising from a sharp import increase associated with low import prices. In 
November 1960, GATT adopted the Decision on the Avoidance of Market Disruption, 
which stipulated that restrictions could be applied even if no actual loss had occurred to 
the producers in the importing market. The restrictions could be applied to the individual 
country responsible for the import surge. The decision also introduced a system by 
which the basis for determining the need for restriction would be a price differential 
between imports and competing domestic goods (Cline 1987, p. 147). Hence, in July 
1961, an international Short Term Arrangement established one-year restrictions on the 
basis of the 1960-1961 levels for 64 categories of cotton textiles in order to avoid market 
disruption until a more permanent agreement was reached.
In February 1962, 19 major importing countries adopted the Long Term 
Arrangement Regarding Cotton Textiles. This arrangement was renewed in 1967, 1970 
and 1973. It allowed for bilateral consultations and automatic annual increases of 5 
percent in restraint levels (Cline 1987, p .147). In spite of the Long Term Arrangement,
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textile imports into the industrialized countries continued to increase dramatically. 
Between 196land 1972, US imports of textiles rose from $1.02 billion to $2.4 billion, 
while imports of apparel rose from $648 million to $3.5 billion (at an average annual 
growth rate of 11.5 percent for the two sectors combined). A major part of the import 
growth was made up of man-made fiibre products that were not included in the 
arrangement. US imports of man-made fibre textiles rose by over 1000 percent between 
1960 and 1970 (Cline 1987, p. 148). The above figures do not actually tell us the effect of 
the Long Term Arrangement (LTA) on changes in the sources of imports, or in the types 
or qualities o f goods imported. But they do show that total imports into the US continued 
to increase dramatically despite the Arrangement.
Bilateral quantitative restrictions were outside the control of the GATT or the 
LTA. In 1971 and 1972, the US negotiated bilateral agreements restricting imports of 
man-made fibres from Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. As the US was the main 
player in initiating bilateral arrangements, these may have translated into increasing 
import pressure on European countries as the affected exporters turned to Europe. This 
led the European governments to seek a new multilateral arrangement that covered man- 
made fibres and woolen goods (GATT 1984, p. 7).
Thus, in January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in 
Textiles, also known as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), was signed. This provided 
a general framework for determining the conditions under which the textile and apparel 
trade could be controlled. MFA provided for annual quota growth of 6 percent instead of 
5 percent. It also allowed for transferring quotas across categories, borrowing against a 
future years’ quota and adding unused quotas to subsequent years’ imports. Although 
these allowances increased flexibility in trade, the cumulative effect of the MFA was 
restrictive because of the inclusion for the first time of woolen and man-made textiles in 
the arrangement (Goto 1988, p. 15). The MFA was clearly inconsistent with GATT 
principles. It introduced quota protection which violated the GATT’s aim of depending 
on tariff protection instead. It also established a precedent of imposing quantitative 
restrictions against a particular group of countries -  in this case, mostly developing 
countries (Cline 1987, p. 151). It must be noted that only imports from developing 
countries an d  Japan were affected by MFA. Trade between industrialized countries (with
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the exception of Japan) was not bound by MFA even if the countries involved were 
signatories and accounted for about 43 percent of world trade in textiles and 35 percent in 
world trade in apparel. In spite of this loophole, the MFA was actually a cause of tension 
within the industrialized group, especially between the US and the EC. Whenever the US 
negotiated a bilateral agreement with a supplier, the EC complained that exports would 
be redirected towards the EC, and vice versa, resulting in mutual recriminations 
(Aggarwal 1985, p. 170). The MFA covered nearly 25 percent of world trade in textiles 
and apparel and had significant effects on it.
Again as with the LTA, textile imports into industrialized countries continued to 
expand despite the MFA.5 However, the MFA was renewed for another four years in 
December 1977 and implementation after the renewal led to much tighter restrictions as 
new definitions and allowances were made. Under this MFA-II the EC developed the 
concept of ‘cumulative market disruption’ in which a global ceiling on imports from Tow 
cost’ countries was established in the sensitive groups. Instead of a bilateral approach, 
whereby action would be taken against a country only if its individual exports were the 
cause of losses, a new comprehensive approach was taken, in which even small suppliers 
would be restricted because disruption would be defined globally (Goto 1988, p. 15). 
MFA was renewed again in 1981, producing even more trade restrictions. For the EC, 
there were clear cutbacks in quotas on the dominant suppliers (mainly, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea) and limitations on quota growth for other countries to levels far 
below the annual 6 percent, imposed on the basis that demand in Europe was stagnant 
(Cline 1987, p. 155). During the 1980s, the US had bilateral agreements with 34 countries 
under the MFA, and nearly 80 percent of US textile and apparel imports from developing 
countries were limited by quotas under these agreements. The EC had bilateral 
restrictions on imports from 25 countries together with unilateral restraints on Taiwan.
The effects of MFA quotas varied widely between different countries. In 1976, 
the three major East Asian exporters filled 99.8 percent of their combined quotas 
(Keesing and Wolf 1980, p. 86). This did not lead, however, to a reduction in their
5 Between 1973 and 1976, total imports o f  textiles and garments increased by 49 percent in Europe, and by 
40 percent in the US. Imports from non-oil developing countries to Europe also increased rapidly from 
$1.9 billion in 1973 to $3.9 billion in 1976. The increase in the US during the same period was from $2.1 
billion to $3.6 billion (Cline 1987, p. 152).
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exports but pushed firms in these countries to shift to higher value goods and relocate 
mills to less-restricted countries. China and Japan had significantly lower shares of 
exports covered by quotas in the US market, and also lower utilization rates. Latin 
American suppliers had both low shares of exports covered by quotas and relatively low 
quota utilization rates (less than 50 percent in Colombia and Mexico) (Keesing and Wolf 
1980, p.86).
Another indirect effect was the diversion of trade from the countries that filled 
their export quotas to the countries that were unrestricted by, or had underutilized, quotas. 
Less competitive exporters could make use of their quota advantage over more 
competitive exporters that had filled their quotas. Moreover, the countries with filled 
quotas had a strong incentive to move their textile projects to countries with under 
utilized quotas, through foreign direct investments and joint projects (Goto 1988, p. 27). 
The evidence suggests further that there has been such a shift in textile export capacity. 
In the 1980s, countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and China 
began to replace Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea as the main exporters, while 
capital in the latter group of countries began making large investments in the textile 
industry in the former.6 Wolf (1987) argues that this evidence helps to show that MFA 
has been a force in the further internationalisation of the textile industry. Another view 
argues that, because the MFA restrictions were based on quantitatively limiting trade, 
they have had an upgrading effect on the industry in exporting countries. Cline (1987) 
suggests:
Because the MFA controls the physical volume of imports rather than 
their value, it introduces an incentive to upgrade products.... While 
controlled suppliers have an incentive to upgrade by moving up the ladder 
of processing stages, they have also faced an inducement to upgrade the 
quality of their exports within each product category. (57)
The MFA persisted into the 1990s, when agreement was finally reached in 1993 at the 
Uruguay round of GATT to phase out the MFA over a ten-year period. The decision to
6 The best example o f  this process is when Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan displaced Japan and 
the share o f  Japanese exports in world textiles and garments fell from 28 percent to 4 percent in two  
decades (Harris 1986).
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phase out the MFA was probably due to the reduced political significance of the textile 
industry in industrialized countries in terms of its ability to provide employment. In 
section four of this chapter I will look at the expected impact of this termination of MFA, 
as one of the major parameters affecting textile and garment industry and trade for 
decades. However, before I do that, we need to understand some of the general trends -  
other than protectionism- that have been characterizing world textile industry in the past 
two decades.
3. Trends in World Production and Trade
Total world exports in the textile industry amounted to $119 billion in 1982 or, 
more specifically, $52 billion in textiles, $41 billion in apparel, $16 billion in fibres and 
$10 billion in textile machinery. The textile complex thus accounted for 9 percent of 
world trade in manufactures and, over the next decade, it continued to rise to 9.3 percent 
(GATT 1994, pp. 79-83). By contrast, in 1970, the textile industry account for only 6 
percent of total world trade in manufactures (Frobel et al. 1980, p. 56). International 
trade in textiles, too, has grown rapidly since the 1960s, from a rate o f 11.5 percent 
annually between 1963 and 1973 to 4.8 percent between 1973 and 1982 (Cline 1987). 
Between 1990 and 2001, it grew at an annual rate of 6 percent (UNIDO 2003). Similarly, 
the growth in world apparel exports has also been phenomenal, amounting to 181 percent 
between 1973 and 1979, and 132 percent between 1979 and 1987. By 1991, it increased 
by another 22 percent (Chriterson and Appelbaum 1995, p. 1363). Between 1990 and 
2001, it again increased by another 30 percent (UNIDO 2003).
However, the growth in the world trade in textiles and apparel in the last three 
decades was not spread evenly across the globe. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide a rough 
picture of the distribution of shares of production and exports of textiles and garments 
from different countries. However, two difficulties must be taken into consideration 
before examining the figures contained in these tables. First, the figures are highly 
aggregate; they lump together a wide variety of sub-sectors and, therefore, only give us a 
general view of the changing location of production and trade in the industry. The 
second limitation is that the figures only cover the recorded sector of the industry and, 
thus, represent a fraction of the real total sizes of the industry in different countries.
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Bearing these problems in mind, both tables provide a rough guide to some of the 
international shifts taking place in the world textile industry.
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Table 3.1 Leading exporters of textiles, 2001 (billion dollars and percentage)
Value Share in world exDorts/imDorts
2001 1980 1990 2001
E.U. 50.54 49.4 48.7 34.4
China 16.83 4.6 6.9 11.4
Hong Kong 12.21 6.6 12.9 _
Korea 10.94 4.0 5.8 7.4
U.S. 10.49 6.8 4.8 7.1
T ai wan 9.92 3.2 5.9 6.7
Japan 6.19 9.3 5.6 4.2
India 5.90 2.1 2.1 3.8
Pakistan 4.53 1.6 2.6 3.1
Turkey 3.91 0.6 1.4 2.7
Indonesia 3.20 0.1 1.2 2.2
Canada 2.16 0.6 0.7 1.5
Mexico 2.09 0.2 0.7 1.4
Thailand 1.89 0.6 0.9 1.3
Switzerland 1.44 2.8 2.5 1.0
Source: UNIDO Industrial Development Report, 2002/2003
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Table 3.2 Leading exporters of garments, 2001
Value Share in work1 exports/imports
2001 1980 1990 2001
E.U. 47.09 42.0 37.7 24.1
China 36.65 4.0 8.9 18.8
Hong Kong 23.45 17.8 27.8 ___
Mexico 8.01 0.0 0.5 4.1
U.S. 7.01 3.1 2.4 3.6
Turkey 6.63 0.3 3.1 3.4
India 6.03 1.5 2.3 3.1
Bangladesh 5.11 0.0 0.6 2.6
Indonesia 4.53 0.2 1.5 2.3
Korea 4.31 7.3 7.3 2.2
Thailand 3.58 0.7 2.6 1.8
Romania 2.77 — 0.3 1.4
Dominican Rep. 2.71 0.0 0.7 1.4
Tunisia 2.60 0.8 1.0 1.3
Taiwan 2.48 6.0 3.7 1.3
Source: UNIDO Industrial Development Report, 2002/2003
As the tables demonstrate, major shifts in export shares have taken place, first, 
from the industrialized countries of the West and Japan to the newly industrializing 
countries of East Asia and, then, from them to less-developed countries in Asia and Latin 
America. This shift in world exports, however, is not simply a shift from the 
industrialized countries to the developing ones. The reality is far more complex. The 
share of exports of textile industries in Japan and the E.U. may have decreased, for 
example, but textile industries in the US sustained their share in the growing world 
market. And although the textile industries in South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan had 
the largest shares since the 1970s, the textile industries with the fastest growing share of 
world exports have been those in Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey. In apparel, the pattern 
is quite similar (Table 3.2). Among the industrialized countries, the share of exports by 
the apparel industries in the E.U. decreased the most, but the apparel industry in the US 
actually increased its share. And although the main gains in exports were made by the
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apparel industries of Hong Kong, China and South Korea, the fastest growing exporters 
were in Turkey, Thailand and Indonesia.7
If we look at the absolute comparative sizes of the textile industry in different 
regions, we will find that the main producers are in the US, Western Europe and Japan 
both for textiles and apparel. In textiles, 50 percent of world production in 1990 was 
concentrated in six countries: the United States, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom. In apparel, the percentage share of these same six countries was 60 
percent of world production (UNIDO 2003). At the same time, when examining the 
share of the fifteen leading producers in the world textile and apparel markets, it is clear 
that this concentration changed significantly between 1980 and 2001. The combined 
share of the newly industrializing countries among these 15 producers rose from, in 
textile production, from 18.5 percent in 1980 to 21.2 percent in 1990 to over 40 percent 
in 2001 and, in apparel production, from 8.8 percent in 1980 to 14.1 percent in 1990 to 
over 45 percent in 2001 (UNIDO 2003). Similarly, looking at US market, between 1980 
and 1987, the percentage share of exports to the U.S. market by the three main exporters 
in the newly industrialized countries began to fall slightly. Hong Kong’s share fell from 
22.8 percent to 17.3 percent, Taiwan’s share from 17.2 percent to 15 percent, and South 
Korea’s share from 15.1 percent to 11.2 percent, although this is partially due to changes 
in relative currencies associated with the Plaza agreement of.8 During the same period 
Turkey increased its share from 0.01 percent to 1.27 percent and Bangladesh from 0.02 
percent to 1.66 percent. There is clearly a shift in favour of relatively new exporters (ILO 
1991, pp. 72-73).
It is therefore an over-simplification to assume that the textile industry as a whole is 
shifting from the industrialized countries to the developing world. The process of 
relocation is much more complex. What is emerging is an elaborate international division 
of labour in which the textile firms in industrialized countries are focusing on more high 
value, capital intensive product categories, whereas firms in the developing countries are 
focusing on more low value, labour intensive, standardized product categories. This
7 Turkey has the largest share (11.7 percent) o f  EU garment imports in 1995 and an increasing share o f the 
US market. Between 1990 and 1996 the number o f  foreign investment firms increased from 58 to 114 
(UNIDO 2003).
8 An agreement between the US, UK, Germany, France and Japan to stabilize their exchange rates by acting 
together to overcome adverse market forces.
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international division of labour is not only taking place between different product 
categories but also within categories as the more capital intensive stages of the 
production process become concentrated in the industrialized countries and the more 
labour intensive processes relocate to developing areas. For instance, the appearance of 
non-woven fibres in recent decades and their increasing penetration of the industrial 
textile market have provided new niches and enhanced the competitiveness of major 
textile firms in industrialized countries. The production of sophisticated fibres and 
fabrics required for specialized activities such as sports, fire fighting, and medicine (used 
in the replacement of blood vessels, for example) are product categories in which firms in 
industrialized countries specialize. Firms such as Toyobo in Japan and Dominion textiles 
in Canada are becoming more specialized in lines of sophisticated non-woven fibres 
(Singleton 1997, p. 105). Also, in Scotland during the 1980s and early-1990s, there was a 
marked expansion of the high technology garment industry. Textile and clothing firms in 
the U.S such as Guilford Mills have been focusing since the early-1990s on specialized 
niches in the sportswear market (Hall 1994, p.282). The Shiloh cotton spinners in Britain 
became sharply focused in the late-1970s on areas such as healthcare and protective 
clothing.
Another important feature of the world textile industry, is that textile industries in 
countries lacking all the necessary raw materials have become major producers and 
exporters. Most notably, imports of natural fibres have been a crucial element in the 
growth of the East Asian textile industry. The combined natural fibre imports of Japan, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, China and the ASEAN states went up from 24 percent of world 
imports in 1967 to 37 percent of world imports in 1987 (Anderson 1992, p. 12). This 
disproves one of the persistent myths determining the policies of some states towards 
their textile industry, which is the assumption that the local production of cotton is an 
essential ingredient of a successful textile industry. In fact, international experience 
shows quite the opposite. When governments have heavily restricted imports of cotton 
fibres to force textile firms to buy local cotton, the result has often been disastrous for 
exports. This has been true both for industrialized countries that produce cotton (such as 
the U.S) and for developing cotton producers (such as India and Egypt). Of course this 
does not mean that lack of raw materials in itself leads to success in the textile industry
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but, rather, that protective state policies in natural fibre-producing countries forced textile 
mills to buy higher cost local fibres of a limited range in quality, while other countries 
were able to buy internationally from the cheapest and most diverse producers.
Another myth that can be deconstructed by looking at the movement o f world 
textile industry, is that of ‘cheap labour’. It is often claimed that the availability of a 
large pool of cheap standardized labour plays an important role in providing a 
competitive advantage in the textile industry (Singleton 1997). However, cheap labour in 
itself is of limited significance when compared to labour productivity. Thus, although 
low waged labour played a significant role in the East Asian textile industries’ success, it 
must be noted that the level of productivity and industrial efficiency was a decisive 
factor. In South Korea, for example, although the wage of a textile spinning operative 
was only 40 percent of that of Japan, the productivity of South Korean spinning mills was 
up 60 percent to that of Japan even as far back as 1965 (Singleton 1997, p.30). One 
example of a dramatic textile export failure despite extremely low wages has been that of 
Kenya. As in most countries, the textile industry was one of the earliest modem 
manufacturing industries to be established. Up until the mid-1970s, under the influence 
of export promotion policies, Kenyan government planners held the conventional view 
that the textile industry was an attractive industry because it was labour intensive and 
could compete on world markets by virtue of low local wages. Because the planners had 
not estimated correctly other important factors (such as the presence of local, protected 
competition affecting the competitiveness of the industry), ‘the result was a failure and 
the collapse of the project’ (Stopford and Strange 1991, p. 132).
An increasingly significant factor in the internationalization of the textile industry 
is the expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) and off-shore processing. This 
expansion is part of the emergence of a new international division of labour in which the 
more labour intensive aspects of the production process are shifted from industrialized 
countries to the developing world. For example, in the 1950s there was only one 
Japanese textile mill in South East Asia. By 1974, Japanese firms had established 275 
fibre, textile and apparel projects in the region. Between 1967 and 1989, the Japanese 
were responsible for 80 percent of the total FDI inflow into the Indonesian textile and 
garment sector (Hill 1991, p.101). By 1988, Japanese FDI in textiles reached $2.35
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billion, of which 52 percent was in Asia, 18 percent in Latin America, 17 percent in 
North America and 10 percent in Europe (Steven 1990, p.68). Another form of foreign 
investment that has grown rapidly has been offshore processing. This involves sending 
fabrics to another country to be made into garments either for re-importation or for export 
to third countries. This form of international subcontracting became particularly 
important for the German textile industry. In 1975, 14 percent of West Germany’s textile 
exports and 6 percent of its clothing exports went to offshore processing. By 1992, 
offshore processing accounted for one third of German clothing imports (Singleton 1997, 
p. 117). Additionally, Germany has been another major source of foreign direct 
investment in developing countries since the 1960s. German textile and apparel 
manufacturers have invested in Tunisia, Greece, Malta and Hungary. Large 
manufacturers in the industrialized countries, then, have maintained their position by 
transferring production to low wage economies. Similarly, the UK-owned company, 
Coates Viyella, cut its British workforce by 11 percent between 1992 and 1995, while its 
overseas workforce increased by 30 percent while it reduced by half the number of 
garments sewn in Britain (Singleton 1997, p. 120). It is now these major retailers and 
brand-based companies which have become increasingly powerful players in the world 
market. Typically, they own no production facilities themselves but manage a global 
network of suppliers.
Another interesting development in FDI in textiles since the 1960s has been the 
emergence of newly industrializing countries (NICs) as growing foreign investors. Hong 
Kong textile manufacturers began investing in Singapore in the early-1960s to get around 
British and American import quotas, which did not apply to Singapore until 1965 and 
1966. Hong Kong textile investments also became increasingly important in Malaysia 
and Indonesia in the 1970s and, on a larger scale, on the Chinese mainland since the 
1980s (Singleton 1997). South Korean textile companies too made investments of over 
$5 million in 9 textile and clothing plants by the end of 1990, while Indian and Malaysian 
companies also expanded their foreign investment in the industry. For example, the 
Indian textile corporation, Birla, has opened joint venture plants in Thailand, Indonesia, 
Uganda and the Dominican Republic since the mid-1970s, and Malaysian firms have 
recently made direct investments in Vietnam (Singleton 1997, p.l 17).
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Finally, the development of computer technology and improved transport 
facilities meant that large retailers were able to control production processes anywhere in 
the world. New technology at the point of sale has also enabled retailers to monitor 
fashion trends closely and to look for flexible responses from suppliers. Information, 
designs and orders can be communicated around the world 24 hours a day, and orders can 
be shifted from one production site to another. Companies operating at this global level 
clearly benefit from the free flow of capital and the removal of trade barriers that had 
prevented them from sourcing to the most profitable locations.
In brief, a number of features have characterized the production and trade of 
textiles. First, there is the internationalization of production in terms of the complex 
division of labour and specialization on the international level, and the subsequent 
relocation of production and investments in the textile industry. Related to this, is the 
revelation that the local production of raw materials is not a prerequisite for excelling in 
this industry, while the presence of efficient, trained labour -and not only cheap labour- 
is. Stemming from this overview of the recent trends in textile production and trade there 
seems to be three features that warrants closer examination; 1) the end of MFA, the 
influential protectionist agreement that has in place for almost three decades and the 
implementation of a new agreement; 2) technological changes in production and their 
dissemination to newly industrialized countries; 3) the deconcentration or informalization 
of production i.e. the shift from big plants to small informal workshops.
4. Effects of the Phasing Out of the MFA
The pattern of international trade is likely to change dramatically by the end of 
2005 when the MFA will finally be phased out under the new Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC). This is part of the global process of trade liberalization conducted 
within the framework of the World Trade Organization. The ATC is seen as working in 
the interest of poor countries since it increases their access to previously protected 
markets in the industrialized world. However, as with the MFA, the effects of ACT are 
likely to be more complicated. A closer look at the expected future of some of the 
notable producers within the world economy can demonstrate the unevenness of expected 
effects.
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For example, as has been mentioned, China’s textile and garment exports, 
especially the latter, have proven very competitive (Francois and Spinanger 2001). For 
this reason, they have faced more stringent restrictions under the MFA than exports from 
most other developing countries. In the case of China, one of the more optimistic 
projections foresees China dominating nearly half of global exports in apparel by the 
middle of this decade as trade barriers are progressively removed, as compared with only 
about 15 percent in 1997 (Abernathy et al 2002). Hong Kong and South Korean apparel 
manufacturers, which now scour the world for countries with unused quotas in which to 
base their factories, are already preparing to shift resources to the Chinese mainland to 
take advantage of the new rules. Some analysts predict that, by the end of the decade, 
China will be a net importer of about 17 per cent of textile products sold on the world 
market. Those imports, in turn, will feed into and buttress the growth of apparel exports.
This pattern is already apparent in China’s textile trade, even with all the 
distortions of quotas and tariffs. At the same time, as China’s apparel exports have 
expanded, Chinese imports of chemical fibre and raw materials for making synthetic fibre 
shot up from a mere $183 million in 1975 to $ 3.73 billion by 1995 (Financial Times 
Survey 2004). Du Pont has invested $700m in China and is continuing to look at further 
acquisitions in its core, fibres, plastics, paints and food ingredients businesses. It sells 95 
per cent of its production to domestic buyers. Sales in China, which were $623 million 
for 2003, have almost doubled since 1998 (Financial Times Survey 2004). Thus, 
continuous liberalization of MFA quotas -  culminating in the final elimination of all 
remaining quotas in 2005 -  will lead to further expansion of Chinese exports, probably at 
the expense of some other developing countries.
Concomitantly, because of the Chinese challenge the effects of MFA phasing-out 
on Bangladesh are likely to be different. For example, in 2003, Canada removed cotton 
shirts from its list of items subject to quota restrictions under the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) which governs global garment trading and from the point of view of 
Dhaka, the effects were alarming. It was alarming because, while Bangladesh was 
superseded by competitors on the Canadian front, by 2005, all global quotas for garments 
should be phased out, lifting restrictions on Bangladesh’s rival South and South-East 
Asian producers and freeing all of the global market. Under this competition, only the
65
fastest, least costly and best quality producers will prosper, and although Bangladesh’s 
garments industry has already shown extraordinary vitality and resilience, there are fears 
the industry may not yet be sufficiently mature to cope with 2005. Since the 1980s, 
Bangladesh’s thriving and mostly smaller-scale garments industry has boomed from 
nothing to earn 70 per cent of the country’s hard currency, replacing a sinking jute 
industry which, by 1996, earned just 8 per cent of Bangladesh’s foreign exchange, having 
fallen from 50% in the 1970s (Financial Times Survey 2004). To meet open competition 
after 2005, the Bangladesh industry must compete against China, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and South-East Asian countries which offer similarly cheap and productive labour, 
higher quality clothes and greater integration of their garments industries.
Another major player is India, which already exports $15 billion worth of textile 
products a year, more than two-thirds of which go to the US and the EU. In the past, 
Indian companies would have invested in other markets such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Nepal to elude the ceilings on Indian exports. But now Indian companies are 
building new capacity at home in the expectation that they will snap up the former quota 
share of many smaller African and Asian economies after the termination of MFA. 
Overseas investors, including companies from Singapore, Italy and even Sri Lanka, are 
also setting up production units in India in anticipation. India is also expected to benefit 
overall, particularly in garment exports, although there remain sectors, such as fabrics, 
where India is still inefficient and could lose out to China (Singleton 1997). Scaling the 
value chain has been the experience of India’s textile rivals, China, Taiwan and Thailand, 
where large-scale production has combined with light regulation. Yet, fears of dumping 
are worrying many in India, especially at the bottom end of the garments market, the 
fastest growing sector because of exports (Singleton 1997).
Hence, as these cases demonstrate the phasing-out of MFA, carries a lot of 
potentials as well as threats for key players in the textile industry among the developing 
countries. The threats and potentials are not equally distributed, so while China stands a 
higher chance than Bangladesh for example, India seems to be awaiting combined 
effects. However, the one clear implication that will be witnessed worldwide is that 
competition will be tougher.
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5. Technology
Related to the toughened competition through the end of MFA, is another source 
of competition and huge impact on the textile industry and trade, that is technology. This 
is the second feature (in addition to phasing of MFA and deconcentration of production) 
that has had -and still has- a tremendous impact on textile and apparel production and 
subsequently on the trade competition. The main technological advances that have taken 
place in the textile industry have been in the spinning and weaving sectors o f the industry 
and have had significant impact on the increase of production.
Spinning is the process by which fibres are transformed into standardized yam 
threads. It involves three consecutive processes; drafting, twisting, and winding (Toyne 
et al. 1984, p.37). In the traditional spinning machinery, the three processes were 
interdependently linked by the same fibre flow. This meant that the productivity of the 
frame was limited to the most restrictive factor along this flow. The development of 
open-end rotor spinning made the three processes independent of each other, greatly 
increasing both the efficiency and speed of the spinning process (Toyne et al. 1984, p.38). 
Although, the early versions of open-end rotors that came into use in the late-1960s had 
problems removing trash and dust particles which greatly reduced their efficiency. 
However, during the 1970s, the development of automatic trash and dust removal 
mechanisms, automatic knotting and improved rotor design eliminated most of these 
problems (ILO 1991, p. 83). In the weaving process, which involves the transformation 
of yam threads into woven cloth, a major development has been the replacement of the 
traditional wooden fly shuttle by shuttleless looms driven by air or water jets. The main 
aim of these technological developments in the weaving machinery has been to increase 
the speed and reliability of weft insertion systems. The introduction of shuttleless looms 
has more than tripled the speed of weaving and has also dramatically increased the 
possible fabric widths that can be processed (ILO 1991, p. 84).
Despite the importance of open-end rotor and shuttles looms and -as shown in 
Table 3.3- their increased use from 1975 to 1990 in different countries the dissemination 
and adoption of this seminal technology has not been equal between countries. As can be 
seen, Hong Kong was already extensively using open-end rotors in 1975, only surpassed 
in 1990 by Sweden. In this area, the more industrialized countries seemed to be trying to
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catch up with Hong Kong rather than the other way round. Indeed, the US, the UK and 
Germany were relatively slow in adopting open-end rotors. However, in the case of 
shuttleless looms, all countries had increased their use significantly by 1990, with more 
dramatic increases seen in Germany, France and Italy (over 80 percent replacement), 
Hong Kong (over 70 percent), and Pakistan and Taiwan (over 30 percent) (Lucke 1993, 
p. 1232-1235). By contrast, shuttleless technology is still not widely in use in India and 
Thailand. What these statistics show is that the international dissemination of new 
technology in the textile industry is very rapid, but also very uneven. Not all 
industrialized countries adopt the new technology to the same extent, and some newly 
industrializing countries make extensive and rapid adaptations whereas others do not.
Table 3.3 Open-end rotors and shuttleless looms as percentages of total spinning 
and weaving capacity in selected countries, 1975, 1990
Country Open-end Rotors Shuttleless Looms
1975 1990 1975 1990
France 2.4 29.2 _____ 83.2
Hong Kong 13.8 46.7 1.0 72.0
India — 0.7 0.4 4.8
Italy 2.8 11.3 5.9 83.9
Pakistan 0.1 3.8 0.2 33.3
Sweden 7.6 55.6 _____ _____
Taiwan 1.2 11.0 3.5 36.5
Thailand 0.3 4.3 0.4 6.3
UK 3.4 17.0 18.3 51.0
US 2.6 17.4 6.9 61.8
Germany 3.9 18.0 — 86.6
Source: Lucke (1993 p. 1232-1235)
As for technological developments in the apparel sector, they have been much 
slower. Unlike Mechanization and automation are much more difficult in this kind of 
production. The bulk of a machine operator’s time is spent in loading and unloading 
fabric. Separating a single ply of cloth and guiding it through the sewing machine
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remains almost completely manual, putting strict limits on the speed of the machines. 
While there have been important advances in the design and cutting stages of apparel 
production through the extensive use of computers (Cline 1987), apparel production 
continues to be a highly labour intensive process, relatively resistant to labour saving 
technologies. This has meant a continued comparative advantage to countries with more 
efficient labour.
However, another important technological factor in the struggle for comparative 
advantage in this sector, has been the introduction and rapid spread of the use of man- 
made fibres. Table 3.4 demonstrates that, between 1960 and 1980, the share of synthetic 
fibres as a percentage of total world fibre production rose from 5 to 36 percent. In the 
European Community, the percentage of yam produced from synthetic fibre rose from 26 
to 60 percent, in the United States from 36 to 74 percent, and in Japan from 43 to 74 
percent (Clairmonte and Cavanagh 1981, p.29). However, this technology just as that of 
spinning and weaving was not equally disseminated. In 1983, 60 percent of the world’s 
man-made fibre capacity was concentrated in the hands of 20 companies based in the US, 
Western Europe and Japan.
Table 3.4 World output of cotton, wool, cellulosic and synthetic fibres, 1955-79 (%)
Year Cotton Wool Synthetics Cellulosics
1955 69.9 9.8 2.1 18.2
1960 68.3 9.9 4.6 17.2
1965 62.2 8.1 11.3 18.4
1970 55.5 7.2 21.5 15.8
1974 52.2 4.9 29.1 13.8
1979 47.8 5.1 35.6 11.3
Source: Clairmonte and Cavanagh, (1981: 27)
In contrast, a different direction can be witnessed in changes within the textile 
machinery sector (Table 3.5). In 1970, all the leading exporters of textile machinery 
were industrialized countries. The machinery exports of countries such as South Korea 
were negligible. Between 1970 and 1993, major changes took place in world market
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shares. US companies lost half of their shares and the UK three quarters, while Japanese 
companies’ share of world exports nearly doubled and South Korea and Hong Kong 
joined the list of top ten exporters (Singleton 1997). Although the industrialized 
countries continued to be the main source of exports for spinning and weaving 
machinery, newly industrializing countries became major locations for the production of 
sewing machinery with Hong Kong, China, Brazil, South Korea and Singapore all among 
the top ten exporters (Singleton 1997).9
Table 3.5 World export-market shares of textile and leather machinery, 1970, 1993
Country 1970 (%) Country 1993 (%)
West Germany 30.4 Germany 26.6
UK 12.3 Japan 22.5
Japan 11.4 Italy 12.4
Switzerland 11.3 Switzerland 7.8
U.S 9.7 Hong Kong 5.6
Italy 9.4 U.S 5.0
France 5.6 France 3.4
Belgium-
Luxembourg 2.4 UK 2.9
The Netherlands 1.4 Belgium-Luxembourg 2.3
Sweden 1.1 South Korea 2.1
Source: Singleton, (1997: 79)
In summary, just as the erosion or decline of protectionism with the ending of 
MFA is not straightforward and equal in its impact on developing countries, so is 
technological advancement. Some of the leading players in the field of textile and 
garments, have benefited a lot from technological advancements, while other countries 
have been jeopardized by it or at least put under stress because of the same technologies.
9 Indeed, China has become both a major exporter and a major importer o f  textile machinery. In 1993, 
China was the largest importer o f  textile machinery in the world with 19 percent o f  global exports. The 
Chinese government is currently attempting to create a modem competitive textile machinery industry. 
Major joint ventures with companies from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan are planned and Shanghai is to 
become a major producer o f  shuttleless looms (Singleton, 1997).
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But in all cases, there has been significant technological changes that changed the kind 
and intensity of competition in that sector.
6. Informalisation and Changes in the Concentration of Production
Finally, the third trend that has deservedly received a lot of attention in the 
literature on the textile industry, has been the growth of the small-scale and unrecorded 
sectors of the industry compared to the relative stagnation of the large-scale and recorded 
sectors in some countries. Evidence shows that the small-scale sector continues to 
produce a large segment of the world’s textile products, especially apparel. In 1990, 
establishments with between 4 and 19 workers produced 30 percent of value-added in 
textiles and 29 percent of value-added in apparel in Japan (UNIDO 1993, p. 550). In 
Hong Kong, there were 5,118 textile and 9,757 apparel establishments in 1989, and less 
than 2 percent of the total employed more than 200 workers (UNIDO 1993, p. 540).
Proving the relative growth of the unrecorded sector is extremely difficult. 
Although it can be shown statistically that the large-scale recorded sector is in decline 
and that there is a process of deconcentration within that sector, it is impossible to give 
accurate estimates for the growth of the unrecorded sector. Thus, it is the accumulation 
of case studies of unrecorded establishments and their relative success in particular 
regions that is provided as evidence for a trend of informalisation.
The case of the Indian cotton textile industry is a good example of the decline of 
the large-scale recorded sector and the growth of the small-scale unrecorded sector. 
According to one calculation, the period between 1960 and 1985 saw a clear decline in 
capital productivity (-3 percent), coupled with very modest increases in labour 
productivity (1.9 percent) (Ahluwalia 1991, p. 53). Value-added in the recorded sector of 
the cotton textile industry increased by only 2 percent between 1960 and 1985 compared 
to increases of above 10 percent in fertilizers, electrical generation equipment and 
telecommunications industries and an average 5 percent in manufacturing industries 
overall (Ahluwalia 1991, p.45). There has also been a dramatic decline in employment in 
the recorded large-scale sector of the textile industry in some of the main centers of 
textile production like Bombay and Ahmedabad. In Bombay alone, the cotton textile 
mills lost more than 100,000 jobs during the 1980s.
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The crisis in the recorded large-scale sector compares with empirical evidence 
showing substantial regional growth in the production of small-scale and unrecorded 
establishments. Thus, in the district of Coimbatore, an empirical study of the cotton 
knitting industry in the Indian town of Tirrupur showed that total employment in small- 
scale units (less than 25 workers) increased from an estimated 3,000 in 1960 to 40,000 in 
1985 (Cawthome 1995, p.45). Research into the Tirruppur garment industry showed that 
there was a clear demarcation between large and small firms in terms of both the types of 
garments they produced and the markets to which they sold. The smallest establishments 
including homeworkers and workshops sold mainly to small local markets and made 
garments of simple design and variable quality. The largest firms concentrated on export 
markets, whereas medium-sized firms produced mainly for markets in other Indian states 
(Cawthome 1995, p. 50).
Another example of a similar shift is the development of the Prato textile industry 
in Italy. In 1970, the Prato region was dominated by large, vertically-integrated textile 
mills, using capital intensive machinery. In the mid-1970s, some of the larger mills 
reacted to the economic crisis by adopting a strategy of splitting themselves up into 
smaller more specialized units, and abandoning vertical integration in an attempt to 
reduce labour costs and become more capable of reacting swiftly to changes in demand. 
Cooperation between the new, smaller firms at different stages of the production process 
became an alternative organizational structure. More advanced machinery was 
introduced and firms started producing higher quality goods. The transformation proved 
successful and the region grew into a cluster of small- and medium-sized firms producing 
not only for the Italian market, but increasingly for export markets as well. By 1987, 
Prato had 2,000 textile and clothing enterprises employing 60,000 workers (Singleton 
1997, p .123).
A variety of explanations have been put forward for this phenomenon. Some 
analysts focusing on the industrialized countries claim that it is due to structural changes 
in the industry leading to the demise of Fordist mass production, which had been 
associated with a particular phase of capitalist development and the emergence of flexible 
specialization. Others focus on the changing role of the state following liberalization and 
structural adjustment and the pressures of the world market leading to the dismantling of
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the state-protected, large-scale industrial sector. However, no matter which explanation 
one adheres to, the aspect relevant to this research is that there is a recorded shift towards 
smaller establishments being the bulk of textile and garment producers. This shift is 
directly related to one of the key questions of this research, which has to do changing 
working conditions of labour in the textile producing district of Shubra El-Kheima.
7. Summary
The world textile industry is a growing and highly competitive industry. Since 
the 1960s, there have been major shifts in production and trade, including the emergence 
of an increasingly complex international division of labour, and the newly industrialized 
countries have become major locations of production especially for the more labour 
intensive sectors of the industry. The governments of the industrialized countries 
attempted to control the process of relocation through protective measures, mainly 
through quantitative trade restrictions such as the MFA. However, these measures were 
not successful in themselves in halting the shifts in trade. In fact, they helped spread 
export capabilities to new, less-developed countries and forced restricted countries to 
upgrade their production.
The changes in the textile industry have put intense pressure on firms in different 
countries to restructure and change their industrial strategies. The constant attempt by 
firms in the industrialized countries to cut production costs has resulted in important 
technological developments, particularly in spinning and weaving and the use of man- 
made fibres. These new technologies disseminated rapidly to the newly industrializing 
countries, as labour costs in these countries increased and firms felt concomitant pressure 
to reduce overall costs. Another important trend in several industrialized and developing 
countries is the process of informalisation and deconcentration of production. Large- 
scale, recorded sectors are facing increasingly severe crises and are in the process of 
decline, whereas there is evidence showing that the small-scale, unrecorded sector is 
growing.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EGYPTIAN TEXTILE AND GARMENT INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
The textile industry has played a central role in the development of the Egyptian 
economy since the 19th century. In this chapter, I provide a description of the 
development of this industry in Egypt and assess its current performance. First, I analyze 
the structure of the industry in the 19th century and describe the state’s early attempts to 
initiate a modem, factory-based textile industry. Next, I discuss the birth of the modem 
textile industry, focusing on its links with the local cotton sector. I then chronicle the 
rapid expansion of the industry during the 1950s and 1960s and investigate the 
peculiarities of its dependence on 1) local, high-quality cotton; 2) bilateral Eastern 
European export markets; and 3) restrictive state policies. Finally, I present the effects of 
current liberalization, focusing on the relative performance of the Egyptian textile and 
garments industry in penetrating export markets.
2. The Traditional Industry
Upper Egypt was the center of cotton spinning and weaving during the 19th 
century, and the most-valued cotton was grown locally around the city of Esna. Weavers 
from the area supplemented these supplies with cotton imported from Syria. In Fayoum 
and the Delta, linen was the main material used, while silk brought from Syria was 
woven in Damietta, Mahalla, and Cairo. Cairo was also the main center for looms and 
dyes and, along with Mahalla, Damietta and Qalyub, was where the more sophisticated 
dyeing processes were carried out (Tignor 1989, p. 10). Wool cloth, the most widely- 
produced textile during the 19th century, was woven in most villages. However, the 19th 
century also saw wool gradually replaced by cotton as the preferred textile, as well as an 
increased reliance on imported, rather than locally-spun, yams (Owen 1969). A 1909 
survey of the weaving industry in the southern town of Assiout, for example, notes that 
all the cotton yam used there came from Europe, and particularly from Lancashire (Owen 
1969).
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Weaving continued to be a thriving handicraft industry during the first quarter of 
the 20th century. Mahalla retained its prominence in silk production while Akhmim 
emerged as a major cotton manufacturing region. In Qaliubia, Tignor (1989) estimates 
than an ordinary village of 300 inhabitants would usually have fifteen to twenty looms 
and the provincial capital, Qaliub, possessed workshops with up to thirty looms selling 
their finished products in Cairo. The weaving machines employed at the village-level 
were mainly simple, locally-made ones with only two warps operated by a pedal. At 
Qaliub itself, however, there were also more sophisticated looms with four to six pedals, 
imported from Cairo (Tignor 1989, p. 10). In the Fayoum province, the textile industry 
was marked by a high degree of liberalization. Numerous villages had no weaving at all 
and traded with those communities in which weavers were concentrated (Tignor 1989, p. 
10). The village of Fidimin, fourteen kilometers from the city of Fayoum, not only 
served the entire province but also exported garments to Tanta, Alexandria and Syria. 
Damietta also continued to be a major textile center -  in this case, for silk production -  
with forty workshops housing a total of 200 looms. Processes of concentration were also 
apparent as one single factory contained thirty-seven looms producing 170,000 square 
meters of silk per year, roughly one third of the city’s production (Tignor 1989, p .10). A 
1918 report of the industry estimated that there were 2,455 looms in Mahalla, 450 in 
Akhmim, 390 in Damietta, 2,000 in Qalyub and 1,000 in Qena exporting south to the 
Sudan (Tignor 1989). After the end of World War I, the estimated number increased to a 
total of 13,000 looms producing 22 million square meters of cloth per year. However, 
Egyptian weavers continued their dependence on imported yam with only about 4 million 
kilograms of yam spun locally. Moreover, this growth of the traditional sector, within 
households and small establishments was not complemented and did not lead to the rise a 
of modem textile industry, despite early attempts in this regard.
3. Birth of the Modern Sector
Modem cotton textile manufacturing was first established in the early 19th 
century. Mohamed Ali established the weaving and trading of cotton textiles and 
introduced large-scale cotton spinning. Between 1818 and 1820, cotton spinning mills 
were set up with European machines, together with bleaching and dyeing establishments.
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The introduction of long staple cotton cultivation gave stimulus to government 
investment in the industry. By 1833, thirty factories were operating employing 30,000 
workers at their peak. Power was mainly generated by treadmills propelled by animals, 
although in a few cases steam engines were imported. Jennies and looms were mainly 
manufactured domestically by Egyptian carpenters under the supervision of French 
technicians (Owen 1969, p. 44). Nominal protection of the industry was insignificant, 
but the army provided a safe market and Mohamed Ali kept the industry alive by 
interfering in the importing of textiles and forcing people to buy domestic goods.
Towards the end of the Mohamed Ali period, the industry went into decline and 
the treaty of 1838 between the European powers and the Ottoman empire effectively 
removed all trade obstacles and abolished monopolies. Mohamed Ali was unable to 
continue financing the factories which were operating at a great loss and there was a large 
increase in cotton goods imports, mainly yam and cloth. Weaving and dyeing of coarse 
cloth continued at the traditional handicraft level (Mabro 1974).
From the 1840s until the end of the 1920s, Egypt was a free trade area. There was 
an 8 percent tariff on imports but this was not strictly implemented and thus was 
ineffective. That is because during this period, the rulers of Egypt (whether the Khedives 
or the British) promoted the cultivation and export of cotton and the import of 
manufactures. Textiles were the major component of Egypt’s import trade. They 
constituted about one third of the value of Egyptian imports during the last decade of the 
19th century and about 30 percent between 1905 and 1914 (Mabro 1974). Britain was the 
main source of textiles for the Egyptian market, accounting for about 60 percent of the 
value of Egypt’s textile imports between 1903 and 1913 (Owen 1969, p.309). Thus, the 
state -mled by the British- neither provided serious tariff protection (international treaties 
forbade change until 1930), nor favorable railway rates (which gave advantages to the 
transport of agricultural products).
In the late 1890s, a brief financial boom saw the creation of a number of new joint 
stock companies. Among these companies were two modem textile firms, administered 
by foreign businessmen resident in Egypt: Anglo-Egyptian Spinning and Weaving
Company and Egyptian Cotton Mills. Both companies rapidly entered severe crisis. 
Lord Cromer, Britain’s Consul General, enacted an 8 percent excise tax on local
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manufacturers signaling that the government would not encourage their efforts. On the 
other hand, the financial boom ended with a crash in 1907 that destroyed most of the 
newly formed companies. The Egyptian Cotton Mills went bankrupt, while the Anglo- 
Egyptian Cotton and Spinning Company managed to sell its assets, originally valued at 
£150,000 to a new group of foreign residential investors for £37,000. The new owners 
reorganized the firm under a new name, La Filiature Nationale d’Egypte, and it went on 
to play an important role in the subsequent development of the Egyptian textile industry. 
The First World War gave the company a boost and allowed it to expand. Cut off from 
traditional European suppliers, Egyptian consumers turned to local manufacturers. By 
1918, the company had 20,000 spindles, 560 looms and its own power plant o f 1,000 
horsepower (Tignor 1989, p. 12).
A law was passed in 1916 prohibiting the importing of foreign raw cotton for 
domestic use. The reason given for this law was the protection of domestic cotton from 
foreign plant diseases. In retrospect, it seems clear that this was only a pretext for a 
protection measure, which served mainly the big landowners who were also the major 
cotton growers. This law dealt a severe blow to the textile industry as the domestic 
cotton was of too high a quality and, hence, too expensive for the mass production of 
cheap cloth to meet the significant domestic demand. As far back as 1898, Egyptian 
spinning mills had been importing Indian short staple cotton to produce such coarse cloth 
at competitive prices. The impact of the 1916 law made the industry unable to compete 
in foreign markets because of high raw material costs. The industry became restricted to 
a protected market, sheltered at first by the 8 percent tariff and, later, by higher rates 
when Egypt obtained tariff autonomy in 1930 (Mabro 1974, p.25).
During the war, the Filature Company had 900 employees and produced 9 million 
square meters of cotton piece goods per year. By 1922, the factory had increased its size 
to 1,500 workers and had 40 thousand spindles using mainly Egyptian, lower grade 
cotton. Its annual output was 4.25 million pounds of yam and 9 million yards of gray 
cloth. By 1930, on the eve of the tariff reform, the company had increased its plant 
capacity to 60,000 spindles and 800 power looms (Mabro 1974). The presence of this 
massive company with its total vertical integration of spinning, weaving, bleaching, 
dyeing and printing works helped to establish cost of entry into the modem textile sector,
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and the company’s increasing political weight kept it afloat even during periods of 
inefficiency (Tignor 1989, p. 14).10 By the end of the first world war, Filature, which was 
heavily capitalized relative to Egyptian industry, served the domestic market by 
manufacturing only coarse and roughly woven gray cloth. Its technical capacity was 
limited and its output was relatively uncompetitive with imports from Britain, India, 
Japan and Italy. The state had helped Filature to survive by removing the excise on its 
manufactures between 1909 and 1918. It then reintroduced the tax at the reduced rate of 
4 percent (Mabro 1974, p. 25). The domination of the industry by large, vertically- 
integrated firms was increased by the fact that tariff reforms were scheduled for the 
precise date of 1930, forcing such companies to expand capacity and encouraging leading 
businessmen to establish large and powerful firms. Thus, Filature expanded its capital in 
anticipation and purchased more machinery in the late 1920s. In 1927, it increased its 
preference share capitalization to LE 320,000, making it the sixth most heavily 
capitalized industrial company in Egypt (Tignor 1989, p. 14).
At this time, a major new entrant into the modem textile industry was Bank Misr, 
founded in 1920 by Talaat Harb. The central aim of the bank was to diversify Egyptian 
capital from its agricultural base into the emerging financial and industrial sectors. The 
central effort in terms of industry was the establishment of the Misr Spinning and 
Weaving Company in Mahalla. The company began with a large capitalization of LE 
300,000, equal to that of Filature. This changed quickly however as the new company 
increased its capitalization first to LE 500,000 in 1933, then to LE 800,000 in 1934 and, 
finally, to LE 1 million in 1936. The intention was to establish a massive vertically- 
integrated spinning, weaving and finishing establishment and to transform A1 Mahalla al 
Kubra into a major textile center for the whole region. The strategy was successful and, 
by the 1940s, this textile establishment was one of the largest plants in the world (Tignor 
1989, p.59). It marked the real start of a significant industrialized textile industry in 
Egypt.
The one other modem textile company, the silk factory o f  the Lawzy family in Damietta, also began to 
vertically integrate its production. It spun and wove silk and had plans to create finishing works (Tignor 
1989).
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4. The Second World War and The Rise of State Intervention
World War II enabled the Egyptian textile industry to expand dramatically. The 
most obvious indication of this expansion lay in increased output. The war brought a 
sharp decrease in imports coupled with an increase in demand fuelled by the allied troops 
stationed in Egypt. In 1938, Egypt imported LE 3.34 million worth of cotton textiles, 
representing about 9 percent of the value of all Egyptian imports (Mabro and Radwan 
1976, p. 63). By 1943, this amount had dropped to L.E 1.85 million, less than 3 percent 
of total imports. Egyptian imports of cotton fabrics fell from 13,270 metric tons in 1938- 
1939, to 3,880 metric tons in 1948-1950, to 860 metric tons in 1954-1956 (Mabro and 
Radwan 1976). Domestic output increased to fill the gap. Local firms, starting from a 
production of 93 million square meters in 1938, increased their output of woven cotton 
fabrics by 10 percent per year during the war so that, by 1946, domestic production stood 
at 195 million square meters per year (Mabro and Radwan 1976, p. 63).
During this period, there was a rise in five major vertically-integrated textile firms 
(Beida, SEIT, Filature, the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company and the Misr Fine 
Spinning and Weaving Company) which played a decisive role in this expansion. The 
total production of cotton yam by the two Misr companies rose from 16.35 million 
kilograms in 1940 to 23.89 million in 1946. Their production of cotton piece goods 
increased from 93.39 million yards in 1940 to 135.36 million yards in 1946 (Tignor 1989, 
p.5 8). At the same time, the import of textile machinery rose from 1,100 tons in 1940 to 
an annual average of 11,500 tons in the period between 1946 and 1950 in order to support 
this increased production.
To satisfy domestic demand for cheap cotton cloth, large spinning and weaving 
mills were subjected to a system of government fixed prices on low-grade cloth in 1950. 
This measure was one of the first direct, large-scale government interventions into the 
price mechanism for manufactured products after the war. This trend of state 
intervention was continued after the Korean boom, when textile exports fell to nearly half 
the level reached in 1951. In 1953, two protective measures were taken. Custom duties 
on cotton textiles were increased and a fund for the consolidation of the spinning and 
weaving industry was established. The fund which was financed by export taxes on
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cotton was aimed primarily at promoting exports by reorienting production towards the 
specifications o f foreign demands and by granting subsidies to cotton textile exporters. 
After the elimination of the export tax on raw cotton at the end of the 1950s, export 
subsidies for textiles were financed by an excise tax of 2.5 to 5 percent, which was later 
increased to 6 percent on the value of the raw cotton consumed by the spinning mills 
(Mabro and Radwan 1976, p.212). Thus, the production of cotton yam grew rapidly 
between 1950 and 1971 with an average rate of 5.5 percent per year.
Concomitantly, there was a growth of textile exports, particularly of yam, but this 
was mainly due to the opening of a large market in Eastern Europe, which is another 
indirect form of state intervention, through politicized agreements11. Yams were 
exported to Romania as early as 1954, and large exports of fabrics to Eastern European 
countries began in 1964. Of the roughly 30,000 ton increase in yam exports from 1957 to 
1966, almost 24,000 tons went to bilateral trade partners (roughly 48 percent of Egypt’s 
total exports of cotton yam and fabrics in 1970-71). The exports to multilateral partners 
between 1957 and 1967 also increased (Davies 1988). In 1955, the unit values obtained 
in the multilateral and bilateral markets were basically the same, but gradually a relative 
increase in the prices of yam and cloth exported to bilateral Eastern European partners 
took place, particularly after the Soviet Union became a large-scale importer of Egyptian 
textiles in the early-1960s (Davies 1988). The Soviet Union was a major short staple 
cotton producer and wanted to supplement its own coarse yam production with finer 
yams from Egypt, particularly because its lagging production of synthetic fibers 
compelled it to use a relatively large proportion of long staple cotton. During the period 
1964 to 1970, prices obtained in the Eastern European markets for cotton yam were 
almost double those of Western markets.12 By the mid-seventies, however, exports of 
cloth to bilateral trade partners stabilized at about 5,500 tons annually.
5. Cotton Production and the Textile Industry
11 This was during the era o f  close collaboration and warm political relations between Egypt and the USSR 
from 1955 to 1973.
12 It is important to note that the prices obtained were received in the form o f commodities -  especially 
weapons — in barter like agreements with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Mabro and Radwan 1976: 
219).
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The textile industry in Egypt and Egypt as a major producer of premium-long and 
extra-long staple cotton, cannot be separated. Cotton is the country’s largest agricultural 
export and was for many years the most extensively subsidized commodity. However, 
the sector has suffered from inconsistent state policy, inflexible export pricing and a 
government policy aimed at propping up the debt-ridden state-owned spinning and 
weaving industries through the provision of cheap cotton. In the 1960s, when the state 
nationalized the cotton trade and the spinning, weaving and textile industry, the 
government was determined regulate the areas and cotton varieties to be planted. The 
state bought the entire crop at a fixed price, supplied its own spinning mills and exported 
the remaining lint. Experts point out that the public-sector mills used local cotton 
varieties which were double the prices of imported Greek or Syrian cotton. However, 
because of state intervention, the mills were not allowed to import. Another reason why 
the mills did not import is that they were losing money and they did not have the liquidity 
to buy from abroad. Instead, they bargained with the state trading companies to get the 
inputs they needed.
From March 1996, the state began to allow import of lower grade short-staple 
cotton from all cotton producing countries, leaving higher value cotton strains free for 
export. In the 1998-1999 season, the government fully liberalized the cotton trade by 
refusing to set a cotton purchase price and by allowing private traders to participate. The 
harvest fell from 345,700 tonnes in 1996-1997 to 206,300 tonnes in 2000-2001, before 
recovering slightly to 285,000 tonnes in 2002-2003 (Financial Times Survey 2004). For 
the 2000-2001 season, the government set a ceiling of 50,000 tonnes each for exports of 
long staple and extra long staple. Although private traders could now buy cotton from 
the market and export it, most o f the crop still went to six state trading companies all 
controlled by the same chairman. When the ceiling is reached, the dealers are told to stop 
exporting (Financial Times Survey 2004).
Moreover, overall cotton output has been constrained by the limited availability of 
cultivated land and adversely affected by the increasing diversification of crops to include 
more fruits and vegetables. Two and three year crop rotations meant that land sown for 
cotton production is limited to a maximum of 20 percent of the total cultivable land -  a 
threshold reached by 1952. Cultivated areas for all varieties have since fallen; most
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notably, by 17.2 percent during 1988-1992 (or 16 percent and 17.6 percent for long and 
medium staple, respectively) (Fletcher 1998), and Egypt’s share of the world’s extra long 
cotton staples also has fallen dramatically. In the 1980-1981 season, Egyptian output of 
this variety was 2.4 million bales, or about 59.2 percent of total world production. By the 
1989-1990 season, Egyptian output was only 1.3 million bales at a time when world 
production had risen to 4.9 million bales and as a result the Egyptian share of the total fell 
to 27 percent (Fletcher 1998). Thus, cotton production and exports have declined, and 
the proportion of cultivated land sown to cotton has consequently dropped sharply, down 
from 924,000 ha in 1962 to 302,400 ha in 2002-2003.
For much of the period between 1952 and 1980, the cotton crop averaged about 
10 million metric qantars, or 1.53 million bales. While 7 million qantars were produced 
in 1989/90, output fell to below 5.7 million qantars in 1990/91, before rising again the 
following year to 5.9 million qantars. Long staples initially dominated the output until 
the mid-1970s, when they accounted for about 40 percent of total production. By the end 
of the 1980s, however, medium varieties made up about 70 percent of output. And in 
1992, medium staple production accounted for over 73 percent of total cotton output 
(Fletcher 1998). Table 4.1 shows production statistics for long and medium staple cotton 
varieties between 1952 and 1992:
Table 4.1 Cotton: cultivated area, production and yield, selected years13
ALL
VARIETIES 1952 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Cultivated Area 1967 980 1014 1006 993 851 840
Production 8233 6029 5422 5055 5169 5023 5992
Yield 4.19 6.15 5.35 5.02 5.21 5.9 7.13
LONG STAPLE
Cultivated Area 965 233 237 253 253 252 199
Production 3830 1431 1454 1490 1490 1637 1586
Yield 3.97 6.14 6.14 5.89 5.89 6.5 7.97
MEDIUM
Cultivated Area 278 747 777 753 740 599 640
Production 1081 4598 3968 3679 3679 3384 4396
Yield 3.89 6.16 5.11 4.97 4.97 5.65 6.83
13 Area in thousand feddans, production in thousand metric qantars, yield in metric qantars per feddan
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Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics
The fact that the production of long staple cotton declined sharply during that 
period, meant that Egypt lost its niche both in cotton exports and the production of high- 
grade textile and garments, both of which are dependent on long-staple types. Thus, 
under both nationalized state-interventionist policies and liberalization, the Egyptian state 
did not manage to put in place conducive policies for dealing with cotton, which 
adversely affected the production and export of textiles.
6. Export Failure
As explained in Chapter Three, the last four decades of the 20th century saw an 
increase in the value of world trade in textiles and garments by 6,000 percent, from 6 
billion dollars in 1962 to 342 billion dollars in 2001, representing 5.7 percent of total 
world trade. Trade in garments increased by a factor of 100 (Fawzy 2003, p.9). During 
the 1990s, China, the USA and the EU dominated the textiles and garments trade with an 
average of 59 percent and 84 percent of exports and 76 percent and 61 percent of imports, 
respectively (Fawzy 2003). Moreover, the current share of developing economies in the 
world trade in textiles and garments is 50 percent and 70 percent respectively (Fawzy 
2003, p. 9). Unlike the trend in many other developing countries, however, the share of 
Egyptian textile and garment exports in world trade has been decreasing since the early 
1990s. In the case of textiles, Egypt’s share of world exports fell from 0.53 percent in 
1990 to 0.2 percent in 2001. As for garments, the Egyptian share fell from 0.13 percent 
in 1990 to 0.12 percent in 2001 (Fawzy 2003, p.l 1).
This failure has already started in the 1980s after Egypt relations with the Eastern 
bloc have worsened -which as mentioned earlier in this chapter was the major importer. 
The country’s textile exports stagnated during the first half of the 1980s, with knitted 
fabrics and terry fabrics declining dramatically and woven fabrics registering an average 
annual decline of 0.4 percent. Textile exports increased slightly in the second half of the 
1980s, with cotton yam exports reaching a peak of $396 million in 1989 mainly as a 
result of the flexible exchange rate policy introduced in 1987 (Fawzy 2003). However, 
this increase proved temporary, as shown in table 4.2. Also, cotton yam exports declined 
dramatically in 1990 and the declining trend continued through 1992, registering an
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average annual decline of 14.7 percent during 1989-1992 against a 5.7 percent decline 
suffered by textile exports in general (USAID 1993).
Table 4.2 Textile exports, 1980-1992, selected years (million $)
1980 1985
Average 
growth per 
annum %
1980-1985
1989 1990 1991 1992
Average 
growth per 
annum %
1985-1992
Cotton
yam 181 197 1.8 396 340 271 245 -14.7
Woven
fabrics 53 52 -0.4 77 79 88 65 -4.1
Knitted
fabrics 15 9 -8.0 60 65 73 77 8.7
Terry
fabrics 3 2 -6.8 6 4 5 6 26.1
Source: USAID, Cairo 1993
With the change of the political context, Egypt’s trading partners change, with the 
USA and the EU replacing the Eastern bloc. As shown in table 4.3, the primary 
destinations for Egyptian textile and garment products became the European Union and 
the United States, with 51 percent and 42 percent respectively.
Table 4.3 Geographical distribution of Egyptian textile and garment exports
Destination Average % 
(1998-2001)
USA 42
EU 51
Other Europe 1.7
Arab Countries 3.3
Non-Arab Asian 1.5
Other 0.5
Source: www.economv.eov.eg
However, the Egyptian portion of both those markets have been declining in both 
relative and absolute terms. So, in European Union the share of Egyptian textile and 
garment exports fell from 2.2 percent in 1995 to 0.5 percent in 2001 for textiles, and from 
0.4 percent in 1995 to 0.3 percent in 2001 for garments (Fawzy 2003, p. 12). Likewise,
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the same trend is evident in exports to the United States, where the share of Egyptian 
exports between 1995 and 2001 fell from 0.9 to 0.8 percent in the case of textiles and 
remained stagnant at 0.6 percent in the case of garments (Fawzy 2003, p. 13). This poor 
record becomes even clearer when compared to that of other developing countries. The 
following four tables compare market shares of a selection of developing lowei-middle 
income countries in the EU and the USA markets for textiles and garments:
Table 4.4 Market shares of textile exports in EU market: Egypt and a selection of 
developing countries (2001)
Country Market share (%)
China 10.15
Turkey 8.55
India 8.02
Pakistan 4.48
Indonesia 2.61
Thailand 1.56
Egypt 0.5
Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2002
Table 4.5 Market shares of garment exports in EU market: Egypt and a selection of
developing countries (2001)
Market share (%)
China 14.48
Turkey 9.49
Tunisia 4.65
India 4.16
Morocco 4.14
Bangladesh 3.95
Indonesia 2.99
Thailand 1.82
Pakistan 1.47
Egypt 0.3
Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2002
Table 4.6 Market shares of textile exports in US market: Egypt and a selection of
developing countries (2001)
85
Market share (%)
China 17.41
Mexico 9.86
India 7.42
Pakistan 6.16
Turkey 2.82
Thailand 2.24
Indonesia 1.25
Brazil 1.23
Egypt 0.8
Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2002
Table 4.7 Market shares of garment exports in US market: Egypt and a selection of
developing countries (2001)
Market share (%)
China 18.61
Mexico 13.13
Dominican R. 3.80
Honduras 3.77
Indonesia 3.48
Thailand 3.31
Bangladesh 3.24
Philippines 3.10
India 3.08
El Salvador 2.44
Egypt 0.60
Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2002
The above tables show how the Egyptian textile and garment industry have been 
unable to significantly penetrate the main export markets of the US and the EU, unlike 
other third world countries that have captured significant shares in those markets at the 
beginning of the 21st century. That is not to mention being able to penetrate other smaller 
markets within the Arab world or other regions. This failure in textile exports is in line 
with the general failure in creating an export-led economy described in Chapter Three,
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and reflects the malfunctioning of the textile and garment industry described earlier in 
this chapter.
7. Summary
This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the development and performance 
of the Egyptian textile and garment industry. The chapter provided a description of the 
traditional textile industry during the 19th century. This was found to be a thriving 
industry of home-based, small-scale establishments with a complex specialization 
between and within several towns in the Delta and Upper Egypt. An attempt to establish 
a modem factory-based industry during the first half of the 19th century could not be 
sustained due to a variety of internal and external factors. In the 1920s and 1930s, a 
number of large, modem, vertically-integrated textile mills were established that relied 
mainly on Egyptian cotton and served the growing local market. These large-scale 
establishments were expanded and several more were established after the nationalization 
of industry in the 1960s, but the industry continued to rely on high cost, high value 
locally-produced cotton, selling to a highly protected local market and exporting mainly 
to the USSR and other Eastern European markets. In the 1980s and 1990s, the industry 
went into severe crisis as the Eastern European markets collapsed. The industry was not 
able to compete in other export markets and cheaper imported textiles and garments 
began to penetrate the local market despite protection.
With the initiation of market liberalization and structural adjustment in the 1990s, 
the government hoped to improve the competitiveness of the industry. This, however, 
did not materialize and the industry was not able to partake in the rapidly growing export 
markets. In fact, the relative performance of Egyptian textile and garment exports was 
negative. Thus, after more than a decade of liberalization policies, the share of Egyptian 
textiles and garments in World trade continues to shrink.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction
The aim of this research project is to investigate the dynamics of small-scale 
garment production in an old industrial region north of Cairo. This subject lies at the 
crossroads between a number of important theoretical and research issues. What is the 
nature of the sector? How does it fit into the urban labour market? How does it relate to 
rural-urban migration? In what ways do small-scale enterprises, which dominate the 
industry, interact within the sector and with other sectors of the economy? What are the 
conditions of labour in such enterprises? Is the sector growing and how is this affected 
by changes in the national and global economy?
Each of these questions has been the focus of large amounts of research and 
theoretical debate. The following chapter will critically analyze some of the more 
influential interpretations. My aim will be, first, to show the inadequacy of dualist 
models which I will explain in the following section, and, then, to explain the growth of 
the informal sector through a critical review of a range of explanations. Finally, I will 
review some of the more recent literature on interactions within the sector, and between it 
and the rest of the economy, focusing on the phenomena of clustering and subcontracting.
2. Dualist Models and the Informal Sector Debate
In the first two decades after the Second World War, the fields of development 
theory and planning were dominated by an ideal-type model based on state-led growth. 
According to this model, overall economic growth would be achieved through a state 
policy o f centralized planning for accelerated industrialization. This particular emphasis 
was based on the assumption that large-scale industrialization could create investment 
capital and save foreign exchange through import substitution at a rate much faster than 
any other policy. It was often assumed that a policy designed to maximize GNP would 
provide the resources needed to develop the whole economy. And accordingly, industrial 
expansion would result in increased wage sector employment on the basis that there was 
inevitably a positive relationship between the growth of output, employment and labour
productivity. Social aspects of rapid urbanization, which included such problems as 
squatter settlements and large-scale poverty and unemployment, were seen as temporary 
pressures that would pass with time. In the process of modernization, migrant workers 
from rural areas would gradually become absorbed into the city. With increased 
participation in the urban structure, they would shift from their marginal position towards 
integration, moving from peripheral occupations to industrial sector wage employment 
(Moser 1978, p. 1042). However, by the 1970s this model proved a failure, with ISI not 
generating the expected economic growth, and those socio-economic problems related to 
urbanization and employment not fading away.
There are a variety of explanations for the subsequent failure of this model of 
modernization. Some analysts argue that the rate of population growth, aggravated by 
the migration of large numbers of peasants from the rural areas, has meant that the rate of 
urbanization has far outstripped that of industrialization under the prevailing conditions 
of capitalist economic development (for a review of this literature see Asaad 2002). 
Others state that the inability of the industrialization process to absorb the large numbers 
of unskilled workers into the productive urban labour force has resulted in immense 
poverty, underemployment and unemployment for a considerable proportion of the urban 
population (Moser 1978). Rural poverty and unemployment were, according to this 
theory, a result of insufficient access to land. This resulted in the large-scale migration of 
peasants to the towns, to enter the urban labour force. With an accelerated growth of 
import substitution policy, urban wage sector employment was limited by the nature of 
the capital intensive manufacturing industrial sector which incorporated only a small 
proportion of the labour force. Therefore most migrants found work in what was called 
the informal sector. This included economic activities largely escaping recognition, 
enumeration, regulation and protection by the state.
Thus it was assumed that the urban scene in developing countries was divided 
into two clearly demarcated sectors. Definitions as to the exact nature of the two sectors 
have varied depending on the particular criteria used. For example they have been seen 
as: two opposing systems of production, one derived from capitalist forms of production, 
the other from the peasant system. Or as two types of economy, a firm centered economy 
and a bazaar type economy. Or as two circuits, the upper and lower circuits. Or as two
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sectors, a high profit / high wage international oligopolistic sector and a low profit / low 
wage competitive capitalistic sector. However, all of these models assumed a dualist 
typology.
Dualist models were first used to characterise rural subsistence areas as 
repositories of surplus labour that would be absorbed gradually into modem industry. As 
developing cities expanded, the modem sector could not keep pace with the influx of 
workers from the so-called traditional economy. Thus, the apparent permanence of large, 
poor populations in developing cities was accounted for only by suggesting that they 
were dedicated simply to surviving while queuing for entry into modem firms. An 
influential economic model for dual labour markets in developing cities was introduced 
by J.Harris and M.Todaro in the late 1960s. This model divides the urban labour market 
into two sectors: the first, a “formal” dominant modem capitalist sector, characterized by 
modem organizational structures, capital intensive technologies, and relatively high 
productivity. It includes firms with a corporate form and government enterprises with 
stable employment policies. Wages in this sector are kept high through the collusion of 
the government and labour unions. The second sector, is an “informal” traditional, small- 
scale, backward sector of the economy, characterized by simple technologies, little 
capital, low productivity and low wages (Kannappan 1985).
According to this model, the high wages of the formal sector are the major 
attraction pole for migrants from the countryside who migrate in search of jobs. 
However, the closed nature of the protected and slow growing formal sector means that 
the majority of migrants will not get jobs and will therefore end up swelling the ranks of 
the unemployed or take up the available low wage, low productivity jobs of the informal 
sector. Yet when migrants do take up jobs in the informal sector it is only, for them, a 
transitional period until they find a job opening in the formal sector. In this model a 
situation of severe labour surplus exists in rural areas due to over population and low 
investment in agriculture. Likewise, in the urban areas there is a severely limited demand 
for labour due to the dualistic division of the urban labour market. It is by this excess 
supply and limited demand for labour that the model seeks to explain the supposed high 
rates of unemployment and underemployment and the large size of the so called informal 
sector in developing cities.
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Another version of this same model was developed by Mazumdar and others at 
the World Bank and is also based on a dichotomy within the urban labour market, and 
describes the informal sector as unprotected as opposed to the formal protected sector. 
This conception with its emphasis on urban labour markets, derives from a particular 
concern with the problems of labour absorption -  the slow rate at which increase in the 
Third World city working age populations are being absorbed into productive 
employment. The existence of a highly fragmented labour market is attributed to a 
combination of market forces, institutional arrangements and public policies, and results 
in the inefficient utilization o f labour resources. With its emphasis on restrictions on 
supply, the approach is based on the assumption that barriers exist to free labour mobility. 
These restrictions, generally are raised by coercive government regulations that include 
minimum wage regulations and rationing of public sector jobs. Mazumdar describes his 
dualist model as follows:
The basic distinction between the two sectors turns on the idea that 
employment in the formal sector is in some senses protected so that the 
wage levels and working conditions in the sector are not available in 
general to the job seekers in the market, unless they manage to cross the 
barrier of somehow. This kind of protection may arise from the action of 
trade unions, of governments or of both acting together. (Mazumdar 1975,
p.262)
Here it is argued that minimum wage legislation and the encouragement of collective 
bargaining stimulates real wages to increase independently of productivity gains, which 
retards the growth of employment by requiring producers to choose excessively capital 
intensive activities. Equally, the import substitution strategy, implemented through 
investment incentives and protection from imports, shields profits from the rising costs of 
labour. The result being the development of a protected sector whose participants are the 
main beneficiaries of the growth process, and of the majority of the population cut off 
from participation in the protected sector (Moser 1978, p. 1054).
The informal sector as a sociological concept was introduced by Keith Hart in 
1971. In fact his theory was entirely based on empirical data from Ghana, and was the
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result of fieldwork carried out among urban workers outside the wage sector. Hart’s 
dualist model of informal and formal sectors was based on a distinction between wage 
earning and self-employment. The informal sector in this model consists of economic 
activities characterized by ease of entry into the activity concerned, reliance on 
indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, small-scale of operation, labour 
intensive and adapted technology, skills acquired outside the formal school system, and 
unregulated and competitive markets. That is versus the formal sector which consists of 
the converse characteristics with entry by new enterprises difficult, operating on a large- 
scale in markets protected by tariffs, quotas and trade licenses, using capital intensive 
technology and with workers with formally acquired skills.
The informal sector was seen as providing a means of livelihood for new entrants 
to the urban labour force who, through lack of opportunities and training, were unable to 
obtain employment in the formal sector. The significant difference between Hart’s 
approach and earlier dualist models was in the identification of new income generating 
activities in the informal sector. Thus “the semi-automatic classification of unorganized 
workers as underemployed shoe-shine boys and sellers of matches contrasts with a view 
which stresses the important part played by these workers in supplying many of the 
essential services on which life in the city is dependent” (Sethuraman 1976, p. 69). This 
gave the informal sector a lot of emphasis as part of the economy, versus the earlier 
versions that disregarded it as being simply a symptom of malfunctioning of the 
economy.
Despite this difference, the dual labour market model on which all these theories 
are based has many weaknesses. The first weakness is that there is very little evidence to 
support the claimed wage differential between so called formal and informal urban 
sectors. Thus in Peru, for example, it was found that nearly 60 percent of incomes in the 
informal sector were in the top urban quartile (De Soto 2000). Similarly, in Bombay, 
head load carriers and porters, typically informal sector jobs, had wages that were above 
those of unskilled workers in many of the formal sector establishments (Kannappan
1985). The assumption that unskilled migrants had particularly low wages or were 
unemployed has also had many empirical refutations. For example in Sao Paolo, 
unskilled migrants entered the labour market at a spectrum of wages ranging above and
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below the legal minimum. Also in Casablanca, employers had difficulties recruiting 
unskilled labour at the legal minimum wage (Kannapan 1985). One of the least 
supported claims of the dual labour market theory is the existence of a commitment by 
governments to maintain high urban formal wages in collaboration with or under pressure 
from trade unions. Thus Richard Webb, in a study of 27 developing countries, found that 
there was no apparent correlation between political systems, labour union power and the 
level of urban wages (Webb 1991).
Another serious problem with the dual labour market model is its analysis of the 
rural-urban migration process. The idea that the impoverished rural population flows into 
the cities in search of jobs has been refuted by empirical research which has shown that 
migrants are usually better endowed in terms of education and skills and are rarely from 
the poorest section of the rural population. It has also been established that migration 
does not take place blindly but takes place in particular paths established by former 
migrants from the same village or region, and that migrants move to the city with a 
considerable amount of knowledge of their employment potential, also that a majority of 
migrants get jobs very soon after their arrival in the city (Berry and Sabot 1978).
The urban labour market in developing countries is much more complex and 
dynamic than is assumed in the simplistic dual labour market model. It cannot be divided 
into clearly demarcated sectors. The assumption that the functioning of a complex labour 
market can be reduced to any static model is very misleading. As Richard Webb 
explains:
The labour market is like a ja r  of honey which is continually being rotated 
at different rates and angles. The position and shape of the honey will 
depend crucially on its own fluidity or stickiness, and on the movement of 
the jar ... In the urban labour markets there is a similar relationship 
between a continually changing environment and a continually adjusting 
supply of labour. (Webb 1991, p. 121)
Thus, although there is clearly formal and informal urban labour sectors, it the 
difference in work conditions and characteristics of those two sectors is not necessarily as 
clear. Differences and similarities do exist between the two shedding doubt on the 
different dualist models adopted when studying the two sectors. Hence, this study -as
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will be shown in through field work- will further question those models, and clarify the 
similarities between the two sectors. However, before doing this the following section 
will introduce another understanding of the two sectors, based on petty-commodity 
production, which is equally misleading and as widely-used as the dual model.
3. Petty Commodity Production
Recognition that considerable internal differentiation exists in the urban economy 
among small-scale enterprises in the manufacturing, services and transport sectors has led 
to the development of an alternative framework based on a continuum of economic 
activities rather than a two-sector dualist division. Correspondingly workers are seen to 
be employed in a number of different categories outside the well-defined wage sector of 
large-scale enterprises. These include wage and salaried labourers for small-scale 
operators, self employed owners and unpaid family labourers, as well as casual workers 
in wage sector employment. Equally the linkages between the small-scale and the large- 
scale sectors are numerous and diverse. These include direct incorporation through 
subcontracting and outworkers, as well as more complicated procedures such as the 
“utilization in retail distribution of agents who put up their own deposits thereby relieving 
the mother company of many of the risks involved” (Moser 1978, p. 1056). However the 
theoretical underpinning to this approach is also based on dividing the economy into two 
categories.
In discussing the urban sector Bienfield has proposed an analysis which entails 
the identification of different modes of production and focuses on the articulation of these 
modes of production. The various modes adapt to each other, each becoming dependent 
on the other and each loosing its identity and independence to some degree (Bienefeld 
1975). Under this model, in a given economy, more than one mode of production is 
identified. In the urban sector the modes of production referred to are; on the one hand 
the capitalist sector, deeply integrated in the international economy, and on the other 
hand, a variety of pre-capitalist modes each more or less transformed through its relation 
with the former. The form this symbiosis takes is historically specific in that it depends 
on the resource base and the level of the forces of production of the capitalist sector, on 
the socio-political framework within which capital operates, on the extent of its
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accumulation and local growth, and on the nature of the non-capitalist mode of 
production within with which it interacts (Bienefeld 1975). According to this theory the 
vast majority of small-scale enterprises, of the type described as being in the informal 
sector, fit into the category of petty commodity production. In describing the nature of 
their relationships to the capitalist mode of production under the sectoral analysis 
articulated above, petty commodity production is identified as a transitional mode 
between feudal and other non-capitalist modes and the capitalist mode of production. 
There is an “articulation” between the capitalist and the pre-capitalist sectors in which the 
latter is exploited and “under developed” by the former (Lewin 1985).
This seems to be an extension of dependency theory with the large-scale sector 
playing the role of the center and the informal sector that of the periphery. There is very 
little difference between this theory and that of the dual labour market theory. Both see 
the large-scale sector as being protected and closed and detrimental to workers in the 
unrecorded sector. The former calls it capitalist, the latter calls it formal. Both view the 
small unrecorded sector as marginal, relatively unproductive, and transitional. The 
former calls it petty commodity production, the latter calls it informal sector.
4. Deconcentration of Production
Part of the interest in informal economy and the rise of both the dual and petty 
commodity models has been the growth of small-scale casual economic activities in 
developing cities, which has been an important issue of debate and research in the past 
three decades. This debate has been dominated by a particular model of industrialization 
which makes two basic assumptions. The first of these is that the process of 
industrialization that took place in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries involved a 
continuous and linear concentration and centralisation of economic activities. The 
second claim is that industrialization in the developing cities should follow the same path. 
The growth and persistence of small-scale activities is seen to be a result of the failure 
and or difficulties of industrialization in developing countries. This model for economic 
development assumed that the ideal to which all economies should move and indeed were 
moving was towards large-scale units of production and employment organised by giant 
vertically integrated corporations.
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The main ingredients of this model are firstly, a system of mass production of 
standardized products. Secondly, a constant market expansion to minimise costs and 
assure absorption of output. Thirdly, Keynesian type demand management policies and 
income stabilisation schemes to assure stable and continuous mass purchasing power. 
Fourthly, a Taylorist- Fordist type work organisation built on an extensive division of 
labour, narrowly defined jobs with a low work content, the separation of planning and 
execution of work, an wide managerial apparatus organised along hierarchical control, 
bureaucratic administration and close supervision. The actual developments until the 
early 1970s seemed to be in accord with this model, whether in advanced industrial 
countries both West and East, or in the developing countries. Most studies revealed that 
capital ownership was continuously concentrating, and enterprises and establishments 
were growing in size. Small firms were expected to gradually wither away, due to 
inferior organisation, poor management, and backward technologies.
A variety of explanations were provided for why this should happen. Industrial 
economics emphasised the principle of economies of scale and predicted a tendency 
towards larger units of production. Adam Smiths’ famous example of the pin factory is 
repeatedly cited. This puts forward the theory of the digressive cost of increased 
production scale attributable to the specialization of labour, machines and equipment as 
well as the more profitable use of technology at higher capacity levels. In the Marxist 
tradition the predicted increasing scale of production was attributed to the process of 
growing capital concentration and centralisation that is inherent in the capital 
accumulation process under the capitalist mode of production. It is important to note 
here that Marx differentiated between concentration and centralization. The former 
meaning concentration of productive activities in large factories and industrial 
complexes, and the latter referring to a centralization of ownership (Marx 1959). The 
relation between the two processes is not necessarily a linear one. Thus there can be a 
process of centralization as with the mergers between large corporations without this 
necessarily leading to a concentration of production.
Since the early 1970s, however, the evidence suggests that there has been a 
worldwide shift in industry from large-scale to small-scale and from formal to casual 
forms of employment. This evidence presents a serious challenge to traditional
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assumptions about industrialization trends. It has been asserted that the much increased 
turbulence in the international markets, the instability of demand, and more differentiated 
consumer tastes witnessed since the early 1970s, have rendered the mass production of 
standardised goods in large production units unprofitable or obsolete. In addition, the 
advent and diffusion of new technologies, based on micro-electronics, is seen to lower 
capital costs and permit the efficiency gap between long and short runs of production to 
shrink, thereby enhancing the cost competitiveness of small-scale production (Piore & 
Sabel 1984). Another assertion is that there is, within limits, a strategic choice of how to 
organise production. Which option is chosen is ultimately decided by ‘politics’. In this 
view it is held that the victory of the mass production paradigm over the craft system 
earlier in this century was by no means inevitable. It was not based on an inherent 
technological superiority or greater dynamism. As a consequence, the course of 
industrial development can produce different results in different settings and periods, and 
it can be re-directed (Piore & Sabel 1984).
These theoretical assertions have been strengthened by the recent increase in the 
share of total employment in small and casual enterprises and establishments has been 
well documented. In general, the increase has been at the expense of large enterprises 
and establishments. While the magnitude of the increase varies considerably from 
country to country and across sectors, its significance rests mainly on the fact that it 
shows the reversal of a substantial downward trend that had prevailed for many decades. 
In Latin America, for example in 1950, informal activities occupied 30 percent of the 
urban economically active population (EAP); in 1980, with an industrial plant four times 
larger, informal employment still stood at 30 percent. Contrary to the experience of the 
advanced countries, self-employment did not decline with industrialization but remained 
essentially constant during thirty-year period (Castells, Portes, Benton 1989).
The trend was first studied in Italy and Spain. Thus in Italy, for example, efforts 
of large industries to control union power during the 1960s led to a process of 
decentralization which has acquired its own momentum. In Italy, artisan enterprises with 
less than 15 workers are exempted from certain provisions of tax code and of the statue of 
labour (Piore & Sabel 1984). These enterprises increased rapidly in the provinces most 
affected by the decentralization process. In Modena, they went from 4,970 in 1963 to
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21,474 in 1975, a 430 percent increase at a time when the total population grew by just 
over 10 percent (Sabel 1982). Small northern enterprises rarely market finished goods, 
but instead work under contract for larger formal firms. Cooperatives of informal micro- 
producers under the putting-out system are found in knitwear, clothes, and ceramic tiles 
around Modena; and in motorcycles and footwear in Bologna. The following description 
illustrates how these arrangements work:
the Morini motorcycle plant in Bologna has 100 employees and produces 
an average of 20 motorcycles per day. Most of the workers in the plant 
are engaged in assembly... Except for the camshaft and the engine 
mounting, all of the components are put out: the frame, the tank, the shock 
absorbers, the handlebars, the brakes, the gears, and the wheels; almost the 
whole machine is produced by subcontractors (Brusco 1982, p. 172).
Similarly, since the mid 1970s, many Spanish industries have experienced a 
process of decentralization quite similar to that of northern Italy. As a result, Spain 
exports at present millions of dollars worth of shoes and other articles produced in 
factories that do not legally exist. Ybarra has presented evidence of this process in the 
form of employment and production statistics for the footwear industry, centered in the 
province of Alicante (Benton 1986). These data show that the value of production in the 
industry increased significantly during the 1970s at a time when the registered workforce 
was declining precipitously. Since no significant technological innovations were 
incorporated into production, the decline reflects indirectly the extent to which 
production was informalized or deconcentrated(Benton 1986).
Despite the near-sweatshop conditions that appear to be the norm in the informal 
plants, the Spanish experience of decentralization has not been based on immigrant 
labour, little of which is found in Alicante, but rather on domestic labour reserves. In the 
footwear industry, employment of women appears to have increased significantly along 
with the decentralization of production into small and informal shops (Benton 1986). 
Moreover, what is new in the current context is that the informal sector grows, even in 
highly institutionalized economies, at the expense of already formalized work
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relationships (Tokman, 1986). Thus, it represents a novel social trend instead of being a 
mere “lag” from traditional relationships of production.
Several different explanations for this trend need to be examined. Firstly it may 
be a statistical illusion. The complexity and unreliability of much of the available 
statistics may have led many researchers to come to the wrong conclusions regarding 
industrial trends. A second explanation that needs to be examined is that the trend is a 
transitory shift due to the economic crises that have afflicted world economy since the 
early 1970s. Indeed a similar trend towards the small-scale and informal was 
documented during the Great Depression of the 1930s in the industrialised countries. If 
small unit shares of employment rise in recessionary periods as large firms reduce 
employment, there is an employment decline in industries like durable or capital goods 
which are produced primarily by large units, and new and small firm employment rises. 
This is a very different matter than if there is a trend increase in small firm employment. 
A third explanation is that the trend represents a search for cheaper labour costs, as a way 
to escape high wage, union protected labour. This may be a plausible argument for the 
shift in countries such as the U.K. with its historically powerful unions, or Germany with 
its very high labour costs, but it does not explain the universality of the process, or how it 
can be taking place in countries and sectors with weak labour organisations and relatively 
low wages. This idea is based on an untenable separation of wage levels and productivity 
levels. It is obvious that capital searches for cheap labour but it searches for it at given 
levels of productivity.
A fourth explanation has been that the universal liberalisation of trade and 
investments and the loosening of government economic restrictions and structural 
adjustment programmes are the main cause for the shift. In this view Fordist mass 
production was due to state policies and intervention and not to any inherent logic of 
capitalist development. Thus the relaxation of government intervention must naturally 
lead to the demise of mass production and the relative growth of small-scale production. 
Because of the growing integration of national economies into the international system, 
there is a tendency toward the diffusion of low labour costs across countries and regions. 
Manufacturers of consumer goods, such as garments and footwear, who cannot compete 
with cheaper Third World imports must either close down their plants or move them
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underground. This international competition affects not only producers in advanced 
countries but those in the Third World as well, as they vie with each other to reduce 
labour costs in an endless downward spiral (Castells, Portes, Benton 1989). In sum, the 
newly industrialized countries informalize themselves, vis-a-vis their competitors as well 
as vis-a-vis their own formal laws, so as to obtain a comparative advantage for their 
production relative to the more regulated areas of world economy.
A fifth explanation is that a new division of labour is emerging with the changes 
of production. This new division is based on a much higher level of specialisation and 
flexibility, than was possible with the traditional vertically integrated production units. 
Many theories of ‘flexible specialisation’ and productive decentralization have been 
introduced claiming that a major structural shift is taking place in the world economy of 
which the trend towards deconcentration and informalization is central. According to this 
theory, this process greatly contributes to the formation of a decentralized model of 
economic organization. The large corporation, with its national vertical structure and the 
separation of its functions between the staff and line, does not appear any more as the last 
stage of a necessary evolution toward rationalized industrial management. Networks of 
economic activities, networks of firms, and coordinated clusters of workers appear to 
comprise an emergent model of successful production and distribution. Although firms 
engaging in such networks are not, by any means, exclusively informal, there is a 
tendency for the informal economy to rely predominantly on networks, and their 
connection with the formal economy, through subcontracting, is also network based. 
Linkages between different processes appear to be at the core of the new economy, so 
that we witness the reversal of the secular downward trend of small business as a 
proportion of overall economic activity (Piore & Sabel 1984). Despite multiple 
explanations, the fact remains that there is recorded growth of informalization and 
deconcentration of production in general, and as shown in Chapter Three in the case of 
textile and garment industry in specific. This trend that has been wrongly compared with 
the putting-out system of early industrialization, as I will show in the following section.
5. A Return to the Putting-Out System?
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Comparisons have been made between small-scale unrecorded labour in 
developing cities today and industrial workshops in 19th century Europe. These 
comparisons fail to take into consideration two important points. The first point is that the 
putting out systems of early capitalism were fully capitalist in the sense that they were 
produced by, and did not precede the rise of ‘classic’ relations of production in the 
factory system, and were not remnants of previous artisanal forms of production. The 
second point is that the context is completely different. The expansion of capital, the role 
of the state in development and the relations between the so-called formal and informal 
sectors in modem developing economies make industrial development irreducible to one 
particular historical model. It is this expansion of informal activities in a new context 
that gives a new historical meaning to the current process of a rising informal economy. 
But it is precisely the development of sweatshops and of other unregulated activities after 
a long period of institutional control that causes the old forms of production to become 
the new ones. An old form in a new setting is, in fact, new, since all the social 
relationships can be defined in their specific historical context. This context is defined by 
the prior existence of institutionalized regulation, by which we understand the explicit, 
active intervention of the state in the process and the outcome of the income-generating 
activities, on the basis of a set of enforceable legal rules.
Furthermore, claims about the marginal nature of small-scale production in 
modem developing cities have been challenged by recent empirical studies. These have 
documented the dynamism of many ‘marginal’ activities and have shown that 
participants often viewed their occupations as stable and relatively rewarding, not merely 
as a means to survive while waiting for access to jobs in the ‘formal’ sector (Portes et al
1986). The studies also revealed that many of the seemingly marginal activities were in 
fact directly tied to modem production and distribution processes (Tokman 1992, 
Schmitz 1995). These activities were found not to be uniformly traditional, either in their 
origins or in the technology employed. Their growth clearly does not just depend on 
changes in the survival strategies of the ‘surplus’ population but also responds directly to 
producers’ efforts to incorporate unregulated labour in modem industrial processes.
These activities cannot be viewed as a set of survival activities performed by 
destitute people on the margins of society. Studies in both advanced industrial and less
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developed countries have shown the economic dynamism of unregulated income- 
generating activities and the relatively high-income of many informal entrepreneurs, 
sometimes above the level of workers in the formal economy (Portes et al 1986).
These discoveries have led to a re-appraisal of the growth of ‘informal’ economic 
activities. As mentioned earlier, theories of productive decentralisation and flexible 
specialisation have been introduced as a means of understanding the changing structure 
of industry both in advanced and developing economies. There has been a move away 
from the search for dualistic models or historical precedents in trying to explain the 
persistence and expansion of the unrecorded small-scale sector in developing economies. 
Instead, empirical investigations of the actual structure and dynamics of these sectors 
have come to dominate the literature. In the following sections some of the most 
important findings and generalizations of more recent literature, relevant to the research 
questions of this thesis are examined.
6. Clusters
Clusters may be defined as sectoral and spatial concentrations of firms. Such 
clusters have received increasing attention in research on advanced economies. These 
share the view of enterprises as connected entities and an emphasis on local factors for 
competition in global markets. Research on clusters in developing countries also grew, 
but out of the small-scale industry debate. The studies on small firm industrial districts in 
Europe, mainly in Italy and Spain, that emerged in the 1980s were soon translated into an 
agenda for research on developing countries which had two main questions: first, are 
there similar industrial clusters in developing countries; second, what are the conditions 
which either produce, modify or prevent their growth? Initial attempts at answering these 
questions, using the flexible specialization framework set out by Piore and Sabel (1984), 
largely examined data that had been collected for other purposes (for example, Pederson 
et al 1984). New empirical research explicitly undertaken to assess the relevance of 
clustering in developing countries came later, gradually leading to a substantial body of 
case material and substantive theoretical discussion (for example Das 1998).
Three main conclusions can be drawn from recent research. Firstly that clustering 
in developing countries is significant. The growing amount of case material shows that
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clusters are common in a wide range of countries and sectors (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994). 
Their statistical significance in industrial production is hard to determine however, 
because economic regions do not respect administrative boundaries, and industrial 
classifications often fail to capture the existing specialization. Secondly, the growth 
experience of these clusters, vary widely. At one end of the spectrum are artisanal 
clusters that show little dynamism and seem unable to expand or innovate (McCormick, 
1998). At the other end, are clusters that have been able to deepen the inter-firm division 
of labour, raise their competitiveness and break into international markets (Cawthome, 
1995; Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1999). Between those two poles, there are many 
intermediary cases. Thirdly, internal heterogeneity is pronounced. Except in the 
rudimentary clusters, medium and large firms have emerged and play an important role in 
the functioning of these clusters. In this respect the developing countries experiences are 
substantially different from the European model.
Clustering becomes significant because it facilitates specialization and effective 
investment in small steps. Producers do not have to get equipment for the entire 
production process; they can concentrate on particular stages leaving other stages to other 
entrepreneurs. Specialized workshops, that can repair and upgrade existing machinery, 
further help to reduce technological discontinuities. It follows that investment capital is 
needed in small rather than big bits. Also, working capital requirements are affected by 
clustering. Where specialized suppliers of raw materials and components are close by, 
there is less need to store inputs. Similarly small amounts of human capital can be made 
to count. One producer’s investment in a specialized skill renders returns because others 
have invested in complementary expertise.
In addition, clustering makes it possible to advance by taking small and 
calculable, rather than large risks. This emphasis on small-risk steps (Schmitz 1997) is 
supported by observations on the industrial structure in developing countries, a frequent 
feature being the absence of a medium scale sector: some large enterprises at the top and 
many small enterprises at the bottom, unable to grow into the medium sized sector. They 
cannot grow because of informational and other market failures related to the provision 
of financial, technical and market support to small manufacturing enterprises (Levy
1994). One of the most striking aspects of much of the recent case material on clusters is
103
that it shows enterprises of all sizes, including a strong middle segment. It seems that 
growth constraints faced by individual small-scale manufacturers are less severe in 
clusters (Nadvi 1996). In summary the argument is that clustering facilitates the 
mobilization of financial and labour resources, that it breaks down investment into small 
riskable steps, that the enterprise of one creates the foothold for the other. It is a process 
by which enterprises create for each other possibilities for accumulating capital and skill.
The emphasis on local co-operation does not imply that it is the only advantage 
which clustering provides. There is a consensus in the literature that the most basic 
advantage which firms (especially small firms) derive from being located in a cluster lies 
in local external economies. In his ‘Principles of Economics’, Marshall (1920) showed 
why clustering could help small enterprises to compete. He noted that the agglomeration 
of firms engaged in similar or related activities generated a range of localized external 
economies that lowered costs for clustered producers. Such advantages included a pool 
of specialized workers, easy access to suppliers of specialized inputs and services and the 
quick dissemination of new knowledge. According to Marshall, such external economies 
help explain the growth of contemporary industrial clusters. Numerous analyses of 
contemporary clusters confirm the relevance of these local external economies (Schmitz
1995)
The literature on contemporary clusters also suggests that in addition to the 
incidental external economies there is often a deliberate force at work: joint action 
amongst the clustering firms. Levels of such joint action were examined for clusters in 
Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999a), India (Knorringa, 1999), Mexico (Rabellotti, 1999) and Brazil 
(Schmitz, 1999). All four clusters produce mainly for distant markets, with the Pakistani 
and Brazilian cluster producing mainly for export and the Mexican and Indian cluster 
mainly for the internal market. In the Mexican case (Guadalajara), import liberalization 
led to the closure of many firms and to reorganization of the survivors. In the Indian case 
(Agra), the crisis was caused by the sudden disappearance of the former Soviet market 
and gradual liberalization of imports. The Brazilian cluster (Sinos Valley) was forced to 
move up-market due to China’s massive penetration of its main export market in the USA 
and Europe; and the Pakistani surgical instrument cluster (Sialkot) was confronted with
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the sudden imposition of new quality standards due to fatal quality problems in previous 
deliveries to the USA.
The co-operation variables included changes in exchange of information and 
experiences, co-operation in improving quality, co-operation in speeding up delivery and 
a number of further variables which varied with the type of co-operation 
(horizontal/vertical) considered. In the Brazilian case, five associations (footwear 
manufacturers, tanners, component producers, equipment makers and export agents) 
responded to the Chinese threat with a joint programme for upgrading the entire chain 
from raw materials to the marketing o f the end product-leather footwear. In the Indian 
case, a small number of export manufacturers with complementary product ranges passed 
on orders to each other (Knorringa, 1999). Similar small-group initiatives were found in 
the other clusters but they are not common. Involvement in associations tended to 
increase rather than decrease. Increases were, however, very uneven within clusters, 
ranging from 61 percent of firms in the Pakistani case to 25 percent in the Brazilian case. 
In the Indian case, Knorringa (1999) stresses that relationships in the high-quality market 
segments are more co-operative than in the low-quality segments. To some extent this 
was confirmed in the Mexican case where (the more demanding) export manufacturers 
have the closest relationships with suppliers (Rabellotti, 1999). Differentiation by size of 
firm was also found in both clusters: compared with large and medium-sized firms, small 
firms have less close relationships with suppliers. Cooperation does not only involve the 
horizontal and bilateral interaction of similar firms but also vertical interaction with 
suppliers, i.e. between different stages in the global commodity chain. The reason for 
increasing vertical co-operation is quite straightforward. The demands of the new global 
competition can only be met if the whole chain responds. Better product quality and 
greater speed cannot be attained by enterprises individually. The recognition of inter­
dependence-even if it is at times asymmetrical-has led to more co-operative behaviour.
Despite these advantages, the idea that there is an increasing tendency of the 
growth and increasing export prospects of clusters of small enterprises in developing 
countries has not gone unchallenged. Harrison (1994), for example, suggests that the 
success of small enterprise clusters has been over-rated and the strength of the large 
corporation under-rated. In his view the dominant form of industrial organization is the
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large company controlling networks of small enterprises. Here, it is important to note 
that successful clusters are unlikely to remain populated only by small firms. For 
example, in exporting clusters in Pakistan (Nadvi 1999) and Brazil (Schmitz 1995), a 
number of large firms have grown from within, occupying powerful positions vis-a-vis 
local suppliers. Some also seek new roles outside their cluster.
More generally, a shift is required in further research on industrial clusters. Over 
recent years it has privileged the study of local relationships and contributed substantially 
to understanding the local determinants of competitiveness. An increasingly frequent 
conclusion in these recent studies is that external relationships need greater attention in 
order to understand why some clusters succeed and others fail. It would be a mistake, 
however, if such a shift resulted in neglecting the local relationships. The key issue is 
how internal and external relationships interact.
7. Subcontracting
Another issue that has come forward from the research on the informal economy 
and has deserves equal attention to clustering, is that of subcontracting. The world-wide 
shift from large-scale vertically integrated industries to a system in which factories 
subcontract to large networks of small workshops and individual home-workers is the 
focus of many of these reconsiderations. The rapid growth of subcontracting, the 
increase in the numbers and varieties of home-based producers and the proliferation of 
small-scale firms are all trends that have been documented in settings in both advanced 
and developing cities. These trends challenge assumptions about the distinction and 
separation between formal and informal sectors of the economy; they also challenge 
assumptions about the concentration and centralisation of production.
The literature on industrial subcontracting has distinguished between two types of 
business arrangements: one in which production is contracted out but raw materials are 
not provided and another in which raw materials and other inputs are provided. The first 
system can be horizontal subcontracting, and this involves orders of goods regularly 
produced and sold by a firm to a variety of clients. The second arrangement, vertical 
subcontracting, amounts to producing orders specific to the firm that subcontracts out. 
Vertical subcontracting generally consists of processing work or production carried out
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for another firm under very specific contract agreements, including exact specifications 
regarding design and other product characteristics. It affects mostly labour intensive 
tasks resulting from the ability to fragment the production process in such a way that 
different parts can be carried out by different firms (Beneria 1989). In most cases of 
vertical subcontracting, the system can be compared with a putting out system defined as: 
the transfer of work formally done within a firm to another firm, an artisan workshop, or 
a domestic outworker (Murray 1983).
Different patterns of subcontracting have been found to operate between casual 
and non-casual units of production. There can be a direct relation in which a regular firm 
sends production out to casual operations without the use of intermediaries. This pattern 
can be found among small firms that have direct contact with workshops or with home­
workers. The relationship can also be indirect. This takes place through a jobber. In this 
case the mediators’ function is to establish the connection between the formal and the 
informal operations. No production takes place at the jobbers’ level, although in many 
cases the jobber has a supervisory role in the activities that are subcontracted or performs 
other functions such as distribution, transportation, and gathering of materials and goods 
produced.
The most prevalent reason given for subcontracting is the lowering of labour 
costs. Studies have a complex view of the reasons for subcontracting. Following Harry 
Braverman (1975), they argue that the process of decentralisation responds to the 
Babbage principle, namely, that costs of production are reduced through changes in the 
division of labour. This is made possible by the fragmentation of tasks in such a way that 
those subcontracted are associated with lower skills and lower wages. Although 
Braverman focuses on the division o f labour within the capitalist firm, the approach is 
applied to an analysis of the division o f labour between firms. The largest drop in wages 
takes place at points at which production goes underground, and particularly when the 
labour force is female. This is clearly the case with homework, but also true for other 
levels of subcontracting. Yet, it must be emphasized that the main cost-saving feature of 
informality is less the absolute level of wages than the avoidance of the “indirect wage” 
formed by social benefits and other employee-related payments to the state. By lowering 
the cost of labour and reducing the state-imposed constraints on its free hiring and
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dismissal, the unrecorded sector contributes directly to the profitability of capital. It can 
be argued that productivity is lower at lower levels of subcontracting and that therefore 
wage ratios reflect productivity ratios. However, given the labour intensive character of 
subcontracting, there is no reason to believe that significant disparities in productivity 
exist for identical jobs performed at different subcontracting levels, particularly the more 
unskilled the task (Beneria 1989).
Other reasons that are usual for subcontracting, besides the lowering of labour 
costs, include: Firstly, when production of parts is highly specialized it can be obtained 
at lower costs by firms that concentrate on a few products. This is particularly the case 
when the number of parts required by the subcontracting firm is relatively small and does 
not justify the investment required by internal production. In other words, the objective 
in this case is the lowering of fixed costs. Secondly, when production is cyclical or 
unstable, subcontracting offers the possibility of transferring the risk and avoiding the 
problems associated with fluctuations of production, such as layoffs and costs associated 
with a temporary increase in production (Beneria 1989).
As for the impact of subcontracting, the growth of subcontracting leads, according 
to some studies, to the replacement of modem methods of production by others 
considered archaic. Obsolete tools are resurrected and the use of new technologies 
postponed. Labour conditions erode and wages shrink. The incentives for technological 
progress, innovation and investment are all reduced or eliminated. According to this 
view the increasing informalisation of industrial production leads to a degradation of 
social and productive relations, and takes place mainly in traditional economic sectors, 
slowing down the emergence of alternative growth models and the modernisation of 
production plants.
In contrast other views argue that subcontracting permits the shifting of 
production, toward the more unrecorded or underground segments of the economy, 
thereby providing a way to escape state regulations on production and market 
transactions, union contracts and fringe benefits. Hence, subcontracting provides for a 
great deal of flexibility in expanding and contracting productive capacity in the small 
business sector. For these reasons, it is often suggested that this flexibility may be very 
important in building an infra structure of small firms that would provide a basis for
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growth. This would be the case particularly if productivity levels among these firms 
were comparable to larger units. It is argued that subcontracting stimulates the 
development of small business, which is more adaptable to the economic conditions 
prevalent in the Third World, and creates the basis for fostering and channeling 
entrepreneurial skills and developing productive forces in general. There are different 
versions of this view. Some see this sector as a way of facilitating the functioning of a 
free market and optimizing the results of a free enterprise economy in the face of 
excessive state regulation. Others see it as a way of fostering initiative and technological 
change in the Third World (Beneria 1989). In general, the impact of subcontracting can 
be seen as positive with regard to business growth, reduction of production costs, and 
manipulating state regulation in favor of business and market dynamics. However, there 
are huge negative impacts of subcontracting from the labour perspective, related to 
working conditions, the lack of protective regulation and the erosion of most of labour 
social benefits.
8. Child Labour
In addition to clustering and subcontracting, the third theoretical and practical 
issue that informal economy raises, is that of child labour. There is a claim made that the 
informal sector is where all child labour was employed. If the economy was really 
divided into a formal sector that is law abiding and regulated and an informal sector 
where anything goes, then one would expect child labour to be one of the clearest 
distinctions between the two sectors. The illegal use of child labour would be a 
monopoly of the informal sector. In fact, this argument is used repeatedly by those who 
see the main problem in the economy being the existence of this invisible and therefore 
unregulated sector. It is also used by those who wish to defend the state which claims 
that the phenomena of child labour exists only in areas that are not regulated by it.
However, child labour is not a new phenomenon, or one that is solely related to 
the informal sector. During the industrial revolution in Britain there was no dearth of 
apologists for child labour. E.P.Thompson quotes a statement by Andrew Ure in 1835:
I have visited many factories...and I never saw a single instance of
corporal chastisement inflicted on a child; nor indeed did I ever see
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children in ill humour. They seemed to be always cheerful and alert; 
taking pleasure in the light play of their muscles, enjoying the mobility 
natural to their age. The scene of industry, so far from exciting sad 
emotions in my mind, was always exhilarating... (Thompson 1963, p.
I l l )
There was also the economic argument by capitalists that regulating child labour would 
be detrimental to business, and the age old threat that the capitalists would have to move 
their businesses to other countries. When it was suggested, in the first factory act of 
1802, that there should be supervision of the implementation of simple reforms proposed 
for the well being of children, the owners declared the following:
The mills or factories will become a scene either of idleness and disorder, 
or of open rebellion; or the masters harassed and tired out of incessant 
complaints of their apprentices, and the perpetual interference of the 
visitors, will be obliged to give up their works; and some of them may
become bankrupt, or be obliged to remove to a foreign country, leaving
their apprentices a grievous load upon the parish where they are employed 
(Seabrook 2001, p.5).
Apologists for child labour in the West were not confined to the early industrial period. 
In 1908, Asa Candler, First President of Coca Cola, speaking in Atlanta at the fourth 
annual convention of the National Child Labour Committee to protest at the horrific 
conditions where women and children worked a sixty hour week, breathing cotton motes, 
for 50 cents a day or less, astonished his listeners when he said:
Child labour, properly conducted, properly surrounded, properly 
conditioned, is calculated to bring the highest measure of success to any 
country on the face of the earth. The most beautiful sight that we see is the 
child at labour. In fact, the younger the boy began work, the more 
beautiful, the more useful his life gets to be. (Seabrook 2001, p.6)
However, the reality of child labour was of course far removed from the above
description during the industrial revolution, and there are countless accounts of the
horrors suffered by children during that age. E.P. Thompson, in the Making of the 
English Working Class, quotes a priest in Yorkshire who related the story of a boy whom
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he had recently interred who had been found (in the mill where he worked), standing 
asleep with his arms full of wool and had been beaten awake. On that day he had worked 
for seventeen hours. He was carried home by his father, was unable to eat his supper, 
awoke at four a.m. the next morning and asked his brothers if they could see the lights of 
the mill as he was afraid of being late, and then died.
Apologists for child labour in the Third World, although not as blunt as their 
forefathers of the industrial revolution, are extremely vocal in their opposition to any 
laws or regulations abolishing child labour. There is the economic nationalist argument 
that whole industries depend on such labour and that these industries would collapse if 
such laws were actually enforced, and that although child labour might be cruel, one has 
to put the national interest above all else. In Egypt, industries such as leather tanning, an 
important export industry, are nearly completely dependent on child labour, most small- 
scale industries whether recorded, regulated and legal or not. The same is true of flower 
growing, especially jasmine, which is transported by air to Paris for the production of 
perfume. In the latter case, the flowers must be picked during the night, to conserve their 
freshness. Children are employed to work through the night to pick them in large-scale 
farms in the delta region. Egypt has one of the highest percentages of child labour in the 
world. Children below 14 years represent 11 percent of the total workforce. In a study 
carried out in 1991, it was found that there were 2,200,000 working children (below 14 
years) representing 20 percent of the total age group population. Amazingly the law only 
makes it illegal to employ those under 12, however the above mentioned study reported 
that there were one million child labourers between the ages of six and eleven, which 
make up 44 percent of the total child labour force (Azir 1992).
In Bangladesh the ILO representative, accepts the gradualist position in the 
removal of child labour. The argument for gradualism being that even in the 
industrialized countries this process was gradual, requiring a combination of skill 
training, economic growth and development. The distinction is made between child work 
and child labour, the former being acceptable and the latter labeled intolerable. Thus a 
new acceptance of child labour under the banner of realism and a reduction in the 
urgency about eliminating it through vague distinctions between different types of child 
labour, has become part of the new NGO consensus on this issue.
I l l
At issue is the clash between those who see the model of a labour free childhood 
as a necessary prerequisite for a ‘civilized’ society and those who defend the ‘right’ of 
children to work. Some of the former, and this includes many trade unionists, say that 
the employment of children depresses adult wages, which makes people poorer and 
drives more children to work. They see legislation as the best means of combating it, as 
occurred in 19th century Britain. Abolitionists tend to see work and education as 
incompatible. Defenders of child work say that, despite conditions that are sometimes 
dangerous and damaging, children want to work. It offers them a chance for self- 
determination and responsibility. It gives them a function. The problem is the absence of 
suitable work, not work itself. In a study on child labour in Bangladesh, Theresa Blanchet 
(1996) notes the efforts to remove children from factory work in the early 1990s. In the 
local cigarette factories of Kustia, children under the age of twelve were dismissed. 
However, after their dismissal, many returned, either through bribery, bringing lunch for 
their older siblings and staying on, even climbing the factory fence to get in. Blanchet 
adds that those working illegally were paid less than those legitimately employed: they 
therefore subsidized their own illegality.
In brief, the problem or ‘issue’ of child labour, goes beyond formal or informal 
economies. Rather, it has to do with macro-economic dynamics as a whole -as in the 
case of the nationalist argument for economic development, or that of subsistence 
necessity. Consequently, the rise or demise of child labour is not solely correlated to the 
informal economy as many would like to argue, since a lot of child labour in countries 
like Vietnam or Cambodia is within the workshops of multinational corporations and a 
lot of the formal sector entities as in the case of agro-export companies in Egypt and 
Peru. Hence, it is part of the problem of labour markets, economies, and state policies of 
these counties, and not the informal economy per se.
9. Summary
In the above chapter it has been argued that the dual labour market model is not 
adequate in understanding the urban labour market in developing countries, and that 
therefore the segmentation based on this model of the urban labour market into “formal” 
and “informal” sectors, or “protected” and “unprotected” sectors, are based on false
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assumptions and lead to false conclusions. It has also been argued that dividing the urban 
labour market into “petty commodity production” and “capitalist” production does not 
take us beyond the dualist theories.
Another argument made in this chapter has been that the undisputed growth of the 
small-scale unrecorded sector of the urban economy is the result of a number of 
interrelated causes, including the internationalization of capital and the search for cheaper 
labour power at given levels of productivity, and the emergence of a new international 
division of labour requiring a degree of flexibility not obtainable under the old vertically 
integrated industrial structures. And that the new growth of the unrecorded small-scale 
sector, although superficially similar to the putting out system of the 19th century, is 
actually a completely different and new phenomenon that is part of the modem capitalist 
economy and must be understood in that context.
Related to the rise of unrecorded sector are three issues; clustering, 
subcontracting, and child labour. The first two phenomenons present two forms of 
interaction both within the unrecorded small-scale sector and between it and the large- 
scale sector were investigated. Clustering and subcontracting were found to be common 
forms of interaction undertaken by this sector and recent research has shown that the 
forms of interaction are both complex and heterogeneous. Lastly, the question of child 
labour was discussed, as this is a widespread phenomenon in the garment industry in 
Egypt. Some of the more common arguments about child labour were presented. But the 
main point was child labour is not solely related to the so-called informal economy.
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHODOLOGY
1. Introduction
The previous chapters provided the general economic and industrial context 
within which the establishments studied in this project are situated, both nationally and 
internationally. The remaining chapters are devoted to the actual results of the fieldwork. 
The following chapters are based on material from research carried out in the city of 
Shubra El Kheima during 1998-1999. This chapter introduces in detail the research 
strategy and methods adopted in the study. The chapter is divided into five main 
sections. The first puts forward the research objectives and main questions. The second 
discusses and defends the research strategy, namely the choice of case-study approach 
and logic that guided the project. The third describes the selection of research units to be 
studied. The fourth section introduces the various methods used for data collection. The 
fifth section introduces the neighborhood and study sites. Finally, the chapter ends with a 
summary of the main points in the chapter.
2. Research Objectives
As mentioned in the introduction, this research project investigates the world of 
garment production in the city of Shubra El Kheima in Egypt. It involves an empirical 
comparison between recorded factories and unrecorded workshops. There are three main 
areas of comparison. The first includes the labour market, labour costs and working 
conditions. The second includes the market channels for inputs and outputs. The third 
includes a comparison and description of the degrees and forms of cooperation and 
networking between units of production. The aim of this comparative study is to 
establish whether or not there are significant differences between the two types of 
establishments in these three areas, and to describe and explain such differences if they 
exist.
The study examines both the economic and the social dynamics of the garment 
sector. It thus involves a study of markets and a study of work. Three main guiding
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empirical questions, dealing respectively with the three main areas of study will be tested. 
The first question is how, if  at all, is the garment sector linked to the world market. Is it 
simply a local traditional sector consuming locally produced raw materials and producing 
for the local market? The relations of the establishments with the outside market, both 
for production inputs and marketing of output, are investigated. This will involve 
information about the sources of raw materials- mainly cloth, information about the 
sources of work orders (subcontracting to traders or larger factories, single customer 
work whether individuals or shops, access to export markets and marketing in 
unregulated markets.)
The second question, which also involves the production and marketing process, 
is to what extent is there cooperation or networking between the different establishments? 
Do they make use o f geographical proximity and the possibility of external economies? 
Do they form part of an industrial cluster, and are there significant differences between 
the recorded factories and the unrecorded workshops in terms of cooperation?
The third question involves the conditions of work in this sector. Do workers in 
the unrecorded sector enjoy self-employment, flexibility and greater control of the labour 
process, compared to those employed in the recorded sector? One of the main themes in 
the literature on the so called informal sector has been the relative sweatshop conditions 
in this sector and that unregulated lower cost labour is a main explanation for the 
persistence and growth of the informal sector. The study attempts to find out the validity 
of such claims. The investigation looks into the use of child labour, wages, working 
hours, work conditions and security, and methods of and sources for labour recruitment. 
Moreover, the research involves an investigation into the labour process, this involves the 
levels of specialisation, divisions of labour and technologies employed within the 
establishments. One of the explanations in the literature for the relative success of small- 
scale industry has been that of flexible-specialization, the less vertically integrated the 
establishment the more it is able to adapt to changes in the market and changes in the 
division of labour within the industry. Again we will attempt to find out to what extent 
this is applicable in our case.
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3. Research Strategy
The general strategy guiding this research project has been the case study research 
strategy. Case study research has long been regarded as a relatively weak research 
method lacking in precision and objectivity. It is therefore necessary to explain why this 
strategy is the most suitable and useful for this particular research project. A key issue in 
deciding to undertake a case study is whether a holistic understanding of a phenomenon 
is required. Case studies by their nature, deal with complex relations within a unit as well 
as the interaction between the unit and its wider environment. Specifically, there are 
three main conditions or factors determining which research method and strategy to 
choose. The first factor is the type o f research question posed. The second factor is the 
extent of control the researcher has on the research object. The third factor is the degree 
of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. For the case study it is best 
suited for when: A “how ” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of 
events over which the investigator has no control. Yin (1994:2) suggests that case 
studies lend themselves best to answering how and why questions. In other words they 
are most appropriate for examining the processes by which events unfold as well as for 
exploring causal relationships. In this research project we are dealing mainly with ‘how’ 
questions: How is small-scale garment manufacturing in Shubra linked to the local and 
global economy, and in what ways labour conditions differ in unregulated establishments 
from those in the more regulated large-scale factories. This is being asked for the 
contemporary situation of garment industry in Shubra El Khiema at the time of 
investigation, which is a situation, that the researcher has no control over.
A common concern about case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific 
generalizations. Case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations and universes. The case study does not represent a “sample” and the 
researcher’s goal is not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalizations). This is a 
particularly important factor for choosing a case study strategy for investigating 
economic activities that are mostly unrecorded. In what other way can we start to 
investigate the statistically unrecorded part of the economy? Economists are usually 
concerned about micro studies dealing with limited numbers of cases in the sense that 
they are non generalizable, relegating such studies to supposedly less scientific and
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rigorous disciplines such as anthropology. But the growing evidence that suggests that 
significant portions of the economy of both developed and especially developing regions 
are not statistically recorded should change this attitude (ILO 1996). Only through the 
accumulation of direct empirical research on segments of these invisible economic 
activities, will the wider picture of what is happening in the economy as a whole become 
clear.
The case study inquiry: copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points, therefore: it relies on 
multiple sources of evidence. Here again we find that this research strategy suits the 
purposes of this research better than others. We are dealing with the contemporary 
phenomenon of garment manufacturing in Shubra, we are investigating, not simply a set 
of production units, but also the market context within which they act, and there is a need 
to deal with a variety of variables that cannot be sufficiently reduced as would be needed 
if we were to use a survey method by itself. Use of the case study method is particularly 
useful to cover contextual conditions- assuming they might be highly pertinent to the 
phenomenon of study. In the case of this research for example, it was required to 
investigate unrecorded markets where the garments produced were sold and to interview 
contractors to get to the details of the marketing process. These aspects could not have 
been covered sufficiently by relying only on quantitative survey methods. The case study 
as a research strategy comprises an all-encompassing method, with the logic of design 
incorporating specific approaches to data collection and to data analysis. In this sense, 
the case study is neither a data collection tactic nor a design feature alone, but a 
comprehensive research strategy. Case studies are a research strategy rather than a 
specific technique and as such can make use of a range of techniques. For example, in 
this study three techniques were used; survey interviews, in depth interviews and 
observations.
Stake (2000, p. 437) identifies three types of case study: the intrinsic case study, 
the instrumental case study and the collective case study.14 Of relevance to this research 
is the “collective case-study”, this means a joint-study of a number of cases in order to 
investigate a phenomenon, a population, or a general condition. In effect it is an
14 For the difference between the three types see Stake 2000.
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instrumental case study15 extended to several cases. Individual cases in the collection 
may or may not be known in advance to manifest some common characteristics. They 
are chosen because the researcher believes that understanding them will lead to better 
understanding, perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases. This 
study of garment manufacturing is an example of a collective case-study which aims at 
increasing the knowledge and understanding of small-scale garment manufacturing in 
Shubra El Kheima in particular and of the unrecorded sector of the economy in general. It 
also aims at questioning some of the prevailing theories about industrialization in 
developing countries and in particular, the role and nature of small manufacturing 
enterprises.
Thus, although case-study methodology is the best suited for this research 
endevour dealing with unrecorded sector the limitations of this study should be 
recognized. The study was undertaken mainly in one particular place, a neighbourhood 
and industrial district in the city of Shubra El Kheima. It involved a limited number of 
cases from a large and unknown universe (the total of small-scale garment establishments 
could not be defined, even in the neighbourhood by itself, let alone the city.) Also, the 
study took place in a particular time and did not have a long time-span. All this must be 
taken into account when dealing with generalizations. What is being proposed is that the 
knowledge and understanding gathered through this study can add to the accumulative 
research into the unrecorded sectors of the economy, thus helping provide a clearer 
picture of the economy as a whole. Thus, the group chosen for this study is not 
representative in the scientific sense, nor could it be. As these establishments are 
unrecorded there was no way we could even estimate the size of the relevant population 
nor any practical way to create a random sample. It is important to keep in mind that we 
are dealing with 60 workshops in one single neighborhood that are part of the statistically 
invisible segment of the economy and therefore generalizations from the study findings 
should be viewed with these limitations in mind.
15 Instrumental case studies, according to Stake, are those in which a particular case is examined mainly to 
provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization. The case is o f secondary interest, playing mainly 
a supportive role. The case is still examined in depth, its contexts investigated and its activities detailed, but 
all because this helps the researcher to pursue the external interest. The case may be seen as typical o f  other 
cases or not.
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4. Choice of Establishments
The most detailed typology of small-scale industries is contained in the early book 
by E. Staley and R. Morse. For them the most important distinction among small 
enterprises is between factory and non-factory production. They contrast factory work 
with artisan establishments as follows: “The factory, whether small or large, is 
distinguished from artisan industry by greater division of labour in production...Artisan 
industry we may define as manufacturing carried on by craftsmen working singly or with 
a few helpers or apprentices and without extensive division of labour” (Staley & Morse 
1965, p.6). A second approach was followed by D.Anderson, who separates small 
enterprises into two categories: household activities, and small workshops and factories 
(Anderson 1982). Household enterprises are never defined analytically, they are defined 
in terms of the data as the residual that remains when information taken from 
“establishment surveys” (which cover only workshops and factories above a certain size) 
are subtracted from information from “labour force surveys” (which cover all types and 
scales of activities).
Throughout this study in general and in the discussion of the relevant theoretical 
background in particular, these abstractly imposed divisions o f artisan/ factory, 
traditional/ modem and formal/ informal have been rejected. The only categorization 
used, and with caution, is that of scale and the extent to which economic activity is 
statistically recorded. This study investigates small-scale garment manufacturing 
establishments, ranging in size from those employing four workers to those employing 
more than forty. These have been divided into two groups, the first including those 
establishments that are statistically unrecorded small workshops, the second group 
including those establishments that are statistically recorded factories. The division is by 
definition simplistic since it is based simply on the question of whether an establishment 
is registered and tax paying or not. In fact most establishments are involved in at least 
some aspects of unrecorded, unregistered and therefore unregulated economic activities 
including employment practices and market transactions. However, in this study of 
garment manufacturers in Shubra El Kheima, I have deliberately not included home­
workers. The reason for this is that the question of homework with its complexities of
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self employment and unpaid family labour and all the related questions of gender would 
have distracted from the main tasks of the study.
The research project was faced with a number of difficulties that have led to a 
series of alterations and adjustments from the original plan. The first difficulty had to do 
with statistics. In the first plan for this project one of the aims was to attempt to measure 
the size of production in the unrecorded garment sector through a comparison of the total 
production in the statistically recorded sector with the total local consumption plus 
exports. The task turned out to be impossible for two reasons. The first was the 
inaccuracy of the statistical records, with different statistical compilations providing 
wildly varying estimations. The second reason was that one of the main sources of 
garments in the local market was that of illegally imported, and therefore statistically 
invisible, ready made garments from a variety of sources. A second source of difficulties 
was in the access to large-scale public and private sector factories. Again it was intended 
that a number of these factories would be included in the study. This also proved to be 
impossible. It required a research permit from the state security police, which was nearly 
impossible. It would take six months of paper work and police screening and in 99 
percent of cases was refused. It did not matter what type of information the researcher 
was looking for, the whole concept of social research is treated with unlimited suspicion. 
Because of these difficulties, a group of 80 establishments was chosen. 60 unrecorded 
workshops in El Wehda neighborhood and 20 recorded factories in the old textile district 
in Shubra El Kheima. Still the choice of both the workshops and the factories was 
limited by different factors outside the control of the researcher as well as some research 
criteria.
The group of 20 factories was limited by several factors. Many owners would 
refuse to meet because I did not have any recommendations. The thought of wasting time 
with a researcher doing some obscure academic study and without any benefits in return 
was not particularly appealing. Others demanded a research permit, which, as explained 
above, was out of the question. The 20 factory cases I was able to get were obtained 
mainly through family contacts. This led to several advantages. The owners trusted the 
researcher and were therefore prepared to talk candidly. They were also prepared to give 
me some of their time and allowed me to interview their workers.
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The group of unrecorded workshops was chosen according to a set of criteria 
were agreed upon between the researcher and a contact in Shubra. These included that 
the establishments had to be garment producers, using cotton cloth, not registered as an 
industrial or commercial activity. On this basis I set out through friends and relatives of 
who has lived in the area all their lives and has an extended family network, to create a 
list of 100 addresses of workshops in the neighbourhood. Of these we were able to visit 
only 60. The rest either refused to participate or had closed down for one reason or the 
other. From these 60 workshops a sub-sample of 20 workshops was chosen, in order to 
conduct more in-depth research. The basis of the choice was if the owners would allow 
further intensive research involving more detailed interviews with their workers.
5. Research Design and Methods of Data Collection
A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected and the 
conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of a study. For case studies, four major 
types of designs are relevant. The first pair of categories consists of single case and 
multiple case designs. The second pair, which can occur in combination with either of 
the first pair, is based on the unit or units of analysis to be covered, and distinguishes 
between holistic and embedded designs. In this research I have used an embedded 
multiple case design looking not only at variables affecting the units as a whole but also 
separately investigating different components within the units. Thus in addition to 
investigating variables relating to a workshop as a unit of analysis, I have disaggregated 
the workshop unit and looked at aspects within it, as separate embedded entities.
A variety of methods were used for the collection of data. With a micro study of 
this type, this was a necessity in order to triangulate the data collected and ensure its 
validity. Thus, a combination of structured interviews, open-ended interviews, direct 
observations and auxiliary interviews were used during the research. The fieldwork was 
carried out mainly in the establishments themselves. Thus workshop owners and workers 
were interviewed in their workshops and factory owners and workers were interviewed in 
their factories. However, some of the more detailed interviews, especially those with 
workers were carried out in homes and coffee shops.
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The research was undertaken in several stages. The first stage was a survey with 
a structured questionnaire which was administered to the 20 factory owners and the 60 
workshop owners. This provided all the main quantitative information, which the basis 
for further stages. The second stage involved in-depth interviews with owners and 
workers in the factories and sub-sample workshops. The third stage involved direct 
observations of the production process, auxiliary interviews with brokers and traders, and 
direct observations of the marketing process. The details of the three main research 
techniques were as follows:
Stage 1: The survey
The interview was administered only to the owners of the factories and workshops. It 
covered the main quantitative characteristics of the establishment. The number of 
workers, the types of equipment and technology used, the production process, the labour 
recruitment process, the main problems faced by the establishment, basic information 
about working hours and other work related details.
Stage 2: In depth interviews and direct observations
In this stage open-ended interviews were carried out with factory owners and owners of 
the workshops, with workers in the factories and workers in the workshops. Questions 
were asked about the production process, the marketing process, the procurement of raw 
materials, and problems of regulation and state intervention. In order to confirm the 
findings I followed closely these processes in factories and workshops through on-site 
visits
Stage 3: Auxiliary interviews and marketing observations
In this stage my aim was to follow the post-production process, to follow the finished 
product after it leaves the establishment and until it reaches its final market place in order 
to understand the external market dynamics that those establishments have to deal with. 
Interviews with traders and brokers were carried out, these were of an open ended and 
exploratory nature. Direct observations were made in the main informal market of Attaba 
in central Cairo, to which much of the workshop products were destined.
6. Description of the Research Site
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The research was conducted in a neighborhood and an industrial district in the 
city o f Shubra El Kheima. The site was chosen for two main reasons. The first is that 
this city is one of the two main textile and garment centers in Egypt (the other being 
Mahalla El Kubra). The second reason has to do with contacts. As the research involves 
unrecorded establishments and as research in Egypt is viewed with considerable 
suspicion, the only way to get to such establishments and be able to extract information 
about their activity was through personal contacts. The contacts available to the 
researcher and willing to help in making the connection with the garment producers made 
this site the most practical to choose.
The city of Shubra El Kheima is part of the Qulyubia province to the North of 
Cairo. It is one of the largest and oldest industrial centers in Egypt. Its proximity to 
Cairo has meant that it is currently part of the greater Cairo region, accounting for eight 
percent of its population, or more than one million people. The city began to develop in 
the 1920s as a small urban center around a number of mainly foreign-owned textile mills. 
During the 1930s and 1940s, the town expanded as a number of large vertically 
integrated textile mills were established. The town was mainly inhabited by workers 
migrating from the nearby villages to work in the factories. The main expansion of the 
town took place on the surrounding agricultural lands. In the 1950s and 1960s, the main 
textile mills were expanded. Large housing estates were built to provide housing for 
workers. The public housing projects expanded through the 1980s, as a labyrinth of 
spontaneous settlements rapidly surrounded them.
The number o f housing units in the city increased from 88,000 in 1976 to 180,000 
in 1986, making Shubra El-Kheima the fastest growing urban settlement in the Greater 
Cairo region (compared, for example, with a 50 percent increase in housing units in Cairo 
over the same period, or an 85 percent increase in Giza) (CAPMAS 1976 & 1986). The 
population of the city also grew rapidly during this time. In 1976, the population was
394,000 people. By 1986, it was 711,000 and, by 1996, 870,000, representing a growth 
of more than 120 percent over two decades (CAPMAS 1976 & 1986). Shubra El- 
Kheima, moreover, also has had a far faster rate of population growth than that 
experienced by other cities in the govemorate of Qalyubia. For example, Banha, the 
capital of the govemorate, grew only by 64 percent, the city of Qalyub by 30 percent, and
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the town of Qanater by 50 percent (CAPMAS 1986 & 1996). Over 50 percent of this 
increase in Shubra El Kheima’s population is the result of migration and, unlike many 
other cities in Egypt, a large percentage of these migrants came from other urban areas, 
mainly from Cairo and Giza.
The structure o f the city reflects its historical development. At the center are the 
old traditional weaving factories many of them still functioning with antiquated 
machinery. Around the center are a number of large-scale public and private textile 
mills, several of them vertically integrated and producing garments. Around this area are 
the big public housing estates, with a major commercial high street cutting through them. 
Around this sector, but mainly to the North and East, are vast areas of spontaneous 
settlements that have housed the main growth of the city’s population since the 1970s.
It is important to note that there is a lot of socio-economic differentiation in these 
areas. Housing settlements that were considered ‘spontaneous’ in the 1970s have become 
something completely different over the last 30 years. The older settlements are now 
made up of four to five story buildings with electricity, sewerage and running water, and 
are arranged in long rows with narrow alleys separating them. These alleys, in turn, lead 
to a wider street which acts as the main commercial center. Though these settlements 
started out as slum areas decades ago, they could not necessarily be classified as slums 
today. By contrast, many of the more recent settlements are still without access to the 
sewerage system or running water. Some still remain without electricity or, alternately, 
are electrified via stolen cables. In the newer settlements one can also find tent 
settlements and huts.
A major feature of private sector, ready-made garment manufacturing in Shubra is 
the prevalence of small-scale enterprise; the 2,838 recorded establishments existing in 
1996 employed only 10,730 workers. The average number of employees per 
establishment was 3.8. More than half of the recorded establishments (1565) had only 
one worker, and another 724 recorded establishments employed only two. Only one 
establishment had over 1,000 workers, and only three had about 500 (CAPMAS, 1996). 
By contrast, the recorded private weaving sector is made up of 1,154 establishments 
employing 21,000 workers. Four factories employ more than 1,000 workers, and fifteen
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factories over 100 workers. Nearly a quarter of the establishments employed between 5 
and 10 workers, and only 112 establishments had one worker.
This picture does not include the unrecorded sector. It is very difficult to estimate 
how large this sector is, but it seems likely that, for garment manufacturing, statistically 
recorded units of one or two workers represent only a small portion of the total. I make 
this assumption, first, because during my interviews it became clear that house-workers 
were extremely reluctant to reveal their economic activity for fear of government 
inspectors. Second, in the enterprises I was actually able to enter via my connections 
with friends and relatives, I found that very few buildings did not have at least one 
household involved in production.16
The structure of public sector companies is totally different. The public sector 
garment industry consists of large, vertically integrated industrial complexes with 
spinning, weaving and garment production all located within the same company. The 
largest of these in Shubra is ESCO. Currently employing 6,000 workers, up until the 
1990s, ESCO had a workforce of 26,000. The company produces wool products as well 
as products made from viscose rayon and cotton. The company was established in 1940. 
In 1963, it was nationalized and combined with other smaller factories surrounding it. 
Until the early-1980s, ESCO was flooded with massive investments by the state, making 
it the third largest textile company after Mahalla and Kafr El Dawwar.
It is important to note the massive scale of the company and place it in the context 
of the predominantly small-scale nature of the rest of the manufacturing sector in Shubra 
El Kheima. ESCO currently has four cotton spinning mills with a total of 167,000 
spindles for the production of combed carded and blended yams as well as ply yams. It 
also has 670 open-end spindles, a viscose-rayon plant of 1,248 spindles producing 
continuous filament yams and a weaving mill with 1200 looms producing cotton fabrics. 
In addition, the company has added a spinning unit for processing wool and wool- 
blended yams. This unit contains 2,640 spindles and 66 looms in addition to a finishing 
unit for processing woolen fabrics. Finally, a complete dye house was built for the
16 The predominance o f small-scale manufacturing in Shubra el-Kheima is a major feature o f  the city’s 
economy in general, and not only in the textile industry. Thus, over 130,000 workers are employed in 
16,000 manufacturing units, over 4,000 o f  which employ one worker and 92 percent employ less than 10 
workers. Only 21 factories have over 1,000 workers and 12 have over 500 (CAPMAS 1996).
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finishing and dying of cotton fabrics. The annual production of ESCO has a capacity of
10,000 tons of cotton yam, 440 tons of viscose rayon, 27 million meters of cotton fabric 
and 570,000 meters of wool and wool-blended fabrics.17
As can be seen from the above description, the city of Shubra El Kheima has a 
large concentration of textile and garment producers ranging from large vertically 
integrated mills to unrecorded garment workshops and household producers. It is 
therefore an appropriate location to study the dynamics of garment production in Egypt. 
The neighborhood chosen for the unrecorded establishments is called El Wehda El 
Arabia (meaning Arab unity), it was started as a spontaneous settlement in the 1960s and 
grew rapidly until the 1980s. It lies to the North of the city, East of the delta railway 
track. It is important to note that in Shubra El Kheima, with the exception of the old 
industrial area, which is clearly demarcated as an industrial area, and the public housing 
estates which are clearly distinguished as residential areas, the rest of the neighborhoods 
have a varied mixture of residential, commercial and industrial activities. This is the case 
in El Wehda. The same building can have a grocery shop in the first floor, a plastics 
workshop in the basement, a garments workshop in the second floor, the rest of the 
apartments being residential, and a small chicken farm on the roof-top (there is 
sometimes also a small mosque in the first floor).
The workshops were found mainly in the first floor of residential, multi purpose 
buildings. The first floors of these building are more like basements in the sense that they 
were lower than the street level. This had a historical reason. As the neighborhood 
became settled the state had to introduce a sewage system. Probably due to cost, the pipes 
were fitted above ground level in the narrow streets separating the rows of houses. The 
pipes were then covered, raising the street level significantly. For this reason, many of 
the commercial and industrial activities in the neighborhood take place on the ground 
floor, since it becomes extremely difficult as a living area. However, other workshops 
were situated in apartments, in many cases extensions of the workshop owners residence.
17 Another major textile factory in Shubra El Kheima is the Wooltex company. This was established as a 
private foreign company in 1937 and was nationalised in 1963. The company specialises in wool and has a 
spinning section, a weaving section and a garment production section. It employs 5000 workers.
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The recorded factories chosen for the study are situated in the old industrial 
district of the city. This district includes both the large-scale textile mills and garment 
factories and a large concentration of small and medium sized weaving and garment 
manufacturing establishments. The latter, which include the garment factories 
investigated in this study, are situated in long rows of one and two story buildings. In 
some cases the ground floor would be occupied by a weaving establishment while the 
second floor would host a separate and independent garment factory or workshop. In 
other cases both floors would be occupied by one establishment with production in the 
first floor and the management office in the second.
7. Summary
This chapter provided the framework for the fieldwork conducted by this 
research. As indicated in the second section, the research is meant to compare recorded 
and unrecorded establishments, in terms of their labour, marketing channels and 
cooperation among each of the two kinds of establishments. It was shown why for this 
type of the research the case study approach is most suitable. I then explained the logic 
behind the choice of small establishments how they were defined and selected. 
Following that the chapter detailed the research techniques used; mainly survey, in-depth 
interviews and field observations. Finally, the chapter ends with a description of the 
research site, Shubra El Kheima, and where the two kinds of establishments are located 
within this site.
The next chapter, will investigate labour costs, the production process and working 
conditions in the unrecorded and recorded establishments. Factors such as recruitment, 
migration, skills, wages, working hours, child labour, secondary work conditions and 
labour regulations will be investigated.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LABOUR
1. Introduction
As was shown in Chapter Five, many theories that divide the urban economy into 
a formal and informal sector assume that one of the main dividing lines between the two 
sectors lies in the labour market. Thus, it is claimed that there are significant differences 
in labour costs and real wages, the pools from which labour is recruited, the skills and 
education of workers, and the working conditions under which work is carried out in the 
two sectors. In the following chapter a comparison is made between those employed in 
the unrecorded workshops and those employed in the recorded factories to test these 
claims. However, before delving into the findings about labour, a brief section will 
outline the basic findings about the studied establishments, in terms of type of 
production, years of work, and workforce. I will then start by investigating wages. 
Wages, however, by themselves do not reflect the real labour costs or real labour 
conditions. I therefore proceed to investigate work contracts, working hours, and 
working conditions. Following this, the question of child labour is investigated. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter Five, the issue is central to the discussion of labour 
conditions in the unrecorded sector, the research is an attempt to confirm whether child 
labour is only found in the unrecorded sector or is in fact endemic in the whole industry. 
I then proceed to compare the recorded factories and the unrecorded workshops in terms 
of the recruitment of workers, their levels of education and gender differentiation. 
Significant differences in these areas would suggest different labour market segments.
Finally, the seventh section of this chapter, tests the variance in technologies used 
by the two kinds of establishments. One of two claims is usually made about the types of 
technology that are characteristically used in unrecorded industrial establishments. The 
first, by proponents of the informal sector theory, is that these technologies are usually 
backward, traditional, non-modem and marginal to mainstream industrial technologies. 
The second, the exact opposite, by proponents of flexible-specialisation theories, is that 
they are, at least in some cases, in the vanguard of technological innovation. I will
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describe some of the equipment used in the factories and workshops to see if  any of this 
is applicable to garment manufacturing in Shubra.
2. Features of the Studied Establishments
This section presents four tables that summarize some of the basic facts about the 
80 establishments that comprise the research’s case study. Starting by the age of the 
establishment, tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide and interesting finding, and difference between 
recorded factories and unrecorded workshops.
Table 7.1 Age of establishment (workshops)
Less than 5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15 + years
32 15 11 2
As can be seen from the above table, most of the 60 workshops under study were 
established in the last ten years. This is a significant fact, given that the 1990s were the 
years of the most severe crises in the large-scale textile mills and garment manufacturers. 
Concomitantly, as table 7.2 shows, unlike the case of the workshops, most of the factories 
were established more than 10 years ago.
Table 7.2 Age of establishment (factories)
Less than 5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15 + years
2 3 6 9
Thus, this is a preliminary indicator to two main findings; the first, as discussed in the 
reviewed literature in Chapters Three and Five, Egypt is conforming to a worldwide trend 
of rise in small workshops and decline in factories. Second, that economic crisis that 
affect factories, do not necessarily affect smaller workshops the same why.
As for the workforce and type of production, tables 7.3 and 7.4 the characteristics 
of the in-depth studied sub-sample of 20 unrecorded workshops (from the original sample 
of 60 workshops, as mentioned in Chapter Six) and the 20 factories, respectively. From 
the two tables it is clear that factories tend a much larger workforce than workshops, so
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while the sampled factories have a minimum of 15 workers and a maximum of 52, the 
workshops have a maximum of 15 and a minimum of 6. However, when it comes to the 
type of products it is clear that both kinds of establishments work in the same products, 
but it still remains to be seen whether they seek the same markets in terms of grade and 
location or not, an issue that will be revealed in Chapter Eight.
Table 7.3 Characteristics of sub-sample of unrecorded workshops
Workshop Total Workforce Main Types of Product
A 8 Men’s shirts, t-shirts, galabiyas
B 10 Children’s shorts, t-shirts, uniforms
C 12 Children’s shorts, t-shirts uniforms
D 8 Women’s dresses
E 14 Women’s dresses
F 9 Islamic dress accessories
G 10 Children’s shirts, t-shirts, pyjamas
H 11 Children’s shirts, t-shirts, pyjamas
I 6 Men’s Galabiyas shirts
J 12 Shorts, t-shirts
K 12 Children’s shorts, t-shirts, school uniforms
L 15 Women’s dresses, underwear
M 8 Women’ s dresses, child garments
N 8 Children’s trousers, pyjamas
O 10 Men’s Shirts and galabiyas, pyjamas
P 10 Children’s shirts, t-shirts, pyjamas
Q 13 Men’s shorts, t-shirts, underwear
R 12 Women’s dresses, underwear
S 8 Women’s Islamic accessories
T 9 Women’s dresses
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Table 7.4. Characteristics of the recorded factories
Factory Total workforce Main Type of Products
A 28 Men’s galabiya and shirts
B 52 Women’s dresses
C 49 Women’s dresses
D 43 Men’s trousers, suits, shirts
E 25 Men’s trousers, suits and shirts
F 37 Men’s underwear and t-shirts, pyjamas, shirts
G 42 Child garments, mainly school uniforms
H 48 Women’s dresses
I 32 Women’s dresses
J 34 Men’s shirts, trousers and school uniforms
K 22 Children’s shorts, t-shirts, pyjamas
L 15 Children’s shorts, t-shirts, pyjamas
M 20 Women’s dresses, Islamic accessories
N 33 Women’s dresses and underwear
0 20 Men’s pyjamas, galabiyas, underwear
P 19 Men’s shirts
Q 41 Men’s trousers, shirts, suits
R 18 Children’s clothing- mainly for school
S 22 Children’s clothing- mainly for school
T 20 Women’s dresses, Islamic accessories
3. Wages and Debt
As mentioned earlier, there is a common belief among observers that wages within the 
unrecorded sector tend to be less than those in the recorded sector, for the same job.
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Table 7.5 compares the average daily wages for workers of the sampled factories to those 
who work in the unrecorded workshops.18
Table 7.5 Comparing total daily wage rates
Average daily wage (LE)
Recorded Unrecorded
No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
0-5 93 15 38 19
5-10 316 51 85 41
10-20 123 20 37 18
20-50 75 12 45 22
>50 13 2 0 0
Total 620 100 205 100
As can be seen from the above table, the only significant differences between the two 
samples are in the 5-10 LE category and the 20-50 LE category. In the former there is a 
higher percentage of workers in the recorded factories than the workshops (51 percent of 
workers compared to 41 percent), whereas in the latter category the unrecorded 
workshops have a higher percentage (22 percent of workers compared to 12 percent). 
Although this does not indicate that there are significant differences in wages as a whole, 
it does suggest that there are more workers at the higher end of the wage scale in the 
unrecorded workshops and more workers at the lower end in the recorded factories.
In order to understand these differences we need to take a closer comparative look 
at the distribution of wages according to different jobs, which is presented in the 
following table.
18 In the tables presented above I used averages for wages. As is inevitable when workers are paid by 
piece, there were considerable differences among workers operating the same tools or carrying out similar 
tasks.
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Table 7.6 Comparing average daily wage rates by job (approximate percentage of 
workers)
Av.
daily
wage
(LE)
Cloth cutter
%
Sewing
%
Accessories
%
Over
%
Ironing
%
Packaging
%
Rec Unrec Rec Unrec Rec Unrec Rec Unrec Rec Unrec Rec Unrec
0-5 0 0 0 0 20 10 30 40 0 0 80 85
5-10 0 0 75 60 80 90 70 60 0 0 20 15
10-20 45 10 25 40 0 0 0 0 40 20 0 0
20-50 55 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 80 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
From table 7.6 it is clear that the main difference in wages was not that between 
workshops and factories but rather between different jobs within the establishment. The 
most skilled job in the garment industry is that of the cutters. These are usually 
experienced tailors, always male, and are the highest paid. However, the above table also 
shows that wages for cloth-cutting and ironing, which are the more skilled jobs, are 
significantly higher in the unrecorded workshops than in the recorded factories.
Thus, unlike the prevalent assumption in the literature, low wages are not an exclusive 
feature of the unrecorded establishments. Not only was this clear quantitatively from the 
above statistics, but also qualitatively from the workers I met with. The case of one 
sewing-operator in a recorded factory is exemplary and instructive. Mohamed has a 
monthly wage of 300 LE. He is married and has three children. Payments for food and 
tuition cost him more than 600 LE per month. Both his eldest son and his wife work 
bringing the total family income to 700 LE. As he explained, without the employment of 
his son and wife, the family would not have been able to survive on his income alone 
(Mohamed, Personal interview, Shubra 2/2/99). It is important to remember that this is 
not some unskilled worker in an informal basement sweatshop. On the contrary, this is
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the supposedly privileged worker of the formal industrial sector. Sweatshop conditions 
are not an exclusive feature of the unrecorded sector; they are a feature of the industry as 
a whole.
Another common feature between workers in the recorded and the unrecorded 
sectors involved their relation to credit and debt, which is directly related to their wages. 
In the following table (table 7.7) comparison is made between workers in the unrecorded 
workshops and workers in the recorded factories in terms of their indebtedness to the 
owners. In the survey questionnaire, the workers were asked whether they had borrowed 
money from the owners during their employment and the amounts that were borrowed.
Table 7.7 Comparing workers indebtedness to employers
Amount Recorded Unrecorded
(L.E.) No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
No loans 253 41 60 30
0-100 301 49 145 70
>100 66 10 0 0
Total 620 100 205 100
As can be seen from the above table, most workers, in both recorded and 
unrecorded establishments, had to borrow money from the owner at some point during 
their employment. In other words for both sectors, wages are not enough to cover 
financial needs. For both categories o f worker they borrowed money to cover for times 
of particular event, it was during the feasts and Ramadan, at the beginning of the school 
year and at the time of marriages and deaths. The result of this situation is that the only 
credit these workers can get is from their employers in the form of advances on their 
wages. The labour power of the borrower is the only available collateral for any loan.
Work constrained by a debt relationship, is according to both employers and 
workers interviewed, a common phenomena in the garment industry. Employers incline 
to present such an arrangement as an advance on wages that is to be repaid with the
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labour of the borrower. Such an advance payment, however, is intended to appropriate 
that labour, whether immediately or later.
However, although wages are slightly better in the unrecorded workshops than the 
recorded factories, and for both sectors pay wages are not enough during specific events, 
it seems that the latter provides more work stability than the former. Table 7.7 shows an 
important difference between the recorded factories and the unrecorded workshops in 
terms of the frequency and method of wage payment.
Table 7.8 Comparing means of wage payment
Payment by Recorded Unrecorded
No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
Monthly wage 341 55 0 0
Weekly wage 29 5 15 7
Daily wage 173 28 63 31
Piece rates 71 12 107 62
Total 620 100 205 100
A majority of workers in the recorded factories (55%) received monthly wages, whereas 
a majority o f workers in the unrecorded sector (93%) were paid piece rates or daily 
wages. Monthly wages are paid, regardless of the frequency of work orders. Daily 
wages are paid only when there is work to be done. Hence, monthly wages provide much 
more stability than daily wages or piece rates
Piece-rate is generally the customary method of payment of labour throughout the 
garment workshops. The amount is based on what a skilled worker can produce in 
twelve hours. If the output of a newcomer or an old hand remains below that norm, not 
incidentally but systematically, then he or she is discharged by the employer who thus 
puts an end to the underutilization o f his capital investment. Furthermore, workers are 
not paid when production is interrupted. In this research this occurred frequently. There 
were a variety of causes for such interruptions. Power cuts, machines breaking down, 
cloth not being delivered, were all causes for short-term interruptions. Longer-term
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interruptions were caused by declines in demand, which most owners described by the 
word “nassib”, which means fate. The owner would send his workers away with 
instructions to report daily until there was work for them to do.
Within the piece-rate, differences in speed, efficiency, skill and experience all led 
to variations in wage rates. In the case of more skilled workers, especially cutters, the 
employer pays some of his workers a higher rate per piece than others. These are the 
more experienced workers who are thus discouraged from going over to a competitor 
willing to pay the same rate. Employers sometimes, also make use of another method 
leading to considerable wage differences, especially in the case of the less skilled 
workers, namely the arbitrary deduction from wages of an amount for damages. 
Deductions are made in the workers pay on account of damages to cloth or waste of 
material due to mistakes. Some workers claimed that the low quality of cloth, 
mechanical defects and problems in the old sewing machines were much more 
responsible for the waste and damages than mistakes on their part (Mohamed 2, Personal 
interview, Shubra 10/2/99; Mahmoud, personal interview, Shubra 10/2/99). The workers 
complained that the blame is always placed on them whatever the real cause for the 
damage was and their wages were deducted, sometimes severely (Group discussion, 
Shubra 10/2/99). Moreover, piecework wages are set at a low level and workers forced 
to work long hours to reach a level of income acceptable to them. One employer, talking 
about his wage policy, claimed that workers tend to be inflexible about the total amount 
of earnings but not about the time and effort spent to arrive at those levels (Employer 1, 
personal interview, Shubra 3/3/99). Workshop workers have very limited ability to 
reinforce their bargaining position in setting the piecework rate.
Thus, in conclusion, both the recorded and unrecorded sectors have advantages 
and disadvantages in terms of labour wages. So while the average wages within the 
unrecorded sector can be higher for the same job than in the recorded establishments, 
income stability seems much better within the recorded sector. That is, within the 
unrecorded sector workers’ wages are more likely to be decreased or even stopped due to 
factors outside their control, than is the case within factories. Hence, overall, unlike who 
the dualist model discussed earlier in Chapter Five would like to claim, negative features 
in terms of wages and employment conditions, are common within both the ‘formal’ and
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the ‘informal’ sectors. However, to further sketch out this conclusion we need to look 
into other aspects of employment. Thus, wages must be placed in the context of legally 
inscribed benefits, working hours and conditions and productivity if we are to get a more 
accurate picture of labour conditions in the garment industry. This is detailed in the 
following section.
4. Work Contracts, Secondary Terms of Employment, and Working Hours
The phrase ‘secondary terms of employment’ has acquired the meaning of 
conditions and benefits that the worker may be able to claim in addition to his/her wage. 
Derived from regulations applicable mainly to employment in the public sector, it is not 
surprising that such provisions are lacking in the unrecorded garment workshops. 
However, it is important to note that these secondary terms of employment only apply to 
workers who have a registered work contract. So what is interesting is that, being a 
worker in a registered and recorded factory does not guarantee having a work contract 
and therefore does not mean having automatic access to secondary terms of employment. 
Table 7.9 Workers with and without contracts in factory sample
Job Workers with contracts 
(%)
Workers without contracts 
(%)
Cloth cutting 80 20
Sewing 30 70
Accessories 15 85
Overall 10 90
Ironing 65 35
Packaging 10 90
Total 35 65
As can be seen from the above table, sixty-five percent of the total workers in the 
recorded factory sample do not have work contracts and are therefore not eligible for 
secondary employment. The main concentration of contracted workers is among the cloth 
cutters and ironers, since those are the highly skilled categories for which employers fear 
competition. This is followed by the sewing operators, from which thirty percent have
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contracts, while and around ninety percent of the other categories of workers do not have 
contracts.
According to Egyptian law it is illegal to employ a worker for a period of more 
than three months without a work contract between employee and employer that is 
registered with the Work Office.19 However, employers manage to overcome this 
provision o f the law by pressuring labour to continue to work without a contract, which 
they accept because of lack of job opportunities, and through bribery of Work Office 
inspectors, which is the only way to ensure that workers have contracts.20 Of the twenty 
factory owners interviewed, sixteen admitted to bribing Work Office officials. One 
factory owner explained how the salaries of the inspectors that came to check on his 
factory were in many cases lower than those of some of his workers (Employer 2, 
personal interview, Shubra 12/3/99). Thus, a small bribe would end the inspection to the 
owner’s advantage. In another case, a factory owner paid a regular salary to a work 
office official, and therefore was never bothered with factory inspections (Employer 3, 
personal interview, Shubra 14/3/99). Although the level of corruption of the work office 
was not a surprise, the extent to which factory owners were prepared to talk openly about 
it was. There was no attempt to conceal the system of organized bribery o f officials, in 
fact owners seemed to be proud of their ability to get around the state bureaucracy.
Only workers with a work contract are entitled to the legal rights that are 
stipulated in the labour law. These include: 1-medical and social insurance, contributed to 
by both employer and employee; 2-the right to file a legal complaint in case o f unfair 
treatment; 3- the right to a yearly three week paid leave; 4- in case of a lay off, the right 
to get a hearing from a committee composed of a union representative, a work office 
representative and a judge who must all agree to the rightfulness of the employer’s 
decision before the worker could be fired. These are just a few of the benefits that come 
with a work contract.
These benefits are denied to workshop workers, and equally lacking to the 
majority of labour in recorded factories. Medical facility, weekly holiday and statutory
1; The Work Office was set up by the Nasserist regime in 1961 to make sure that the ‘socialist’ labour laws 
were implemented. Until now it is the only mechanism for the inspection o f labour conditions.
20 The office sends inspectors on both random and regular visits to factories and other registered 
workplaces.
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leave are completely denied to the workshop workers. The only signs of secondary 
labour conditions do not concern rights but duties to which the workers have to adhere in 
order to get employment and then keep it. This system of unwritten rules lays down what 
the employer considers to be desirable work behaviour: to show maximum flexibility, to 
accept the wage, to work overtime when necessary, and to accept any interruption. It is 
important to note that the absence of any positive secondary terms of employment was 
not a feature only of the unrecorded workshops. The majority of workers in the larger 
factories suffered similar conditions, with no extra wage provisions or benefits. Only 
those with permanent job contracts had access to such provisions, and even these had to 
struggle in many cases to get their rights enforced.
Even with workers who do have contracts, the owners can circumvent the law. A 
worker in one of the factories with 30 workers described how owners made the workers 
sign an undated letter of resignation on their first day of work (Mostafa, personal 
interview', 3/2/1999). This tactic allows the owner to fire the worker whenever he/she 
wishes to, by putting in the date on the resignation letter, but also the worker would be 
constantly under threat and would be unwilling to complain to the Work Office in case of 
violations against him/her. According to the interviews, this tactic is quite common in 
the cases studied, although I could not get accurate numbers because not all workers were 
prepared to talk about their contracts and not all owners allowed us to interview all the 
workers. Another aspect concerning contracted work is that, according to the law, 
payments for medical and social insurance are to be divided between the owner and the 
worker. What happens in practice is that the employers’ share is often subtracted from 
the worker’s pay (Mikhail, personal interview, 3/2/1999; Raga, personal interview, 
3/2/1999). In fact, for this reason, many workers prefer not to have a contract.
Take for example, the case of an owner of a garment factory employing 42 
workers with only 15 contracted workers, who argued that for him the labour law was 
archaic. He alleged that no one in the garment industry could afford to follow this law. 
The problem, according to this owner, was not only that the benefits stipulated by the law 
were too expensive for employers, but more importantly that the law made it extremely 
difficult to fire workers with permanent job contracts (Employer 4, Personal interview, 
9/3/1999). The employer wishing to get rid of a worker was required to take his case to
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the Work Office, which would then appoint a committee including representatives from 
the general union for textile workers that would look into the matter. Only in cases of 
violence, sabotage or other serious offences would these committees agree to the request 
by an employer. He alleged that even in cases of long term absence by a worker, the 
employer would have to go through long term procedures of issuing a first and then 
second warning before bringing the case to the attention of a Work Office committee 
(Employer 4, Personal interview, 9/3/1999). But again, these rules applied only to 
workers with full time work contracts. In the same vain, another factory owner said, that 
the law was designed in a completely different era when the state owned most industries 
and could afford to give the workers what he considered to be lavish provisions 
(Employer 5, personal interview, 9/3/1999). He complained that the state had not yet 
changed the law after ten years o f promises.
The current labour law stipulates the maximum hours to be worked by any 
employee is eight hours a day for six days a week. Any hours above the maximum 
should be counted as over time with from 1.5 to 2 times the hourly wage. These rules 
apply neither to the workshops nor to the factories in our study. In the case of the 
factories normal working hours were from nine in the morning to seven in the evening. 
This was the minimum. When there is a large order and a deadline to catch the workers 
could be kept until 10 in the evening. This, according to several owners happens 
throughout the busy season, before feasts, at the beginning of the school year, at the 
beginning of the summer season. There are no over time arrangements, workers put in 
whatever extra hours of work that are demanded of them by the employer. In the case of 
the workshops working hours are even worse. Work starts at eight in the morning and 
continued as long as there was work to be done, sometimes until midnight (with the 
exception of non-family female workers who were released at nine). Thus, for the 
factories the average daily hours out of busy-season was nine, while the average hours in 
the busy-season were thirteen. For the workshops the average hours of work, when there 
was work, ranged from 10 to 15 hours.
Even if we assume that the garment factory workers do only nine working hours a 
day, and they did this for six days, this would mean a working week of 54 hours, 
compared to the 48-hour week of the contracted public sector worker, (which is still high
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by world standards). If we take the comparison one step further, we would find that the 
garments worker in this research works for 312 more hours per year than a public sector 
contracted employee. This means 39 extra eight- hour working days per year.
In conclusion, the above findings suggests that the effects of labour regulations on 
employment conditions in the factories was limited by the fact that most workers in these 
factories did not have work contracts and therefore their employment conditions were not 
affected by the law. Furthermore, many of those who had contracts did not benefit from 
the rights provided by the law. This challenges the aforementioned assumptions, detailed 
in Chapter Five, about labour regulations acting as a dividing line between the ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ establishments, raising labour costs in the former and reducing them in the 
latter, as well as ‘protecting’ labour in the former and ‘unprotecting’ it in the latter.
5. Child Labour
In a sociological study on child labour in the informal sector in Egypt, the focus 
was placed on why the child or his family ‘choose’ to go out to work i.e. on the supply of 
child labour. The only aspect of demand for child labour was that of the vices of 
‘informal workshops’ and their employers who employ children from behind the back of 
the state and of legislation (Azir 1992). However, unlike this common understanding that 
was detailed earlier in Chapter Five, the findings of this research confirm that the whole 
garment industry seems to exploit child labour with the direct or indirect acquiescence of 
the state. The employment of children in the garment industry is a function of demand 
for low wage, low skill labour in some of its production stages, and is protected by a state 
which does not impose its labour legislation.
In terms of both number o f children employed and the working conditions, the 
‘formal’ sector factories did not fare better than the ‘informal’ sector workshops. Table 
7.10 shows that child labour is a common feature of both recorded factories and 
unrecorded workshops. Both the factories and the workshops employed children below 
the minimum legal age. And although within the recorded factories the percentage of 
child labour was 9 percent o f the labour force, as opposed to 16 percent within the 
unrecorded workshops, the difference in percentage is not that significant, especially that 
the absolute numbers of children employed in the 20 factories is much more than their
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peers in the 20 sub-sample workshops featured in the table. In both kinds of 
establishments, the average age of child labourers was 10 years.
Table 7.10 Comparing age distribution of workers
Age group Recorded Unrecorded
No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
6-14 59 9 33 16
15-19 31 5 29 14
20-29 122 20 68 33
30-39 208 33 50 24
40-49 156 25 19 9
50-59 44 7 6 3
Total 620 100 205 100
In terms of type of work in both the factories and the workshops child workers 
played a central role. They worked in a variety of occupations, moving tools, cloth 
pieces, threads, buttons and zippers between the different work positions. The only 
difference in type of work is that in seven of the factories there were girls less than 14 
years old working on the sewing machines, and in all the factories the packaging process 
was carried out by young girls.
In the sub-sample of workshops, the abusive working conditions of child 
labourers were not significantly different from those in the factories. I was able to talk to 
ten children from the factories and ten children from the workshops (all boys). Only four 
of the twenty children had been to school and these had dropped out after the second 
year.21 In both groups beatings by the employer and by older workers were often a 
regular occurrence. These would range from slaps and punches on the face to serious 
caning, depending on the perceived mistake. The child is sometimes beaten if he brings
21 It must be noted that primary education is compulsory in Egypt.
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the wrong tool, the wrong size o f scissors for example, if he in any way answers back, if 
he is sent to the market to buy something and takes too much time...etc. In the case of 
workshops, employing a child is sometimes seen as a favour from the owner to a 
neighbouring family and the parents would be as harsh with the child as the employer.
Thus, it is clear from the above findings, that the supposedly 4 formal’ sector is 
not any different from the ‘informal’ in terms of being a safe haven for child labour. The 
violation of labour regulations prevalent in the two sectors with regard to adults -as 
shown in the previous section- is equally pertinent to child labour. Hence, the prevalent 
assumption within the “dualist model’’ literature regarding the demarcation of the two 
sectors even in respect to child labour is fallacious.
6. Features of Recruited Labour
The final hypothesis with regards to labour, is that of their origin. As noted 
earlied in Chapters Three and Five, dual model theories, assume that the 4 formal’ and 
‘informal’ sectors tend to attract different pools of labour. Thus, if the sample factories 
of this research were part o f the so called formal sector, as they are recorded, tax paying 
and regulated establishments, and if the workshop sample were part of the so called 
informal sector, then according to the dual labour market theory the two groups should be 
recruiting their labour from different markets. The former from the urban, relatively high 
wage labour market and the latter from the low wage marginal and migrant labour 
market. In this section I compare the recruitment of workers in terms of the place of their 
origin (migrant/non-migrant), their educational attainment and their gender distribution. 
Significant differences would suggest a division in the labour markets between the two 
types of establishments.
With respect to the origins of recruited labour, table 7.11 shows that only a small 
percentage of both workshop and factory workers are first generation migrants (15 
percent and 25 percent respectively) and none are recent migrants. All the workshop 
workers were living in Shubra before being recruited to their current job, and 90 percent 
of the factory workers were also from Shubra. Thus, not only are the workers of 
workshops of the same origins, but moreover unlike the assumptions of the dualist model 
theories less of the ‘informal’ sector workers are first generation migrants.
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Table 7.11 Comparison of labour origins
Origins Recorded
%
Unrecorded
%
First generation migrant 25 15
Second generation migrant 70 60
Lived in Shubra before job 100 90
To further test the demarcation between the two sectors in terms of labour, the 
following table compares the previous employment of the workers of the two groups. 
The aim is to find out to what extent there is labour movement and fluidity within and 
between the recorded and unrecorded establishments.
Table 7.12 Comparing previous employment
Previous
Employment
Recorded Unrecorded
No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
Recorded factory 280 45 60 30
Unrecorded workshop 154 25 103 50
Other 186 30 42 20
Total 620 100 205 100
Contrary to the basic premise of dual models theory, table 7.12 shows that there is 
significant movement both between and within the two types of establishments. For the 
factory workers, 45 percent had previously worked in other recorded garment factories 
and 25 percent were previously employed in unrecorded workshops. For the workshop 
workers, 30 percent were previously employed in recorded factories and 50 percent 
worked previously in other unrecorded garment workshops. These results strongly 
contradict the idea, put forward by dual labour market theory that labour mobility is only 
from the informal sector to the formal one, and that the informal sector is only a stepping- 
stone for migrants wishing to join the formal sector.
If both the factories and the workshops recruit from Shubra, and if there is 
movement from the workshops to the factories and vica versa, then it seems that we are 
dealing with a single labour market.
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However there is, in Shubra El Kheima a dividing line in terms of labour 
recruitment, this does not distinguish between recorded and unrecorded sectors but 
between the public sector and the private sector as a whole in terms of skilled jobs. This 
division is based on education. Skilled workers in the public sector must be either 
graduates of the industrial secondary schools or the factory training schemes. A worker 
without such qualifications, however skilled, would not be recruited to the public sector. 
It is important to note that this division only involves the recruitment of skilled labour. In 
terms of unskilled labour the public sector recruits from the same pool as the private 
sector. It is also important to note that since the economic reform process began in the 
early 1990s the public sector factories have reduced their workforces significantly; hence 
this difference is gradually disappearing within the garment labour market. As for 
eductational attainment as a dividing line between the recorded and unrecorded sector, 
the results are complex. The following table compares the educational attainment of 
workers in unrecorded workshops and recorded factories of this study.
Table 7.13 Comparing educational attainment
Education Recorded Unrecorded
No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
Illiterate 121 19 53 26
Read and write 162 26 93 45
Less than intermediate 184 30 48 23
Intermediate 66 11 7 3
Higher than intermediate 59 10 4 2
University 32 4 0 0
Total 620 100 205 100
As can be seen from the table 7.13, in general, workers in the recorded factories 
had a higher formal educational attainment than workers in the unrecorded workshops; 25 
percent of the former had intermediate or higher education compared to only 5 percent 
for the latter. However, there were more workers who could only read and write within 
the workshops than in the factories (45percent versus 26 percent, respectively). The
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percentage o f illiterates was close in the two types of establishments (19 percent for the 
factories compared to 26 percent for the workshops).
In general, the degree of skill required for industrial work in the workshops and 
factories of our study varied considerably, but in general, access to a trade was not tied to 
formal education. 'WTiile applicants for a public sector factory are expected to have at 
least a diploma from an industrial training institute, workshop and private factory 
workers have to pick up their skill on the job. Sometimes they follow an apprenticeship 
lasting a few months, but more usually they leam by helping an experienced worker. 
During this training phase newcomers are paid little if any wage.
As for difference in the supposedly two labour markets based on gender, table 
7.14 shows that the majority of workers in both sectors are female with 76 percent for the 
unrecorded workshops and 60 percent for the recorded factories. The predominance of 
female labour in the garments industry is a general phenomenon in the private sector 
garments industry on a national level (CAPMAS, 1998).
Table 7.14 Comparing Gender distribution
Gender Recorded Unrecorded
No. of Workers % No. of Workers %
Male 249 40 49 24
Female 371 60 156 76
Total 620 100 205 100
However if we compare these results with the percentage of female labour in the 
public sector garments industry, which is less than 30 percent on a national level 
(CAPMAS 1998), then we can see that there is a significant difference, not between 
recorded and unrecorded establishments in Shubra, but between the private and the public 
sector garments industry. In order to get a clearer picture of gender distribution in the 
establishments of our study, we need to disaggregate the data to find out how this 
distribution takes place according to the different jobs within the establishments.
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Table 7.15 Comparing Gender distribution according to job
Job Recorded Unrecorded
Male
%
Female
%
Male
%
Female
%
Cloth cutter 100 0 100 0
Sewing 5 95 0 100
Accessories 25 75 10 90
Ironing 70 30 90 10
Packaging 15 85 5 95
The above table (7.15) shows a strong concentration of female labour in sewing, 
accessories and packaging, which is the same for the two types of establishments. High
skilled jobs, cloth-cutting is an exclusively male job, and ironing is also male dominated
22in both workshops and factories. Again, as with migration origins, the differences in 
gender distribution, even when disaggregated, between the recorded factories and the 
unrecorded workshops is insignificant.
7. Technologies and the Labour Process
Finally, another element that supposedly differentiates the ‘formal’ from 
‘informal’ sector is the use of technology. As noted in Chapter Five, “dual models” 
assume that the formal establishments are more modem and technologically advanced in 
terms of their production process than the informal sector, which is supposedly 
‘traditional’ and ‘backwards’. Therefore, in this section I will describe and compare the 
three main processes in the recorded factories and unrecorded workshops. The aim is to 
find out whether there are significant differences in the technologies and tools used in 
both groups. The production of garments involves several basic stages. The first stage is
22 If we relate these results with our previous results on wages, we find that females, although a majority o f  
the workforce, are concentrated in the lower end o f  the wage and skill spectrum.
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the cutting of the cloth on the basis o f the particular pattern of the job order. The second 
stage, is the sewing of the cloth pieces, followed by the covering in which the cloth edges 
are pressed in, to prevent the cloth unraveling. The final is the ironing stage.
7.1. The cutting stage
Setting up the markers and cutting the garments is a relatively complex and 
skilled process. The general objective of the cutting is to get the most pieces out of the 
cloth possible. However the pattern of the cloth affects where to put the markers. The 
thickness of the stack of cloth will affect the difficulty of cutting as will how close 
markers are laid. A calculation must also be made about the thickness versus the length 
to make the quickest cut with the least possibility of error. The process includes 
spreading out, on top of each other, a number of lengths of cloth. The number o f pieces 
in each garment and different sizes of garments must be known so that optimal length of 
cloth and number of layers can be determined. The key problem is to lay the cloth layer 
by layer, so that it is stretched neither too loose nor too tight. On the top layer, cut out 
templates of each piece are laid to guide the cutting and to minimize the excess cloth 
required to make the garments.
There are three methods used to cut the cloth into the required patterns. The first 
is using a manual cutter. A skilled worker would use a drawn pattern to follow and would 
manually cut the cloth to shape. This method is both time costly and produces the most 
waste in terms of cloth. The second method is using an electrical cutter. Again the 
method is similar to the manual one although much faster and more accurate. The third 
and most advanced method is the use of a computerized cutter. The pattern is fed into a 
computer programme and the machine basically sucks in the cloth from one side and 
produces the cloth cuttings with the desired patterns from the other side. This is the most 
efficient and rapid method for cutting the cloth.
None of the establishments studied in this research used a computerized cutter. As 
table 7.16 shows, the electric cutter is the standard used in the factories. In the 
workshops exclusively manual cutting is still used by a slight majority of establishments; 
52 percent as opposed to 35 percent within factories. A significant minority of factories 
still use only manual cutting (15 percent), which is not far away from the percentage of
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workshops using the same method (23 percent). However, while only half the factories 
use electrical cutting exclusively this percentage is reduced by half for workshops using 
this technology (Table 7.16).
Table 7.16 Comparing cutting technology
Type
of establishment
Manual only Electric only Mixed
No. of
Establish
ments
% No. of
Establish
ments
% No. of
Establish
ments
%
Recorded 7 35 10 50 3 15
Unrecorded 31 52 15 25 14 23
7.2. The sewing stage
After the cloth has been cut, it is sewn. Three production systems can be 
identified, which differ by the degree of labour specialization and capital use: the whole 
garment production system, the subassembly production system, and the progressive 
production system. In the whole garment system, one individual completes most of the 
garment. In the second system, the subassembly line system, different parts of the 
garments are processed with several workstations or assembly lines making pieces of the 
garment at the same time. Relative to the whole garment method, this method allows 
greater specialization of labour and requires more use of capital, such as conveyers, carts 
and more specialized sewing machines. In the third system, the progressive bundle 
system, different operations or jobs are never done simultaneously. In the second and 
third systems, the amount of specialization differs according to the type of clothes being 
made and the specialized machinery available. As Solinger puts it, “ no definite answer 
can be given as to which production system is best unless the garment style, 
specifications, working force, and manufacturing policies are known” (Solinger, 1980: 
445)
As a generalization, the smallest firms use the whole garment production 
methods, the medium firms often use some version of the sub-assembly system, and the 
largest firms use the progressive bundle system. These are the best systems for each size 
of firm because the smallest firms can obviously not specialize, the medium firms often 
use several rooms in an older building and find it is better to split the production process
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into separate parts, and the largest firms have fixed lines for long production runs and can 
use the very specialized and capital intensive progressive bundle systems.
In the sampled workshops and factories of this research, two types of sewing 
machines were found to be used. Mechanically driven Singer machines, which are half a 
century old and driven by a foot pedal. Or electrical sewing machines, much smaller in 
size and faster than their mechanical ancestors. The following table compares the use of 
each of the two types in both factories and workshops studied in this research:
Table 7.17 Comparing the use of mechanical and electrical sewing machines
Mechanical only Electrical only Mixed
No. of 
Establish­
ments
% No. of 
Establish­
ments
% No. of
Establish
ments
%
Recorded 0 0 18 90 2 10
Unrecorded 10 17 35 58 15 25
As we can see from table 7.17, the majority of both factories and workshops use 
electrical sewing machines only (90 percent and 58 percent respectively), and a minority 
in both groups use both electrical and manual machines. Only 17 percent of the 
workshops did not use any electrical machines, while none of the factories did not have 
electrical machines.
7.3. The ironing stage
In this stage there are three basic technologies used. The most advanced and 
efficient are the large press irons in which the finished folded piece is pressed in one 
single stage. Another method is the simple electric iron, which is used manually. The 
third method is the stove iron, which is kept on a stove and used manually. The 
following table identifies the use of each type in the two sectors (recorded and 
unrecorded):
Table 7.18 Comparing types of irons used
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Press iron Electric iron Stove iron
No. of
Establish
ments
% No. of
Establish
ments
% No. of
Establish
ments
%
Recorded 8 40 19 95 0 0
Unrecorded 0 0 42 70 18 30
The above table (7.18) shows that the majority of both factories and workshops 
use electric irons. However, while 40 percent of the factories also use press irons, only 
one of these factory uses solely this kind of advanced tool. On the contrary, 30 percent of 
the unrecorded workshops still use a stove iron exclusively, while none use press irons.
The above comparisons o f the technologies used in factories and workshops 
suggest that the differences are minor. This contradicts dualist theories which place the 
former in the ‘modem’, ‘formal’ sector, and the latter in the ‘traditional’, ‘informal’ 
sector. In fact, if there is a technological advantage, such as in the ironing stage, it is in 
the larger scale of production in the factories compared to the workshops. Several 
economies of scale exist in the production of garments. The cutting process has 
substantial economies of scale, at least in the time involved per unit. Since few people 
and limited machinery is involved, even in the larger firms, the cost per unit o f cutting 
probably drops dramatically as well. Because the skilled labour involved in cutting is 
scarce, larger firms are able to make better use of that resource. There are also economies 
of scale in the cloth usage in the garment cutting process because the amount of extra 
cloth required is minimized.
In the sewing process, there is a fixed lower limit in the production of a garment, 
which is a function of the speed of the sewing machine and the number of stitches. The 
limit is never approached because the garment must be repositioned and reinserted into 
the machine. A factory manager remarked that more than 75 percent of the time required 
to sew a garment was taken up by handling, and this is in a large relatively modem 
facility. The single worker using the whole garment production process needs several 
times the handling as in the larger modem facility. There are economies of scale because 
the production can be reorganized to reduce handling costs.
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The economy of scale mainly occurs as a function of the size of a uniform order. 
The set up time for a line production operation is quite long, so down-time between 
production runs can be long, especially if the products being made are different. For 
small orders it is less costly for the whole garment method to be used. However, as we 
shall see in the following chapter, the advantages of the division of labour within the 
larger recorded factories is compensated in the case of the unrecorded factories through 
cooperation and division of labour between the different units.
8. Summary
Based on my fieldwork in Shubra El Kheima, this chapter compared labour and 
production processes in recorded and unrecorded garment establishments. In comparing 
wages in recorded factories and unrecorded workshops, the only significant difference is 
in the higher skilled jobs for which wages are higher in the workshops than in the 
factories. The main differences in wages are not between the recorded and the 
unrecorded establishments but between different jobs within the establishments. Piece 
rates and daily wages are the predominant means of wage payment in the workshops as 
opposed to monthly wages in the factories. In both cases it is common for workers to 
enter debt relations with their employer, and these debts are repaid with the labour of the 
borrower.
The majority of workers in the factories do not have work contracts. Those who 
did, were concentrated in the higher skill categories. Nevertheless, having a work 
contract does not guarantee the benefits stipulated by the labour law. Employers use 
various means to evade following the law, including the bribery of Work Office officials 
and forcing workers to sign undated letters of resignation. Average working hours are 
similar for both groups, far exceeding the eight-hour limit set in the labour law. 
Similarly, child labour is a common feature in both types of establishments with 
widespread mistreatment by employers, low wages and long working hours, despite 
supposedly strict laws prohibiting it.
In terms of recruitment, the majority of workers in both types of establishments 
are second and third generation residents of Shubra El Kheima, suggesting that both 
recruited from the same pool of labour and that recent migrants were not a significant
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source of labour. There is significant mobility of labour between workshops and 
factories, and this does not only, or predominantly take place from unrecorded workshops 
to recorded factories. Many workers move from the latter to the former. There was also 
significant mobility within each category. In terms of education, a higher percentage of 
workers with formal education was found among the factory workers. However the 
percentage of those with less than intermediate education was similar in both cases. And 
lastly, female workers represented the majority of the workforce in both types of 
establishments. Female labour is concentrated in the lower skill, lower wage jobs. Sewing 
is predominantly a female job and cutting and ironing a predominantly male job.
In terms of technology used, the factories used a higher percentage of electrical 
equipment, although a majority o f workshops had already turned to using modem 
electrical equipment. However, when aggregating the comparisons in the different stages 
of the production process- cutting, sewing and ironing- there was no qualitative 
difference in technology between the two types of establishments.
Overall, these findings disqualified the different premises made by dual model 
theories, in distinguishing ‘formal’ from ‘informal’ labour markets. In the next chapter I 
will move out of the workplaces and into the marketplace to find out how the 
establishments procure their raw materials and how they market their finished products. 
And if there are any major differences between the recorded and the unrecorded ones 
within the marketplace.
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Interviews:
Employer 1. Owner of an Unrecorded Workshop. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 
3 March 1999.
Employer 2. Owner of a Recorded Factory. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima 12 
March 1999.
Employer 3. Owner of a Recorded Factory. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima 14 
March 1999.
Employer 4. Owner of a Recorded Factory. Personal Interview’. Shubra El Kheima 9 
March 1999.
Employer 5. Owner of a Recorded Factory. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima 9 
March 1999.
Mohamed. Worker in a recorded Factory. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 2 
February 1999.
Mohamed 2. Worker in an Unrecorded Workshop. Personal Interview, Shubra El 
Kheima: 10 February 1999.
Mahmoud. Worker in an Unrecorded Workshop. Personal Interview, Shubra El Kheima: 
10 February.
Mostafa. Worker in a Recorded Factory. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 3 
February 1999.
Mikhail. Worker in a Recorded Factory. Personal interview. Shubra El Kheima: 3 
February 1999.
Raga. Worker in a Recorded Factory. Personal interview, 3/2/1999)
N.B. For all interview entrees, only the first name of the interviewee was mentioned in 
order to guarantee anonymity.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PRODUCTION AND TRADE
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I attempted to show how the small-scale garment industry 
in Shubra El Kheima is characterized by sweatshop labour conditions with low wages, 
long working hours, no benefits or security and the systematic use of child labour. I also 
found that, although the unrecorded smaller establishments had bad labour conditions in 
general, the recorded larger establishments were also characterized by similar conditions 
and evaded labour regulations. These findings contradict the arguments put forth by 
advocates o f dual model theories.
In this chapter, it will be argued that the small-scale garment establishments in 
Shubra El Kheima cannot be categorized in terms of modem/ traditional dichotomies -  
adhered to by theorists of the dual model- and that they are, in fact rapidly integrating 
into the global textile industry. In the following sections, I compare the sources of raw 
materials, marketing channel, level o f cooperation and import challenges for each of the 
two types of establishments respectively to show the difference, and to what extent to 
these differences result from the recorded sector being more ‘modem’ or advanced. 
Although, there are differences between the recorded and unrecorded establishments in 
terms of sources of their raw material, marketing channels, and level of cooperation 
amongst each type of establishment, these differences do not fit the modem/traditional 
dichotomy Finally, the chapter ends with a summary of the findings in five sections of 
the chapter.
2. Comparing Sources for Raw Materials
As shown earlier in Chapters Two and Four, garment production in Egypt has 
been dominated by the state controlled sector and was heavily regulated through the 
control of cotton yam. Also, although liberalization has been the main policy since the 
early 1990s, the cloth trade and production continue to be heavily regulated by the state. 
Bearing in mind those regulations, the owners of the sample of recorded and unrecorded 
garment producers were asked to give estimates of the proportions of cloth used during
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the past year according to source. The results they gave were informative not only of the 
variance between workshops and factories, in terms of their raw material markets, but 
also of how the state regulations affect the garment sector in general. The results are 
summarized in the following table:
Table 8.1 Comparing main sources of cloth
Source of cloth Recorded Unrecorded% %
Egyptian cloth 
(wholesalers) 65 15
Egyptian cloth 
(brokers, retailers) 25 10
Imported cloth 
(legal-drawback system) 10 0
Imported cloth 
(illegal-through brokers) 0 75
Total 100 100
As can be seen from the above table (table 8.1) 90 percent of cloth used by 
recorded factories is Egyptian cloth bought either directly from wholesale markets, or 
indirectly through brokers, compared to only 25 percent in the case of unrecorded 
workshops. Legally imported cloth represented only 10 percent of input for the recorded 
factories. These quantities were procured through the drawback system, which allows 
factories to buy specific quantities of cloth only for use in the production of garments for 
exports. There are two main sources of cloth; cloth imported, either illegally or through 
the draw back system, and Egyptian cloth from the main textile companies. Egyptian 
cloth is sold to wholesale cloth traders or directly to the large-scale garment producers. 
The wholesale traders are the main source of cloth for the garment factories in our 
sample. The imported-cloth enters the market through two main channels, both illegal. 
The first is through smuggling, mainly from the free zone areas such as Port Said. The 
second is through large private sector garment producers, selling cloth that is allocated
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for re-export. The imported cloth is purchased by traders and brokers who then distribute 
it to workshops and collect the finished products.
It is important to note that the above are only the main channels for the 
procurement o f cloth. The cloth trade is more complex and involves other secondary 
channels and sources and mixtures of imported and local cloth. However, the evidence 
suggests that the unrecorded workshops and the recorded factories procure different cloth 
through different marketing channels. The former use illegally imported cloth procured 
through brokers and the latter use Egyptian cloth procured through legal wholesale 
traders and brokers for retailers.But the question remains as to why did these factories not 
make more use of the draw back system introduced by the government in the early 
1990s? The whole idea of the drawback system was to get around the problem of the 
high prices of local cloth and to try to encourage garment producers to export.
In fact two of the factory owners had tried to export through the draw back 
system, but it turned out to be a negative experience for them. According to them, 
detailed and illogical demands by the government agency supervising the draw back 
system made it impossible to continue successfully (Owner of Factory A, personal 
interview, 13/3/99; Owner of Factory B, personal interview, 13/3/99). A factory owner 
who went through the experience explained how the officials would refuse to deduct 
wasted cloth from the total quantity of cloth used to produce the pieces for export, 
regardless of the cutting pattern used. Thus, the owner would end up paying the full tariff 
for cloth that was not and could not be used (Owner of factory A, personal interview, 
13/3/99).
It seems that the only area of legislation and inspection that the government 
agencies actually imposed with any degree of strictness was those concerning the origins 
o f cloth used in garment factories. In interviewing garment factory owners it was 
revealed that prices for locally produced cloth and the heavy restrictions on cloth imports 
were a major obstacle to the survival of the industry. According to one factory owner, 
the government was suffocating the industry by restricting their access to imported cloth 
and forcing them to use the more expensive Egyptian cloth, through import restrictive 
regulations (Owner of Factory B, personal interview, 13/3/99). In prioritizing the 
problems they faced, all 20 in our factory sample were unanimous in their view that this
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was the main problem faced by the industry. The factories are put in an extremely 
difficult position. They are not allowed to use imported cloth except in very restricted 
quantities for exports. At the same time, the available Egyptian cloth is much more 
expensive than the imported cloth and the market is full of illegally imported cheap 
garments. Their products cannct compete.
According to factory owners, imported cotton cloth, without tariffs, can cost from 
20 to 30 percent less than locally produced cotton cloth. This might seem peculiar, given 
that Egypt is a traditional cotton producer and has a well-established cotton textile 
industry, with relatively low labour costs. How can imported cloth, with all the added 
costs of transportation and storage be that much cheaper than the readily available 
Egyptian cloth?
As I have explained earlier in Chapter Four, this problem is of historical and 
structural nature. The cotton produced in Egypt is of high quality and cost and occupies a 
niche in the world market. However, the emergence of the US as a major competitor for 
high quality cotton, and the general instability of the world cotton market has meant that 
large quantities of Egyptian cotton must be consumed locally. This is achieved by a ban 
on the import of cheaper lower grade cotton so the Egyptian textile mills are forced to use 
the more expensive Egyptian cotton. The result of this, added to the general inefficiency 
and low productivity of the large-scale vertically integrated public sector textile mills, is 
that the cloth produced has prices that are 20 to 30 percent higher than imported cotton 
cloth. Again the government solves this problem through a ban on cloth imports, thus 
forcing garment factories to use the more expensive Egyptian cloth. This system worked 
fine as long as the Egyptian consumer had no choice but to buy Egyptian made garments. 
As long as he/she was forced to pay 20 to 30 percent more than world prices, the industry 
was kept afloat. But the influx of imported garments through illegal smuggling has 
meant that the consumer can find cheaper and in many cases better quality garments than 
what he or she was forced to buy previously.
The location from which factory owners get the cloth is also indicative of some 
aspects o f the textile industry. In the survey conducted during fieldwork, 15 of our 20 
factories procured cloth from A1 Azhar wholesale cloth market in central Cairo, which 
seemed peculiar since some of the major cloth producers were situated in Shubra. A
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factory owner in one of the interviews explained that they used to buy their cloth from the 
wholesale market in Shubra but that they now depended mainly on the Cairo markets. 
Although this costs them more in terms of transport costs, the difference in terms of 
variety and quality are, according to him, worth the expenses. The Cairo markets get 
cloth from all over the country, and some of the best available Egyptian cloth is now 
produced in the private sector companies of the new industrial cities. The Shubra market 
has a much narrower variety. Another factory owner complained about the quality of 
cloth produced in Shubra, explaining that it has been deteriorating for years (Factory 
Owner C, personal interview, 15/3/99). The textile companies have not changed or 
modernized their machinery for decades. The cloth they produce is full of imperfections 
and a lot of it goes to waste. A possible explanation for this problem is that the cloth 
producers have depended since the 1960s on stable non-competitive demand from the 
major public sector cloth wholesale traders and distribution centers. Therefore there was 
very little pressure on them to modernize their plants. The increasing import competition 
of recent years has suddenly exposed them to competitive pressures from which they had 
been protected for decades.
In contrast to the sources of cloth for factories, outlined above, the main source of 
cloth for the unrecorded workshops comes either from contractors with specific job 
orders or from individual customers, again with specific demands. Contractors provide 
the cloth and the design and agree on a deadline with the workshop owners. They then 
collect the finished products at a set date. In the study survey, 75 percent of cloth used by 
workshops was reported to be imported cloth. When asked how they knew it was 
imported cloth, a whole host of distinct characteristics were described, including the 
quality of dying, the density of the threads, and other more technical characteristics. As 
one workshop owner explained, the source of the cloth is irrelevant to them, as the 
contractor is in full control of that aspect of the business, but that imported cloth was of 
better quality, producing less waste and solves the problem of chronic shortages that used 
to occur with Egyptian cloth (Workshop Owner A, personal interview, 12/3/99).
The contractors are always from outside Shubra, either from Cairo or Giza. 
According to the workshop owners they get their cloth from Port Said. The city of Port 
Said was completely destroyed during the 1973 war with Israel and the population was
159
evacuated. In 1976 the city, one of the main trading ports in Egypt, was made a free trade 
area, in an attempt by the government to revive the economy after the 1973 war and lure 
the refugees back to their city. The decision also coincided with the beginnings of the 
economic liberalization programme initiated by the Sadat regime. The logic of the 
government was to make the city a re-export center where goods would be imported with 
no tariff, would be processed in Port Said, and then exported again directly from Port 
Said without entering the local market.
In practice a completely different process took place. It became the main entry 
point for luxury goods for the Egyptian elite. Starved from imported consumption goods 
since the 1950s, their demand for imports was insatiable. Traders began to devise 
ingenious ways of getting the goods past the tariff controllers at the borders o f the city 
and into Cairo. A combination of corruption and turning a blind eye by the regime made 
this process into a booming trade. Because most of the items imported were luxury 
goods-electronic equipment, signature garments and exotic foods- they were not in direct 
competition with Egyptian industries, the process did not present any direct threat to the 
majority of local industries.
In the 1990s however cheap Asian cloth and garments became the major import 
items in Port Said. Since protectionist measures on other goods like foods and 
electronics were relaxed, traders turned to the last remaining bastion of protection, textile 
products. One of the contractors that I was able to interview explained that there was 
another important source of imported cloth, which was the drawback system (Sayed, 
personal interview, 15/3/99). As explained earlier, private sector companies are allowed 
to import cloth on the basis of the drawback system. This involves importing cloth, 
under government supervision, that must be used in the production of garments for 
export. It is not allowed to enter the Egyptian market. In reality what is said to happen is 
that through a combination of corruption, recording larger quantities of cloth as being 
wasted during the production process, the large garment producers are able to smuggle 
large quantities of imported cloth into the Egyptian market.
Another contractor said that he only dealt with workshops, and did not give work 
to the factories. He explained that the factories required papers for the quantities of cloth 
and even those who were prepared to take the risk, for the contractor the risk was too
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great, since if the cloth was confiscated, the whole cost would have to be borne by the 
contractor (Ahmed, personal interview, 1/4/99). There was also the question of 
flexibility in terms of quantities required and the time required for production. The same 
contractor explained that the quantities of work required varied with the amount of cloth 
available and the demands of the garment market traders. He described how, with the 
workshops he was able to employ one or two workshops if the job is small, but if he had 
a big job, he could employ ten workshops at the same time.
In contrast, the factories require fixed and regular quantities, which reduces 
flexibility in a changing and highly competitive market. The factories needed work 
orders that matched their size and capacity which are fixed. With the workshops it is the 
size of the work order that determines the capacity. The workshops act as adjustable units 
of production that can be used at will by the broker. As positive as the flexibility of the 
workshops may be to the contractors, it has an obvious negative aspect for the workshop 
owners. It means that they can be very busy for some weeks and have no work from the 
brokers in other weeks. This needs some explanation. Historically the way people 
clothed themselves in popular urban neighbourhoods was through buying the cloth 
themselves and taking it to a tailor who would cut the cloth and make of it whatever the 
particular customer required. This system has to a large extent become extinct in poor 
neighbourhoods, especially since the state stopped selling subsidized cloth to poor
■j “3
families in the early 1990s. The tailors have been replaced either by ready-made 
garments, or in the case of special clothing, by woman homeworkers sewing at home. 
The workshops also revert to this individual customer system, when not employed by 
brokers: clothes for weddings, special uniforms that workers have to provide for 
themselves, school uniforms that are too expensive on the market. Thus, as one 
workshop owner explained, when there is no work from the brokers, they turn to their 
neighbours:
One o f  the major government programs which affected the textile industry was the cloth rationing 
program, known as the Popular Supply program. By the late 1980s -before it was stopped- that program 
accounted for approximately 35 percent o f  the cloth sold by retailers domestically, which represented about 
25 percent o f  the total recorded production o f  cloth (Davies 1988).
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of course we do not profit much from individual work, but we have to 
keep busy and it also helps keep our reputation in the area. Although work 
with the brokers has been good recently, you never know (Employer 1, 
personal interview, 3/3/99).
In brief, the evidence suggests that there is a significant difference in the 
procurement of raw materials between the recorded factories and unrecorded workshops. 
Legality and state control force the former to consume mainly Egyptian cloth and 
deprives them from the wider variety and cheaper prices of imported cloth. Flexibility 
and legal invisibility allow the latter to have access to illegally imported cloth.
This finding might seem to contradict the arguments made in the previous chapter 
about the inadequacy of dualistic models with clear divisions between formal and 
informal sectors. However, although the above findings point to significant differences 
between the two types of establishments, and as will be shown in the remaining sectors of 
this chapter, the differences point to a complex picture that does not fit the usually 
assumed dichotomies of such models. Thus, for example, the assumption of the modem 
formal sector versus traditional informal sector is in this case reversed. In the next 
section the marketing channels for the finished garments from the unrecorded workshops 
and the recorded factories are compared, to see if the same difference exists.
3. Comparing Marketing Channels
Contractors are the major buyers of the finished garments produced by the 
workshops and factories of this study. However, in order to investigate the markets of 
their finished products, there is a need for understanding the marketing channels which 
concomitantly, will require a comparative investigation of the subcontracting 
relationships. Subcontracting is the most common relation between the buyer, whether a 
broker, a retailer or a wholesaler, and the workshop or factory. The contractor can 
provide:
A) rolls of fabric that the subcontractors24 cut themselves according to patterns or 
samples provided by the contractor.
B) pre-cut pieces of fabric that are assembled by the subcontractor.
24 That is the factory or workshop.
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C) instructions in the pattern or sample with the subcontractor procuring the inputs. 
The main provisions given by the contractors to the two kinds of establishments 
(subcontractors) are compared in the following table (Again percentages refer to total 
quantities and not units of production.)
Table 8.2 Comparing main provisions from contractors
Provisions 
from contractor
Recorded
%
Unrecorded
%
A) rolls of fabric 50 70
B) pre-cut pieces 10 25
C) instructions only 40 5
As we can see from table 8.2, the largest percentage of materials provided by the 
contractors in both cases comes in the form of fabric rolls which are completely 
processed by the subcontractor i.e. both factories and workshops get the bulk of their jobs 
through the same means. However, in the case of the factories, 40 percent of the cloth 
they used was bought directly from wholesale markets and was not provided by the 
contractor who only provided instructions and specifications for the job. This contrasts 
sharply with the case of the workshops, which got 95 percent of their cloth from the 
contractors, and the exact pieces to be produced. This difference could be attributed to 
the lesser number of workers, especially skilled workers that workshops have, as shown 
earlier in Chapter Seven.
Both factories and workshops tend to seek relatively long-term contracting 
relations. The average duration of the subcontracting relationship was three years for the 
unrecorded workshops and five years for the recorded factories. In both cases a majority 
of owners said they would rather keep working regularly with one contractor than find 
new customers. The reasons given are summarized in the following table.
Table 8.3 Main reasons given for focusing on one contractor
Reason Recorded
%
Unrecorded
%
Distrusting new contractors 60 70
Inability to simultaneously work with several contractors 35 20
Lack of knowledge in finding new contractors 5 10
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Table 8.3 shows that trust is a major element in the subcontracting relationship in both 
the case of the workshops and the factories. There was no difference in this between the 
legal establishments (factories), versus the unrecorded ones (workshops), which one 
would assume to be less protected and consequently emphasize this aspect of trust. 
Moreover, both kinds of establishments did not have major difficulties finding new 
contractors, i.e. the lack of a legal status -in  the case of workshops- was not an obstacle 
for workshops, nor was its presence a source of major advantage for the factories. 
Finally, the finding of the above section, regarding more flexibility of workshops, as 
compared to factories, was further confirmed, since only 20 percent of the earlier were 
not able to work simultaneously, versus 35 percent of the latter.
In terms of markets for their finished products, 60 percent of the sampled 
workshop owners named Attaba square market in Cairo as a major final destination for 
their products. There were of course other markets in Shubra and Giza in which their 
products were sold, but I decided to focus on Attaba, being the largest informal market 
place in Cairo, and on a national scale, and also because of the contrasts and 
contradictions it exposes being located in the very center of commercial Cairo.
Located between the Opera square in the European commercial center and A1 
Azhar square in the traditional commercial center, A1 Attaba square is a complex maze of 
markets. There are the established shops on the main high streets of the square, each 
block of shops specializing in a line of products, thus there is a mall of electronic 
equipment, a main street with up market women’s garments, a main street for engineering 
tools, another for home appliances, and so on. All these shops have proper window 
displays, pay rent and taxes, and display an array of both legally imported goods and 
locally produced goods. But all this only forms the borders, the lining surrounding a 
much bigger ‘informal’ market place on the streets, the alleyways, the public spaces and 
the gardens that lie between the shops and malls.
The informal market is also divided geographically according types of 
merchandise. Tools, ranging from screwdrivers and nails to electric drills are sold in one 
area, another area specializes in watches, toys, and small electronic gadgets, yet a third 
area specializes in plastic products from toilet slippers to toilet seats. However the largest
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open space in the Attaba area is reserved for garments, women’s accessories and shoes. 
Hundreds of vendors crammed next to each other, displaying their merchandise and 
constantly shouting out prices for items, and thousands of shoppers, meandering through 
the narrow walkways between the rows of vendors looking for the best buy. It is in this 
market and markets like it across the country that the poor buy most of their clothes and 
other requirements. It is here that both workshop produced garments and illegally 
imported garments are displayed and sold.
The market is completely illegal. Vendors do not have licensing, there are no 
verification papers for any of the items on sale, the grounds on which the items are 
displayed are not legal selling grounds and the vendors have no legal rights to use these 
grounds nor do they pay any rent or fee. The state’s attitude towards these markets is 
peculiar. This market is in the center of Cairo, probably one of the most heavily policed 
areas in the world. If they wanted to prevent the market from assembling they could do 
so with ease. Yet they let this illegal market assemble on a daily basis. If that was the end 
of the story one would conclude that the benevolent Egyptian state was encouraging such 
informal markets.
However, on a daily basis, and at random times, usually at peak hours of the 
market, an amazing ritual takes place. Without prior warning, screams are heard and the 
vendors start hastily packing their merchandise into bundles using the cloth on which 
they place their displays, they throw their bundles on their backs and run as fast as they 
can into the alleyways surrounding the market place. In a matter of minutes the cause of 
panic becomes apparent. Several police cars appear on the scene and soldiers begin 
catching those vendors who were too slow or unfortunate to escape. Both these vendors 
and their merchandise are thrown into the back of the police cars, which speedily takes 
around a dozen vendors and their stuff to the Attaba police station. Meanwhile the 
vendors in the alley ways hide in the building entrances for at least 20 minutes until they 
are sure that the raid is over, then they slowly return to the market, spread their 
merchandise again and life returns to normal. The merchandise of the unfortunate 
vendors is confiscated and the vendors spend the night in the police station, get slapped 
around, and are then set free (one wonders what happens to all the confiscated 
merchandise!)
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It seems that the state has realized that it cannot practically put an end to these 
informal markets, but at the same time it does not want to give them any sense of 
permanence and security. The police actions also seem to reflect a sense of insecurity on 
the part of the state. These bustling markets, in which absolutely nothing passes through 
the recorded economy, in which literally nothing has any legal visibility, seem to threaten 
the state’s sense of control and planning, and it therefore cannot let it alone, at the same 
time realizing that it cannot successfully repress it completely.
The following diagram (Diagram 1) provides a simplified summary of the routes 
taken by the finished products and the linkages formed in the marketing process of the 
garments.
166
Diagram 1
Garment
factories
Garment
importers
(illegal)
Unrecorded
workshops
fin ished
garments
Finished imported
garments
Shops
Finished imported 
lents Informal 
markets
Finished imported
garments
Finished
garments
Broker
<L>
JC
c /2
*s
<L>
-C
C /2
c
£
c<D
03GO
Garment
traders
167
However, the most important finding in terms of marketing channels described in 
this section is that both factories and workshops depend on subcontracting as the major 
source of market provisions and jobs. This is in line with the international trend 
described earlier in Chapter Five. It also means that both the factories and workshops are 
equally experiencing the world-wide trends in the garment industry and that unlike the 
assumption of dual models theories, the recorded sector is not more modem or better 
linked to the international trends in this industry.
4. Forms of Cooperation between Units
As described earlier in Chapter Six, it is important to remember that in our 
sample, the 60 unrecorded workshops are all situated in one residential neighbourhood -  
clustered- in Shubra El Kheima, whereas the 20 recorded factories are scattered within 
the industrial district of Shubra El Kheima. The difference in location and size of the two 
kinds of establishments reflected in difference in levels of cooperation within the two 
sectors.
4.1 Cooperation between unrecorded workshops
A high degree of cooperation was found between the unrecorded workshops. 
Cooperation took place in financing, information and the sharing of orders. Within 
finance, 80 percent of the workshop owners depended on rotating saving schemes to 
finance their activity. Typically a rotating scheme is composed of a small group of 
individuals who contribute a given amount or share to a pot periodically with the pot 
being given in rotation at the time of collection to a member of the group. In its simplest 
form, the frequency of contributions is linked to income flows and the order of rotation is 
determined by lot. Contributions may be made daily or weekly or monthly in other cases. 
After all members of the group have received a pot the group may disband, may add or 
delete members and then continue, or simply recycle with the existing membership. 
These non-official self-help financial groups are given the generic name of rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAS). ROSCAS are flexible and generate financial 
contracts that are tailored by the group. The size may vary from a handful of individuals
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to several hundred people. Members may be all women, all men, or a mixture of both 
and the amount of each person’s share can range from 10 Egyptian pounds to hundreds. 
Several individuals may divide a share by each paying for a fraction of a share and then 
splitting their pot proportionally. Informally, members may also renegotiate their 
position in the rotation to receive the pot in case of emergency.
In this research study, all the workshop owners (60) were members of Roscas, and 
48 of them depended mainly on these schemes to finance their work. All of these Roscas 
had a monthly rotation that ranged between one hundred and three hundred pounds. The 
different Roscas membership ranged from eight to fifteen members (some splitting the 
monthly payment and the pot), with pots ranging from 500 pounds to 6000. Of the 48 
workshop owners that depended on such schemes 41 (nearly 70 percent), said that their 
partners in these schemes included owners of other workshops in the neighborhood.
A second form of cooperation between workshop owners was sharing job orders. 
Workshop owners without job orders ask for orders from neighbouring workshops, while 
subcontractors who fear they will have problems meeting their deadlines ask others to 
help them complete the order on time. In all cases, owners who shared their orders 
declared imposing the same prices between their piece rate and the one applied to the 
workshops they shared the order with. In a number of cases, workshop owners admitted 
to taking more orders than their capacity allowed, so as to spread orders to different 
workshops.
In addition to finance and job orders, another form of cooperation between 
workshop owners involved the sharing of information. Owners shared information about 
potential contractors, the availability and location of new and second-hand machinery, 
labour problems and exchanging warnings about dishonest and unreliable contractors, 
which was the most important and frequently discussed issue. Table 8.4 outlines the 
different subjects of information shared between workshop owners, and the percentage 
they allocated to discussing each of these subject.
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Table 8.4 Subjects discussed between owners of unrecorded workshops
Subject Unrecorded workshops
%
Potential
contractors
30
Dishonest
contractors
60
Machinery 40
Labour 40
Other problems 20
4.2 Cooperation between recorded factories
Unlike relations between workshop owners, a much lower level of cooperation 
was reported by factory owners. In contrast to unrecorded workshop owners, factory 
owners did not share in financing schemes. Instead, the main source of financing was 
self-financing from personal or family savings (50 percent), followed by loans from 
commercial banks (30 percent), or a combination of both (20 percent). Similarly, there 
was no evidence of job order sharing, which contrasts sharply with the widespread 
sharing found between unrecorded workshops.
There was however a limited degree of cooperation in terms of sharing 
information. This was done through the association of Shubra El Kheima garment 
producers. This association met on a monthly basis to discuss industry problems. The 
effectiveness of the association was limited however due to its composition and 
government intervention. The association included all the registered garment producers 
in the Shubra El Kheima industrial district. This meant that public sector producers, 
linked directly to the public sector spinning and weaving establishments, and large-scale 
private sector producers, together with smaller scale independent producers are all 
lumped together in the same association. This makes it highly ineffective for the small 
factories, since they have much less influence and their interests usually clash with those
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of the large public and private producers. Another problematic aspect of the association 
is that it formed and controlled by the government, with representation from the ministry 
of industry. Hence, it is more representative of the governments’ interests than those of 
its members.
Interestingly, in contrast to the assumption of dual model theories, the unrecorded 
workshops, are experiencing the world-wide trend of clustering described earlier in 
Chapter Five more than the recorded factories. In other words, the ‘informal’ sector is 
displaying more ‘modem’ features resembling the international trend within the industry 
more than its ‘formal’ peers.
5. Import Competition
Just like cooperation, import competition was another arena were workshops and 
factories differed. As explained previously, one of the main challenges faced by the 
garment industry in Egypt is the influx of illegally imported garments into the market. 
This challenge however was not perceived by the unrecorded workshops in the same way 
as the recorded factories. The following table (table 8.5) compares the views of owners 
in the two groups on which aspect of imported garments was most challenging to them. 
Table 8.5 Main challenge from illegally imported garments
Challenge Recorded Unrecorded
% %
Price 80 25
Design 0 50
Quality 20 25
As can be seen in the above table the majority of factory owners (80 percent) 
prioritised low prices as the main problem they faced from imported garments. However, 
only 25 percent of workshop owners viewed price competition as the main problem. 
Design and quality were the main challenges for them.
On the one hand, although Egyptian designs were becoming more flexible and 
varied, this was done mainly through a process of imitation. The imported new designs
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would first make their appearance on the market and then the Egyptian producers would 
start imitating them, always depending of course on the availability of cloth. As one 
workshop owner explains, one of the problems with imported garments is not only their 
competitive prices but also the variety of patterns colours and designs that make the 
Egyptian products, according to him, of boring design and outmoded (Workshop Owner 
D, personal interview 1/4/99). The buyers are always asking them to imitate imported 
garments. On the other hand, the factory owners portray a contradictory position. As we 
have seen in section two of this chapter, one of their main problems is that of not being 
able to have direct legal access to cheap imported cloth. Yet, here we see that one of the 
problems for factory owners is competition from illegally imported garments (see table 
8.6). They want the state to ease its restrictions on the importing of cloth but increase its 
restrictions on the importing of garments. However, a more detailed examination of the 
position of factory owners suggests that the difficulties in obtaining cheaper imported 
inputs are a more significant factor to them than import competition.
Table 8.6 Factory owners on comparing problems with trade policies
Problem
Factory
owners
No. %
Tariffs and bans on imported inputs as 
main problem 14 70
Ineffective protection from illegally 
imported garments as main problem 4 20
Both of the above have equal negative 
impact 2 10
As can be seen from the above table (table 8.6), when the owners are asked which 
was the more significant problem, 70 percent argued that it was restrictions on imported 
cloth and other inputs, and only 20 percent argued that it was the need for more 
protection from garment import competition. This suggests that the majority of garment 
producers do not want the state to protect them from import competition but to allow
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them to compete fairly by removing restrictions on the procurement of the cheaper inputs 
available on the international market.
One factory owner argued that if they can import cloth and machinery freely then 
they can start to compete with the imported goods. According to him there is a long 
tradition of textiles in Egypt and cheap skilled labour, so there is no reason why they 
should not be able to compete with the Asian products (Factory Owner D, personal 
interview, 21/3/99). According to how he put it:
If the government really liberalized the market without favouring 
particular interests, then not only will we be able to compete, but we could 
become major exporters. But you know how our government is. It is a 
very frustrating situation. Instead of producing and expanding we are 
going bankrupt
The problem, according to this owner, is that the government keeps protecting the big 
companies, and even when it liberalizes, it does so to help the big import and export 
companies. The owner found it illogical that the government turned a blind eye to the 
importing of cheap garments and then prevented them from accessing cheap cloth on the 
international market.
The usual stereotype is that textile and garment producers, especially the small- 
scale and traditional ones are ardent supporters of protectionism. This stereotype was 
either wrong to begin with or has been changing dramatically in the past years. In the 
case of those opposing liberalization, the main arguments revolved around the issue of 
inefficiency. Thus, one owner argued that the industry needed major upgrading in terms 
of machinery and skills, before becoming capable of international competition. 
According to him, there should be a transitional period, during which the state should 
intensify its protection of the industry and help develop the technology and infrastructure 
and then open the market for competition (Factory Owner C, personal interview, 
15/3/99).
The above findings suggest that import competition is a major problem for both 
types of establishments. However the ways in which the recorded factories and 
unrecorded workshops were affected by import competition differed significantly. In the 
case of the former, being restricted in terms of raw materials and marketing channels
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leads to inability to compete with low price imported garments. In the case of the latter, 
restricted access to a wide variety of designs and types of cloth leads to difficulties of 
competing with the varied and constantly changing imported garments.
6. Summary
Through the findings of this chapter, it was observed that the recorded establishments 
procured their cloth from whole sale cloth traders and that the bulk of cloth they use was 
local, whereas the workshops received their cloth through brokers who provided them 
mostly with illegally imported cloth. It was also observed that the reliance on local cloth 
was creating severe crises for the factory owners. This was found to be because of the 
higher prices of Egyptian cloth in comparison with imported cloths. The result of the 
exclusive dependence on Egyptian cloth was that they produced garments that were not 
price competitive, neither with the imported garments nor with the locally produced 
garments that used imported cloth.
Unlike the presumptions of dual-model theories, subcontracting proved a major 
source of work orders for both factories and workshops. Although, there were 
differences in terms of the kind of subcontracting, the fact remains that the two types of 
establishments were predominantly subcontractors. A larger percentage of factories are 
only provided with instructions and design by their contractors than workshops, while in 
the case of the majority of workshops, both instructions and rolls of fabric are provided. 
And in both cases the provision of pre-cut cloth is rare. Both factory and workshop 
owners preferred to deal with a limited number o f contractors, with personal trust playing 
a major role in their choice. Hence, both kinds of establishments displayed the world­
wide trend of subcontracting.
It was also observed that the destination of the finished garments produced by the 
factories was the recorded, legal retail stores in Cairo and Shubra, whereas the destination 
of the garments produced in the workshops was the unrecorded, unregulated street 
markets such as Attaba in Cairo. The attitude of the state to these unregulated markets 
was found to be contradictory. Whereas the state allowed them to function, it continually 
harassed the market vendors, it neither wanted to destroy such markets nor was it 
comfortable with their growth and dynamism.
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There was a significantly higher level of cooperation between the unrecorded 
workshops, related to their clustered position. This included joint financing through 
ROSCAS, the sharing of job orders and the sharing of information. The difference in 
level of cooperation between workshops versus factories is related to the difference in 
size and location. Interestingly, the unrecorded ‘informal’ workshops were more in line 
with the global trend of clustering than the ‘formal’ factories.
As for import competition, for the factory owners, the main challenge from 
illegally imported garments was their low prices. In the case of the workshops, the main 
challenge was the superior design and quality. Although directly affected by the illegal 
entry of foreign cloth and garments to the market, most of the factory owners were not 
against liberalisation, although they did not think that this process would be implemented 
fairly by the government. However, although for different reasons for both kinds of 
establishments import competition was a major challenge that they were grappling with.
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Factory Owner B. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 13 March 1999.
Factory Owner C. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 15March 1999.
Factory Owner D. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 21 March 1999.
Sayed. Contractor. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 15 March 1999.
Workshop Owner A. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 12 March 1999.
Workshop Owner D. Personal Interview. Shubra El Kheima: 1 April 1999.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS
Back to the Beginning
In the introduction to this study we set out several basic arguments defending the 
significance of our choice of subject and location. It was first argued that the textile and 
garment industry plays an important role in the process of industrialization and that in the 
last three decades, the role of garment production for exports in a number of developing 
countries has been central in their integration into the world market and in their 
subsequent industrialization. Secondly it was argued that the textile and garment industry 
in Egypt presents a special case. Despite an economic reform program explicitly aimed 
at promoting exports and despite a large textile industry with a long history, the relative 
performance of exports has been poor, garments and textiles included. Thirdly it was 
argued that an important aspect of the textile and garment industry is that a large portion 
of this industry takes place in small and statistically unrecorded establishments. This 
presents two challenges to research. The first is a practical challenge: only direct 
empirical research can shed light on the nature and dynamics of such establishments. 
The second challenge is theoretical: the study of small-scale and statistically unrecorded 
economic activities has been dominated by dualistic theories that divide economic 
activities into “formal” and “informal” sectors. However, during the 1990s new and 
more fruitful approaches to the study of small-scale industries were introduced focusing 
on the dynamics of economic clusters, networks and global commodity chains.
The above three points shaped the choice for the location of the study and types of 
establishments investigated in this thesis. Shubra El Kheima, as described earlier in 
Chapters One and Six, is a major textile centre, with a large concentration of textile and 
garment producers, ranging from the massive public sector integrated textile mills to 
home-workers producing garments in the spontaneous urban settlements around the city. 
The development of the textile and garment industry, in Shubra El Kheima and in Egypt 
in general, during the past two decades, is taking place in the context of a policy of 
economic reforms with the stated aim of liberalization, the promotion of exports and 
foreign direct investment.
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However, as shown in Chapter Two the economic reform program was a failure. 
The historical context of the reform program was presented and the results, in terms of 
the promotion of exports and the attraction of foreign investments, were compared to 
those of other developing countries. The failure of economic reform and export 
promotion in Egypt, is in contrast to some of the major trends in the world textile and 
garment industry which were presented, in Chapter Three. These included changes in 
world trade, the growth of exports from developing economies and the changing trade 
policy environment were discussed. To explain the failure of Egyptian textile and 
garment industry, Chapter Four provided a brief history of the textile and garment 
industry in Egypt focusing on the special features of this development. It was argued that 
the role of cotton production, its links to the large public sector textile mills, and the 
economic dominance of the latter, created a vicious cycle shaping economic policy and 
preventing the emergence of an exporting garment sector.
In Chapter Five we turned to some of the theoretical issues involved in the study 
of small-scale production, focusing on the inadequacy of dualities of formal versus 
informal, modem versus traditional and segmented labour markets. More recent 
approaches involving the study of economic clusters and global commodity chains were 
found to be a more appropriate framework for understanding the dynamics of small-scale 
establishments that dominate garment production in the developing world.
Chapter Six introduces the methodology used in our empirical investigation. It 
was argued that the case study approach was the most useful research tool to tackle the 
difficulties of gathering data on small and statistically unrecorded economic units. The 
limitations and complexities of this approach were also discussed and a detailed research 
design was presented. The research aim was to compare statistically unrecorded 
workshops with statistically recorded factories in terms of labour, marketing channels and 
forms of cooperation. This comparison was done in detail in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
In which the main premises of dual-model theories were proved wrong. In addition, the 
findings of the two chapters revealed some of the latest trends in garment industry in 
Egypt.
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In the following two sections of this concluding chapter we discuss the possible 
meanings, significance and implications of the main findings presented in Chapters Seven 
and Eight.
1. Labour
Our findings suggest, firstly, that there are no significant differences in wages, 
working conditions, working hours and secondary terms of employment for the majority 
of workers in both the recorded factories and unrecorded workshops. The idea that 
workers in the former group are some how protected by a wall of labour regulation, 
contractual arrangements and rights was found to be inaccurate. Secondly the findings 
suggest that both types of establishments recruit their labour from the same pool. There 
is no significant segmentation of the labour market, no clearly demarcated dividing line 
that would place the workers in each type of establishment in a different category. 
Further evidence of this was found in the extensive mobility of workers both within and 
between the two types of establishments. Thirdly, the findings suggest that, although the 
labour process in the recorded factories employs a higher percentage of more advances 
tools, the differences in technology between the two types of establishments are limited 
and cannot be categorized clearly into ‘traditional’ establishments using rudimentary 
tools versus ‘modem’ establishments using advanced tools.
Let us examine some of the possible theoretical implications. The findings 
challenge some of the dominant dualistic assumptions in the literature on the so-called 
“informal sector”. The classical dual labour market model relied on several basic 
assumptions. Firstly, the existence of a clearly demarcated formal sector- a modem 
capitalist sector, legally registered, tax paying and most importantly, with a labour force 
that was registered, protected by labour laws and had access to social and security 
benefits. This sector, according to this model, contrasted with an informal sector- a 
marginal sector that was not registered, with a labour force that had none of the legal 
protection or benefits of the formal sector and had lower wages and productivity. The 
second assumption of this model was that the “informal sector” was seen as providing a 
means of livelihood for new entrants to the urban labour force who, through lack of 
opportunities and training, were unable to obtain employment in the “formal sector”.
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This means that the earlier sector acts as a transitional stage that allows workers to 
survive while waiting to get jobs in the formal sector. The informal enterprises were thus 
not depicted as a diverse and complex manifestation, but were interpreted as a simple 
survival mechanism. Informality, according to this model, became the term of reference 
for activities excluded from the modem sector and synonymous with marginality and 
poverty. The labour force of the informal sector was conceptualized in terms of excess 
supply of labour and not increasing demand for labour. Consequently, the limited ability 
of the formal sector to absorb the growing urban workforce was seen as explaining the 
proliferation of small informal enterprises in developing cities, which in turn explained 
how the urban poor managed to adapt and survive within the constraints of developing 
urban economies.
The findings of our research project contradict these assumptions, at least as they 
apply to the garment industry in Shubra El Kheima. As we have seen, most of the 
workers in the recorded factories (part of the “formal sector”) did not have the benefits 
and protection that is assumed in the model. There was mobility between the recorded 
and unrecorded establishments suggesting that there was no dividing barrier. Recent 
migrants were not a main source of labour for the unrecorded establishments and both 
types o f establishments had similar composition in terms of skill, gender, age distribution 
and were recruited from the same labour pool.
An alternative version o f the informal sector was provided by Hernando De Soto 
(1989, 2000). In his book, ‘The Other Path’ (1989), he attributes the origins of 
informality not to excess labour supply but to excess regulation of the economy. 
According to this view, the “mercantilist” state in developing countries survives by 
granting the privilege of legal participation in the economy to a narrow elite, including a 
privileged and protected labour force. Informality is the popular response that tries to 
break down this legal barrier. In ‘The Other Path’ informality is described as economic 
activity whose ends are legal but whose means are currently proscribed by inefficient 
bureaucracy, unjust laws, or arbitrary administrative decisions.
The problem with De Soto’s alternative approach is that it continues to cling to 
economic dualism, in this case idealizing the informal sector as the engine of market 
liberalization struggling against the mercantilist state. Whereas the classical model
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overemphasized the marginal character of urban “informal” activities and the associated 
poverty, De Soto’s analysis leaned in the opposite direction.
Our findings on the garment industry in Shubra El Kheima suggest that the 
legalistic division that De Soto focuses on is not a helpful tool in understanding the 
complexities involved. Thus, for example, how can we classify a factory that is legally 
registered yet most of its workers are illegally employed without contracts or benefits? 
The urban labour market in developing countries is much more complex and dynamic 
than is assumed in the simplistic dual labour market model. It cannot be divided into 
clearly demarcated sectors. The assumption that the functioning of a complex labour 
market can be reduced to any static model is very misleading. Dualistic constructions fail 
to appreciate that the zones of employment, as shown in our findings, are fluid and merge 
into one another.
The problem is not only of theoretical interest. There are important practical 
implications. Those who claim that there is a clear division in the urban economy 
between a ‘formal’ and an ‘informal sector’, including De Soto, call for the dismantling 
of state regulatory barriers. This call influences both international development agencies 
and governments. An important part of the economic reform program in Egypt is the 
dismantling of labour laws supposedly protecting workers in the ‘formal sector’. Yet as 
we have seen in our investigation of garment workers in Shubra El Kheima, these laws 
affect a tiny minority o f workers and do not act as a significant barrier between the 
different types of establishments. As noted earlier, labour laws only apply to workers 
with full time registered contracts. Even if we include the public sector industrial 
establishments, the laws apply to a small and shrinking minority o f the Egyptian working 
class. The majority of workers are beyond the rule of law, not merely through their 
employment conditions: wage level, mode of payment, working hours, vacations, social 
provisions, etc., but also through the lack of any regulations to guarantee their safety and 
to prevent their health being affected during and by the production process. The 
unprotected nature of labour is closely linked to the inability of the workforce to reduce 
its vulnerability by forming trade unions or associations.
If it is true that a growing majority of workers are not protected by labour laws 
and if the conditions of work, wages and rights for most workers are similar to those
181
found in our investigation of garment workers in Shubra El Kheima, then there would 
also be important implications for the workers movement. Traditionally trade unionists 
and leftists in Egypt, as well as scholars, have focused exclusively on workers in the 
large-scale factories.25 Influenced by dual labour market theories, they regarded other 
workers in small-scale and unrecorded establishments as marginal, backward and 
irrelevant to the struggle for worker’s rights. This led to an emphasis on fighting (in the 
case of activists) and studying (in the case of scholars), limited defensive battles 
concentrated in the large factories, without any serious attempts to link these battles to 
the demands and needs of the majority of workers in small firms, workshops and 
households.
Thus, by refuting the dual-model theories and proving its faulty emphasis on 
‘formal’ sector as a definite ending point within the development of labour markets, 
scholars and workers’ organizers can move on to an understanding and a strategy that 
takes into account the changing structure of the Egyptian working class and the growing 
importance of the small and unrecorded producers. Those workers in the small 
workshops and households spread throughout the spontaneous settlements of urban 
Egypt, would finally receive the deserved attention both on a scholarly as well as an 
organizational level. Equally, this would tend to fill a gap in the literature on Egyptian 
labour as well as the developments within so many industries that depend on the so-called 
‘informal’ labour.
2. Markets
The second area of research findings that is of utmost importance of in this thesis 
is the fact that the unrecorded workshops rely on illegally imported cloth whereas 
recorded factories rely on legally purchased Egyptian cloth. This finding suggests the 
existence of two relatively distinct systems within the Egyptian textile industry; the crisis 
ridden public sector system that produces Egyptian cloth, and the pervasive market of 
illegally imported cloth. The crisis ridden ‘traditional’ public sector system, is where the 
logic o f import substitution industrialization and state control was taken to the extreme, 
with the aim of producing locally and under centralized control all the different stages of
25 See for example; Posusney 2002; Assad 2002.
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production from the cotton seed to the finished garment. This system has been in crisis 
since the mid 1980s. Its inability to compete internationally, not only in the production 
o f garments, but even in the prices for cotton, cotton yam and cloth, the collapse of the 
Eastern European bilateral markets, and bureaucratic management, all these factors have 
made it impossible for this system to succeed. The policies of structural adjustment in 
the textile industry came as attempts o f the state to solve the above-mentioned crisis.
However, attempts to dismantle the old system proved politically impossible. The 
cotton growers depended on the state to buy their cotton at fixed prices and had no access 
to other markets. So the public sector spinning industry had to continue buying the 
cotton. The Spinning industry itself employed tens of thousands of workers and had to be 
kept floating, even if it meant draining millions of pounds in losses and debts. This 
meant that weavers, whether in the public sector or the private sector, had to be forced to 
absorb the cotton yam produced by the spinning industry. This transformed the problem 
to the next stage, with garment producers being forced to use the cloth produced by the 
weaving industry to keep the whole system afloat.
The type of reforms carried out by the government exacerbated the problems of 
the industry. It dismantled the popular supplies system, removed subsidies from the 
textile industry, and dissociated the industry from state financing. At the same time it did 
not relax restrictions on the import of cheaper yam and cloth and continued to force 
producers to use the products of the public sector industry. Thus, it removed the only 
secure market that the recorded garment producers had, while at the same time keeping in 
place the same controls over the raw material supplies. Hence, leading the industry as a 
whole into a state of chronic bankruptcy.
On the other hand, the demand for cheap clothing and cracks in the ability o f the 
state to restrict the entry of imported cloth and garments, are two factors that have led to 
the emergence of a parallel system over which the state has practically no control. 
Illegally imported cloth that is smuggled into the market, and cloth imported through the 
drawback system has found its way, through brokers and traders, to small-scale, 
unrecorded, garment producers. The garments thus produced are sold in informal 
markets at prices competitive with those of illegally imported Asian garments sold in the 
same informal markets. However, the fact that competitively priced cloth is restricted by
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its illegality, still meant that garments produced using it do not provide an internationally 
competitive bulk. Hence, between the overly-priced and often low quality Egyptian 
textile, and the illegality of imported cloth, the Egyptian garment industry has been 
facing major challenges both locally and internationally.
Thus, what this thesis has shown is that the timely and frequent questions about 
the peculiarity of the Egyptian case, in terms of not following the path of leading 
garment-producing developing countries like India, China, and some Latin American 
countries, can only be answered through tracing the development of the textile industry in 
Egypt. Looking at state regulations in the agricultural sector -affecting cotton- and in the 
industrial sector -affecting textile- one can deduce why Egypt has not been a global 
player within the garment industry.
3. Global and local commodity chains
Another area of research findings gives impetus to the more recent 
approaches to the study of industrial clusters in developing countries which is the global 
commodity chains perspective (GCC). The GCC perspective starts from the premise that 
analyzing the dynamics and structure o f global industries is a useful way to understand 
the local consequences of global changes for firms and workers (Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz, 1994). Commodity chains are composed of links that represent discrete, 
though interrelated, activities involved in the production and distribution of goods and 
services. In the case of the cotton garment industry, the focus of this thesis, the chain 
extends from the main raw material- cotton, to the production of textiles, then to the 
design, cutting, assembly and finishing of apparel, and, finally, to the distribution, 
marketing and retailing of garments (Appelbaum and Gereffi, 1994).
Our findings on garment production in Shubra El Kheima suggest that there are 
two distinct commodity chains involved. The recorded factories are involved in a mainly 
“ local” commodity chain starting with Egyptian grown cotton, spun and woven in 
public sector Egyptian textile mills producing cloth that is purchased by public and 
private sector wholesalers. The next stage in this local commodity chain is the purchase 
of cloth from the wholesalers, either directly by the factories, or indirectly by contractors,
26 Local here refers to Egypt and not Shubra El Kheima
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usually representing local retailers. The garments are then manufactured in the factories 
and then delivered to contractors or retailers and sold locally.
This commodity chain was found to be heavily protected at each of its stages. 
Thus, until 1994 the importing of cotton was prohibited and delivery prices set on a 
yearly basis by the state. The government determined the areas and cotton varieties to be 
planted and farmers had to follow orders. The state bought the entire crop at a fixed 
price, supplied its own spinning mills and exported the remaining lint. The public sector 
textile mills were guaranteed their supply of cotton at government controlled prices. 
Garment producers, both public and private had to use this textile. Similarly, the bulk of 
exports in the textile and garment sector were tied to long term bilateral agreements with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, uncompetitive markets as we noted earlier, and 
was in the main supplied by vertically integrated mills of the State sector (producing at 
this stage about a fifth of the output of ready-made garments (RMG)). It was still small - 
in the late 1980s- whereas Turkey's RMG exports rose rapidly to supply 45 per cent of 
the textile and garment exports, Egypt's provided 3 per cent.
The unrecorded workshops are involved in a different kind of commodity chain- a 
global commodity chain- starting with illegally imported Asian cloth, mainly from China, 
purchased by local contractors, subcontracted to the workshops. The finished garments 
are then collected by the contractors and sold in local “informal” markets and competing 
with illegally imported finished garments. This difference found within the garment 
industry in Egypt within pushes forward the GCC approach.
However in the case of our unrecorded workshops, although linked to the global 
market through illegally imported cloth, they lack many of the features that allowed 
similar clusters of garment producers in other developing countries to flourish. Firstly 
they do not have access to export markets. Their products are distributed exclusively in 
local markets. This curtails their potential for growth, especially if compared with 
producers in other developing countries who have access both to their local markets and 
to the growing and varied export markets. Secondly, their reliance on cheap illegally 
imported cloth, although allowing them to compete with illegally imported garments, is 
necessarily of a restricted nature. Pressure from the big textile mills results in repeated 
campaigns by the government to reduce the inflow of illegally imported cloth. A recent
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example is the abolition o f the free trading zone status o f the city of Port Said in 2003. 
Although such campaigns do not succeed in halting illegal imports completely, they do 
have a negative effect on the variety, quality and price of illegally imported cloth, thus 
reducing the competitive abilities of the unrecorded garment producers. Thirdly, because 
they are only linked to the global market through illegal imports, they are deprived of the 
central role played by lead firms in developing design, quality control, technical 
information and other inputs. As we have seen, in other developing economies garment 
producers have successfully inserted themselves in global commodity chains that are 
governed and shaped by lead firms, thus having access to innovation and information in a 
rapidly changing world market.
In most studies on global commodity chains the focus is on export markets and 
the role of buyers in the industrialized countries in shaping and governing the commodity 
chain. In fact it is the success of a number of developing countries in rapidly increasing 
their exports and utilizing imported inputs that triggered interest in this phenomena. The 
GCC approach identifies the main features of the context in which export manufacturers 
from developing economies tend to operate. These export manufacturers feed into chains 
that are organized by lead firms that source globally (Schmitz and Knorringa, 1999). 
These lead firms govern the structure o f the global commodity chain. To claim that every 
commodity chain has a governance structure is to say that each set of activities related to 
the design, production, and distribution of a finished good is controlled by a lead firm or 
set of firms that determine how the costs and benefits are distributed between the various 
actors involved in the chain. Governance refers to the way that power is exercised along 
the chain by the actors that define the terms under which other companies (i.e. suppliers, 
contractors) participate. It includes the criteria for accessing the chain and the rules 
governing participation, the process o f auditing performance and checking compliance 
with the rules, and the type of assistance (if any) provided to companies to help them 
comply (Kaplinsky 2000).
The role of global buyers in the upgrading of manufacturers has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in recent literature (Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2000). A recent empirical example of the role of global buyers was observed in the case 
of Ludhiana’s woolen knitwear industry in India. In the early 1990s a number of foreign
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buying houses began tapping into Ludhiana’s production base building new decentralized 
sourcing networks for woolen and cotton knitwear purchases by European and North 
American retail chains (Tewari,1999). In the case of Egypt, as we have shown in the 
case of our unrecorded garment producers it is not the price of illegally imported 
garments that represents their main competitive challenge but the design and quality of 
the latter. Thus not being linked to export markets negatively affects their ability to 
compete locally. It is local contractors that provide design and instructions, based on a 
relatively limited variety of cloths and depending mainly on imitation of imported 
garments.
4. Economic clusters
Finally, our findings suggest that there is a significant level of cooperation 
between the unrecorded workshops, including the sharing of orders, information and 
financing arrangements. This type o f cooperation was found to be lacking in the case of 
the recorded factories. These findings feeds into the important literature on clusters.
As noted earlier in Chapter Five, there is a consensus in the literature that the 
most basic advantage which firms (especially small firms) derive from being located in a 
cluster lies in local external economies. Where producers cluster, they attract specialized 
suppliers of inputs and buyers of their outputs; a pool of specialized workers emerges, 
and new ideas and practices diffuse rapidly. Numerous analyses of contemporary 
clusters confirm the relevance of these local external economies. The literature on 
contemporary clusters also suggests that in addition to the incidental external economies 
there is often a deliberate force at work: joint action amongst the clustering firms. The 
increase in cooperation between clustering firms is seen as a response to new competitive 
challenges, either in export markets or in import competition or a combination of export 
and import challenges.
One of the peculiarities of the Shubra El Kheima case is that although the city has 
a concentration of firms at each stage of the textile and garment industry- spinning, 
weaving, dying and garment production, our findings suggest that there are no backward 
links or vertical cooperation between the small garment producers and the local textile
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industry. Even the contractors, both for the recorded and the unrecorded establishments, 
are usually from outside the city.
This is in sharp contrast with for example, the case of the knitwear producers in 
Ludhiana, who are linked to a local knitting machinery industry and a local spinning 
industry producing a wide range of raw materials used by the knitters (Tewari,1999). In 
fact it is precisely through avoiding the local sources of raw materials that the unrecorded 
workshops of our study were able to compete with imported garments. This contrasts 
clearly with the positive effects of vertical cooperation found in a number of industrial 
clusters in India (Knorringa, 1999), Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999), Mexico (Rabellotti, 1999) 
and Brazil (Schmitz, 1999).
Another peculiarity in the Egyptian case is that very limited horizontal 
cooperation exists between the larger garment factories of our study. Although there is 
an association of garment producers in Shubra El Kheima, and although the majority of 
these producers face severe pressures from import competition, which is a usual catalyst 
for the activation of such associations, in this case it plays no role in promoting 
cooperation between garment producers. Government control and the dominating 
interests of the large public sector companies, make such an association useless to the 
smaller private firms. Thus, we can observe a situation where there is no significant 
horizontal cooperation between recorded garment factories, no significant vertical 
cooperation within Shubra El Kheima, and significant horizontal cooperation between 
small-unrecorded garment workshops.
In the literature on clusters a distinction is made between simple horizontal 
cooperation, which takes place between individual firms, and forms of collective action 
through associations. In our study it was only the former that was found and even that is 
restricted to the small-unrecorded workshops. Thus, only some of the features associated 
with economic clusters can be found in our case. Firstly, external economies due to 
concentration of establishments in the same geographical area such as the availability of a 
pool of labour with a variety of skills within the area, are clearly present in Shubra El 
Kheima. Yet, as we have seen, the combination of intense import competition due to 
smuggling, coupled with the restrictions on legally imported cheap cloth for the recorded 
garment producers and the relatively low quality and high cost of the cloth produced by
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the large textile mills, has prevented the emergence of an industrial cluster with the 
varieties o f vertical and horizontal cooperation associated with successful clusters in 
other developing cities.
Further Research
Based on these findings and conclusions several areas that require further research 
become apparent. Firstly, in the area of labour, it seems clear that there is a world of 
academically, politically and statistically invisible workers who probably form the 
majority of the working class. Understanding the changing structure of the Egyptian 
working class, its living and working conditions, its culture and its traditions of 
resistance, all these aspects require an accumulation of research projects in the many and 
varied slum cities and industrial areas o f urban Egypt.
Secondly, in the area of markets, in order to reach a deeper understanding of the 
economic dynamics of industrial production, distribution and consumption in Third 
World cities such as Cairo, a reliance on formal statistics will lead to inevitable 
distortions in the results and conclusions of research. A variety of case study research 
projects on the vast world of unrecorded small scale production and the links between 
this world and the global and local commodity chains within which it is embedded, will 
help economists in particular and social scientists in general reach a more accurate and 
useful understanding of the complexities and contradictions of Third World 
industrialization.
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